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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Much current research deals with incomplete knowledge using classical 
logics such as First Order Logics. One problem with classical logics is their 
monotonicity properties. In order to deal with this problem, there have been 
several proposals for augmenting classical logics to allow nonmonotonic 
reasoning. Some of these proposals are Nonmonotonic Logics [26], Default 
Logics [39], Circumscription [30], Autoepistemic Logics [31], Probabilistic Logics 
[33]. Default Logics, developed by Reiter in 1980, are based on an extension of 
classical frrst order logics. In this approach, first order logics are augmented with 
plausible inference rules, called defaults. However, these logics have several 
disadvantages. In order to remedy these disadvantages, several authors conducted 
some research to improve the original Reiter default logics for example [1, 2, 5, 8, 
18, 24, 47]. 
~ The motivation behind the development of classical logics some time ago 
such as first order logics was to put mathematical reasoning on a precise, formal 
foundation. The main reason was to establish a mathematical reason for us to deal 
with. However, such reasoning is based on precise and complete knowledge. In 
real life, humans rarely have precise and complete knowledge. 
The main problem of frrst order logics in dealing with incomplete 
knowledge is its monotonicity property. Monotonicity properties can be summed 
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up as adding new information to a system employing first order logics never 
shrinking the system. For example, if a fact Pis derivable from a set of premises 
S, then P is also derivable from each super set of S. Therefore, adding a new fact 
to the system never invalidates already derivable facts. 
Dealing with incomplete knowledge problems requires another approach. 
Incomplete knowledge reasoning is usually not monoton. In many situations, 
humans are forced to draw conclusions even though they have little information. 
The classic example is the flying ability ofbirds. If we are given information that 
Tweety is a bird, we tend to conclude that Tweety can fly since a bird typically 
flies. If further information is given that Tweety is a penguin, we certainly 
withdraw our former conclusion, but without withdrawing any of our former 
premises. However, we still have the ability to deduce that other birds can fly. 
Such forms of reasoning in which the system has the ability to invalidate 
conclusions whenever further information is given are called nonmonotonic. 
1.2 Nonmonotonic Logics 
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Since monotonicity properties are fundamental to the concept of first order 
logics, a new approach should be taken to deal with nonmonotonicity. Several 
logics have been developed to deal with nonmonotonicity properties. Those logics 
have some things in common. They are based on deriving conclusions in the 
absence of some information to the contrary. These kinds of inferences are called 
plausible inferences. Furthermore, when facts that are contrary to facts derived 
using plausible inferences are found and added to a system, the only facts 
"removed" from the systems are those that are contradictory. Other facts are not 
affected. 
1.2.1 Reiter Default Logics 
Default Logics were initially developed by Reiter [39]. The purpose of 
Default Logics is to extend first order logics to deal with incomplete knowledge. 
Furthermore, these logics have nonmonotonicity properties. 
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Default logics are more attractive because of their simplicity and the 
naturalness of their underlying ideas. This term is related to the process of 
inducing conclusions based upon patterns of inferences of the form "in the absence 
of any information to the contrary, assume ... " [3 8]. These patterns represent 
forms of plausible inferences. These patterns are needed to reason with 
incomplete knowledge about a world being modeled. 
The plausible inference rules in a default logic are of the form 
A:B 
c 
These forms are called defaults, noted S. Such rules are read as, "If A is provable 
and it is consistent to assume B, then infer C." These plausible inference rules may 
be applied by inferring C in absence of information refuting B, that is, if we do not 
have any evidence to believe -J3. Therefore, using these kinds of forms of 
plausible inference rules, it is legitimate to infer C for the given A. 
A, B, and C in a defaultS are closed well-formed formulae. They are called 
the prerequisite, the justification, and the consequent of the default, respectively. 
If C is logically equivalent with B, default d is called normal; otherwise default S is 
called non-normal. If C can be logically inferred from B, default S is also called 
semi -normal. 
Reiter and Criscuolo [42] investigated some phenomena that can be 
represented using defaults. They conclude that typical facts can be represented 
using normal defaults [42]. For example, the fact "typically, birds fly" can be 
represented using a normal default d of the following, 
bird(x):fly(x) 
fly(x) 
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This default is read as, "If a thing is a bird, and it is consistent to believe that it can 
fly, infer that it can fly." Therefore, in the absence of information to the contrary, 
ifTweety is a bird, then it is legitimate to conclude that Tweety can fly. 
Furthermore, when we fmd that Tweety is a penguin, and penguins cannot fly, then 
the plausible inference rule cannot be applied. So, we cannot infer that Tweety can 
fly. 
Formally, a default logic consists of a set of defaults and a set of closed 
well-formed formulae of first order logics. The set ofwell-formed formulae 
consists of facts known to be believed and called hard facts. A default logic is 
called normal if all defaults are normal; otherwise it is called non-normal. 
A default logic may result in sets of acceptable beliefs called extensions. 
An extension for a default logic is defined using a fixed point of an operator. The 
operator is defined in terms ofthree conditions: deductively closed in terms of first 
order logic; a superset of the hard fact set; and plausible inference using defaults. 
Moreover, it corresponds to a maximal consistent augmentation; i.e., no additional 
defaults can be applied without violating the consistency of the extension. Since 
several extensions may satisfy the three conditions and a maximal consistency, a 
consequence of a default logic is any well-formed formula that belongs to an 
extension. However, there is no mechanism for choosing among extensions for a 
default logic, if they exist. 
Reiter found a class of default logics that is very attractive [39]. These are 
normal default logics. He found that an extension for a normal default theory is 
guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, he also proved that these logics are semi-
monoton; that is, adding defaults to default theory may enlarge its extensions but 
adding hard facts may not enlarge extensions. 
However, default logics have some disadvantages, such as lacking an 
extension. Most arbitrary default logics do not have an extension, for example, 
non-normal default logics. 
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A theory that does not have an extension represents the worst form of 
inconsistency since it does not define the notion of theorems or consequents. 
Furthermore, an extension for a default logic is a set of beliefs that one may hold 
due to incomplete knowledge of the world being modeled. So, an extension can be 
viewed as a solution to an incomplete knowledge problem. Therefore, an 
extension for default logics is essential. 
Reiter [39] conjectured that all naturally occurring default logics are 
normal. However, as Reiter and Criscuolo [42] pointed out, this guess seems not 
to be true. They found that there are natural non-normal default theories. 
Additionally, most of these theories do not have any extensions. 
Several variations to Reiter default logics have been introduced such as 
Free Default Logics [2], Conditional Default Logics [8], Modified Default Logics 
[24 ], and Cumulative Default Logics [3 ]. 
1.2.2 Lukaszewicz Default Logics 
Lukaszewicz developed another approach to building an extension [24]. 
The main idea is to make an arbitrary default logic have an extension. Building an 
extension, called a modified extension for default logics in the Lukaszewicz 
approach is formally more complex than in the Reiter approach. Lukaszewicz 
defined a modified extension for a default logic using two operators. The first two 
conditions of one operator for the Lukaszewicz versions are the same as for 
Reiter's. The main difference is in the third condition, that is, in applying a 
default. The second operator is used to control an application of a default to build 
the extension. 
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Lukaszewicz also proved that modified extensions for arbitrary default 
theories have similar properties to the Reiter normal default theories. Two of them 
are existence of extensions and semi-monotonicity. 
1.2.3 Disjunctive £am Problems 
Lukaszewicz proves that the new version has at least one modified 
extension. Furthermore, he also shows that it has semi-monotonicity properties. 
There are some problems in using both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz 
approaches to build extensions. They fail to deal with disjunctive facts concerning 
prerequisites and justifications of defaults. Disjunctive facts consist of two or 
more facts which we do not have sufficient evidence to believe except in their 
disjunctive form. The first problem is disjunctive facts concerning prerequisites. 
For example, suppose that we are given two birds and one of them has broken 
wings. This example is formalized using a default logic with hard facts "two 
birds" and ''one of them has broken wings" and a default "typically, a bird can fly 
in absence of evidence that it cannot fly and its wings are not broken," that is, 
bird( x ): fly( x) 1\ -,broken- wing( x) 
fly(x) 
This problem has both an extension and a modified extension but both the 
extension and the modified extension contain "both birds can fly." This is counter-
intuitive since we know that one of them has broken wings. 
Another problem is that both Reiter and Lukaszewicz default logics cannot 
deal with default logics that have disjunctive hard facts in which the applicability 
of defaults is blocked due to no evidence to believe any of the prerequisites of the 
defaults. These defaults have the same justification. For example, suppose that we 
believe that either "John was born in the US," or "John was naturalized by the US 
government" but we do not have sufficient evidence to believe either of them. 
Formalizing this problem with two prototypical facts, "Typically, if a person is 
born in the US, the person is a US citizen" and "Typically, if a person is 
naturalized by the US, the person is a US citizen" using defaults, 
and 
born- in - US( john): US- citizen(john) 
US- citizen (john) 
naturalized- by- US(john ): US- citizen(john) 
US- citizen(john) 
we cannot infer that "John is a US citizen," using either the Reiter or the 
Lukaszewicz approaches. 
1.2 .4 Related Works 
Much research has been done in order to improve the original Reiter work, 
for example Free Default Logics [2], Conditional Default Logics [8], Ordered 
Default Theory [ 14 ], Possibility Default Reasoning [ 11 ], Cumulative Default 
Logics [3], and Disjunctive Defaults [18]. Free Default Logics developed by 
Besnard supposedly deal with modus tollens. These logics let the system admit 
inferences similar to contra-positive in First Order Logics, but they are 
accomplished by using defaults, free defaults to be precise. However, these logics 
have ~ndesirable features, namely deriving facts without supporting facts. 
: In 1987, Etherington conducted research in order to fmd a sufficient 
condition for semi-normal default theories to have extensions [ 14]. First, he 
defined an order to check whether "circularities" exist within semi-normal default 
theories. He found that semi-normal default theories have at least one extension if 
they are ordered; i.e., no circularity occurs. He also presented a procedure to 
generate extensions based on a series of successive approximations. As Reiter 
showed, Etherington also found that this procedure may or may not converge to an 
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extension. Furthermore, this procedure may not be computable due to first order 
provability. However, he proved that the procedure will converge to an extension 
for a class of default theories [ 14 ]. 
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In 1991, Chen figured out some disadvantages of the Etherington approach 
[5]. He found that the Etherington original work for orderedness of a default 
theory depends on a particular representation of both the hard fact set and the 
default set. To remedy these problems, first he defined a minimal form, and then 
he defined a new approach to order a semi-normal default theory. In his approach, 
a default theory is represented using a "canonical" form. A default theory Cj)' = 
(~, L\') is a canonical form of a default theory en=(~, L\) if its hard fact set is 
represented using a minimal form, and if for each default o = 4!e L\, there is one 
O'= A~~· e.1', where A', B', and Care minimal forms of A, B, and C, respectively. 
For semi-normal default theory which is in the canonical form, he presented a 
well-defined order relation similar to the Etherington approach. He also proved 
that every semi-normal default theory in the canonical form has an extension. 
Furthermore, he also provided an algorithm that converges to generate an 
extension for any ordered, fmite, semi-normal default theory. 
Brewka addressed the cumulativity of default theories [3 ]. The Reiter 
Default Logics are usually not cumulative. Brewka developed logics called 
Cumulative Default Logics in order make default theories cumulative. The 
Brewka approach dealt with assertions instead of simple well-formed formulae. 
(An assertion is a pair of well-formed formulae.) In doing so, he defined the 
notion of derivability using assertions as an extension of first order derivability. 
He found that the new approach has semi-monotonicity properties. In addition, he 
also addressed inconsistency between justifications of defaults that may lead to a 
counter-intuitive result [3 ]. 
In 1991, Gelfond et al. developed a totally new logic, called Disjunctive 
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Default Logics, to deal with "disjunctive infonnation" [18]. The new approach not 
only changes a default theory, the way of deriving extensions, but also changes the 
way of representing defaults. The motivation behind this logic is that a difficulty 
was found in attempts to use defaults in the presence of disjunctive infonnation as 
observed by Lin and Shoham in [22]. To handle disjunctive infonnation, Gelfond 
et. al. used a disjunctive default of the fonn 
A:B 
instead of the Reiter simple default. A disjunctive default theory is a set of 
disjunctive defaults. They defined an extension for disjunctive default theories as 
follows. A set of sentences E is an extension for a disjunctive default theory Cj) "if 
it is one of the minimal deductively closed sets of sentences E' satisfying the 
condition: For any ground instance of any [disjunctive] default in Cj)," if A e E' and 
-,B !2: E, then q e E' for some i, where l~i~. They demonstrated that a related 
disjunctive default theory has a Reiter default theory. However, an extension for a 
disjunctive default theory is not generally equivalent with an extension for the 
related Reiter default theory. In other words, it is possible that a disjunctive 
default theory has an extension but the related Reiter default theory does not have 
an extension. So, the classes of extensions for both approaches are not similar. In 
addition, there is an unintended result using this new approach as we see in 
Chapter 3. 
Besides default theories, there are several theories to deal with 
nonmonotonicity properties. One of them is Nonmonotonic Logics [26]. In these 
logics, NMLs for short, a language of first order theory is augmented with a modal 
operator ~to capture the notion ofnonmonotonicity. It is read as "is consistent." 
So, an expression fK.4 is read as "A is consistent." For example, an expression 
'Vx bird(x) " ~fly(x) ~ fly(x), 
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is read as "For all x, if x is a bird and if the fact that x is able to fly is consistent 
with everything else that is believed, then we infer that xis able to fly." One of the 
main differences between NMLs and Default Logics is that in Default Logics, such 
nonmonotonic expressions, called defaults, are rules of inferences, whereas in 
NMLs, such a nonmonotonic expression is in the language. McDermott and Doyle 
defmed an extension for an NML, i.e., a set of all theorems, as the intersection of 
all its fixed points. That is, if \r{is an NML, then S is a fixed point of <I'{_ if 
S = Th(<l'{_ u {£,\(A 1--,AE S} ). 
The intuition behind this is to capture the notion that if -,A is not derivable, then 
infer ~ which intendedly means "A is consistent." Some problems can be solved 
using NMLs. However, this approach has some disadvantages. One of the main 
problems is that the operator ~can be miscarried to capture the intuitive notion of 
consistency. For example, an NML <I'{_= {~P, -,P} is consistent [40]. 
To remedy these problems, McDermott attempted to develop several 
stronger approaches. These approaches are based on various standard modal 
logics as opposed to the previous approach which is based on a first order logic. 
Unfortunately, these attempts seem to result in a weak characterization for operator 
~based on T and S4 and to result in a monotonic logic based on SS [40]. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to develop a new approach to solving 
problems with disjunctive facts concerning prerequisite and justification of 
defaults. To solve disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications, we will 
develop two kinds of sets of beliefs. The first is a consistent set consisting of 
(1) hard facts, (2) all justifications and conclusions of applicable defaults, and (3) 
all derivable facts in terms of first order logics. It is an assumption set for 
applying defaults and is called an assumption set. The second set is a subset of the 
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first set but without justifications. This set is related to a Reiter's belief set, that is, 
an extension containing all facts that are to be believed. Assuming that the set of 
hard facts is consistent, then both an assumption set and extension are consistent. 
To solve disjunctive hard fact problems concerning prerequisites, we will 
build sets of equivalence classes of defaults having the same justification. For 
each set, we associate a set whose elements are disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites of the defaults. The applicability of defaults is associated to the sets. 
For example, a default can be applied if its related set is not disjoint with an 
extension. So, applicability of defaults does not depend on individual defaults but 
on the sets of classes built from defaults having the same justifications. Therefore, 
their applicability is not restricted to their prerequisites, but to the sets. Hence, 
these defaults are more applicable than to those of both the Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz approaches. This new approach can be achieved by strictly 
following the above development of the two sets: an assumption set and an 
extension. 
In adition, a survey of complexity analysis of the new approach will be 
conducted. 
The main benefit of the new approach is that every default logic has an 
extension. Furthermore, the new logics have semi-monotonicity properties. In 
addition, the logics can deal with disjunctive fact problems adequately. 
CHAPTER II 
OVERVIEW OF DEFAULT THEORIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Default theories are nonmonotonic theories developed by Reiter. In 
general, the purpose of default theories is to enhance derivability of first order 
theories to deal with incomplete knowledge. These theories extend the logical 
language by using defaults as additional inference rules inducing the so-called 
extensions of classical logical theories. The defaults are used to extend a logical 
knowledge base to belief sets, called extensions, containing non-logically 
derivable facts in terms of the first order theories from the "known-to-be-true" 
knowledge base [39]. 
Default theories introduce kinds of non-logical derivable inference rules 
called defaults. Such inference rules, sometimes called plausible inference rules, 
are imbedded in first order theories to deal with incomplete knowledge. For 
example, the problem "the ability of birds to fly" is represented using a form 
bird( X): fly( X) 
fly(x) 
which is to be interpreted as: "If a thing is a bird and it is consistent to believe that 
it can fly, we can infer that it can fly." The phrase "it is consistent to believe that" 
is read as "there is no proof to the contrary." Therefore, ifTweety is a bird and 
there is no proof in the knowledge base that Tweety cannot fly, the inference rule 
can be applied by inferring that it can fly [39]. However, when the fact "Tweety 
12 
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cannot fly" is derivable, for example by adding facts "Tweety is a penguin" and 
"penguins cannot fly" to the system, the plausible inference rule cannot be applied 
any more. So, the fact "Tweety can fly" is not derivable further. This means that 
adding facts to the knowledge base may invalidate some inferred facts using 
defaults; i.e., this logic is not monoton. 
Reiter finds an interesting class of default theories, called normal default 
theories. He proves that every normal default theory has at least one extension. 
Furthermore, he also shows that normal default theories have a semi-monotonicity 
property. That is, adding some defaults to the system may augment extensions, but 
it never shrinks the previous extensions. 
In general, default theories, for example non-normal default theories, need 
not have an extension. In order to make an arbitrary default theory have an 
extension, Lukaszewicz restricts the applicability of defaults [24 ]. He proposes an 
alternative approach to building an extension so that every default theory always 
has an extension. He calls it a modified extension. He proves that modified 
extensions have semi-monotonicity properties. 
In the next two sections we will present and review both the Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz versions. Materials found in the next two sections are mostly taken 
from the original Reiter and Lukaszewicz works [24, 39]. Furthermore, all proofs 
to the theorems can be found in the references. 
2.2 Reiter Default Theories 
In this section, we present some definitions used to develop the formal 
default theories in Reiter's original works. As Reiter found, a special class of 
default theories will be identified. Furthermore, we also present some properties 
that belong to this class such as the existence of extensions and semi-monotonicity. 
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2.2.1 Formal Definitions 
As previously mentioned, the purpose of default theories is to extend the 
derivability of first order theories. In order to do that, the language used in default 
theories is a first order language. All conventions in the first order language are 
used. For example, plain capital characters like P and Q belong to the first order 
language. They are well-formed formulae. Meanwhile, italic capital characters 
like A and B belong to "meta-variables," denoting well-formed formulae. 
Furthermore, terms in the first order theory are referred to, such as closed well-
formed formulae, subformulae, logical validity, logical implication, consistency. 
In addition, ~S) denotes the well-formed formulae in a first order language~ 
that are consequences of or inferable from the set S. See the appendix for more 
detail. 
Defmition: Default theory language 
A default theory language is any first order language Sl, All terms such as 
terms and well-formed formulae are included in a default theory language. 
In default theories, defaults are used to extend non-logical derivable 
inference rules. Defaults are defmed by the following. 
Definition: Defaults 
Defaults are of the forms: 
O= A(x):B(x) 
C(x) ' 
where A(x), B(x), and C(x) are closed well-formed formulae of a first order 
language SL, called a prerequisite, a justification, and a consequent of default o, 
respectively. 
A default o = A(x):B(x) is interpreted as: "If A(x) is believed and it is 
C(x) 
consistent to believe B(x), then infer C(x)." 
Example 2.2.1: 
The ability of birds to fly can be represented using a default o, where 
0 bird(Tweety):fl}(Tweety). 
fl)'(tweety) 
The default o is read as: "IfTweety is a bird and it is consistent to believe 
that it can fly, then infer that it can fly." 
In the definition of defaults, their prerequisites, justifications, and 
consequents are closed well-formed formulae. For convenience, we may need to 
"classifY" some defaults into a set of the same nature in forms of defaults. For 
example, if we have some birds, we may want to abbreviate the default example 
above as a group of defaults of the same nature as the following. Suppose that 
there are some birds: Tweety, Clyde, etc. A default set for these birds is: 
{o
1 
= bird(Tweety):fly(Tweety), 02 = bird(Clyde):fly(Clyde), ... }. 
fly(Tweety) fly( Clyde) 
These defaults can be represented using a set of defaults 3, 
- bird(x):fly(x) o = { I x = Tweety,x =Clyde, ... }, 
fly(x) 
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where x is a symbol that does not belong to the first order language. Of course, the 
symbol x does not appear in any well-formed formulae A, B, and C. For short, this 
set of defaults is abbreviated using, 
3 = bird(x):fly(x) 
tly(x) 
and we will write 3 as a simple o. 
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From now on, by "a default" we mean a set of defaults unless otherwise 
specified. However, when applying a default, the resulting well-formed formula is 
closed. 
In general, defaults can be classified into two classes: normal defaults and 
non-normal defaults. A default o is called normal if its justification is logically 
equivalent with its consequent, that is, C(x) = B(x). Otherwise, it is called non-
normal. For example, the default to represent the ability of flying birds above is 
normal. A subclass of non-normal defaults can also be identified; if a consequent 
of a default can be logically implied from its prerequisite, that is, B(x) logically 
implies C(x). These defaults are called semi-normal. 
Example 2.2.2: Non-normal defaults 
A default 81, where 
o = P:Q 
I R , 
is non-normal, whereas a default ~' where 
8 = adult(x):student(x)A--.married(x) 
2 
-,married(x) ' 
is semi-normal. 
According to Reiter and Criscuolo [42], typical facts such as "prototypical 
facts" can be represented using normal defaults. For example, facts such as 
"Typically, birds fly" known as the ability of birds to fly can be represented using 
a normal default o, where 
8 = bird(x):fly(x). 
fly(x) 
A default theory consists of two sets. The first is a set of closed well-
formed formulae g; of a first order language Sl This set describes all facts that are 
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known about the world being modeled. It is called a hard fact set and is intended 
to represent the "known-to-be-believed" knowledge. The second is a set of 
countable, possibly fmite, defaults a to be used to infer facts beyond first order 
derivability. It is intended to express potential beliefs. The prerequisites, 
justifications, and consequents of all defaults in the set a are closed well-formed 
formulae of the same first order language st.; The following is the defmition of a 
default theory. 
Definition: Default theories 
A default theory en is a pair (a;, a) of a set of closed well-formed formulae 
a; of first order language 'luanda countable, possibly finite, set of defaults a 
whose prerequisites, justifications, and consequents are well-formed formulae in 
the same first order language St.; 
A default theory is called normal if and only if its default set consists only 
of normal defaults. Otherwise, it is non-normal. Normal default theories are an 
important class of default theories. They have some interesting properties, as we 
see later on. 
In the Reiter approach, a default theory may result in a set. This set consists 
of all facts derivable using frrst order theories and defaults. Reiter defines this set 
in terms of a fixed point of a certain operator based on three conditions. 
Furthermore, it is the smallest set satisfying the three conditions. The set is called 
an extension for a default theory. 
An extension is defined as follows. 
Defmition: Extensions for default theories [39] 
Let en = ( a;, a) be a default theory and S be a closed well-formed formula 
set of a first order language St.; Suppose that r(S) denotes the smallest set 
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satisfying the three following conditions: 
D 1 g:!:: r(S); 
D2 ~r(S)) = r(S); and 
D3 if 0 = A(x):B(x) E ~. A(x) E r(S), and -,B(x) ~ S, then C(x) E r(S). 
C(x) 
A closed well-formed formula set CE is an extension for Cj) if and only ifCE = r(CE). 
This defmition provides criteria for a closed well-formed formula set CE to 
be an extension. The frrst criterion is that what is known about the world being 
modeled is in any extension. The second criterion is that any extension is closed 
under first order theories; i.e., it is deductively closed or l'hs(SCE) = CE. The third is 
related to applicability of a default o. It says that if A is in an extension CE and it is 
consistent to believe B (i.e., -,B~ CE), then C must be in the extension CE. In this 
case, the default o is called applicable. In addition, the smallness of the extensions 
ensures that no fact is added into any extension for no reason, i.e., without 
violating the three conditions. 
Example 2.2.3: 
and 
Let Cj) = (g;, L\ = { o}) be a default theory, where 
g: = {bird(Tweety)}, 
0 = bird(x):fly(x). 
fly(x) 
That is, all we know is that "Tweety is a bird," and we have only one default, a 
typical fact, that is, "if a thing is a bird and it is consistent to believe that it can fly, 
infer that it can fly." Therefore, an extension for Cj) must contain "bird(Tweety)." 
Furthermore, since o can be applied, it also contains "fly(Tweety)." An extension 
for the default theory Cj) is 
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tE = Th_{~u {fly(Tweety)}). 
Now, we prove that CE is the only extension for Cj). Let E be another extension for 
Cj). Then~ c E, and fly(Tweety) e E since o is applicable. Furthermore, no other 
default is applicable. So, E = CE. 
Furthermore, a fact that is believed, is in an extension, if and only if it is 
either a hard fact, a consequent of applicable defaults, or monotonically derivable 
from the set of hard facts and consequents of applicable defaults. In case of an 
empty default set, an extension is the first order derivability. That is, (E = ~~ 
is an extension for default theory (~, ~). 
The idea of the notion of extensions for default theories is that defaults may 
result in some facts that cannot be derived in terms of first order theory due to 
incomplete knowledge. In the definition above, there is no mechanism to 
determine which defaults should be applied first. The applications of defaults in 
different orders may result in different extensions. Therefore, an extension for a 
default theory may not be unique. Furthermore, it will be interpreted as an 
acceptable set of beliefs that one may believe about the incomplete knowledge 
world being modeled [39]. 
Example 2.2.4: 
and 
.Let Cj) = (~, ~ = { 01, ~}) be a default theory, where 
~~= {studentGohn), adultQohn)}, 
0 = student(x):-.married(x) 
1 
-.married(x) ' 
02 = adult( x ): married( x) . 
married(x) 
That is, the facts are "John is a student" and "John is also an adult" and defaults are 
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"Typically, students are not married" and "Typically, adults are married." It can be 
shown that this default has two extensions, that is 
and 
~ = ~~ u { marriedGohn)} ). 
In <EI> default ~ is not applicable; i.e., it is not consistent to believe 
"marriedGohn)" since "-,marriedGohn)" is derivable in <E1• A similar reason is 
also applied to <E2. 
2.2.2 General Properties .Q[Default Theories 
Reiter presents a way of characterizing a closed well-formed formula set to 
be an extension for a default theory. It can be used to characterize an extension. 
However, this characterization cannot be used to construct an extension. It is 
given in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.2.1: Characterization of Extensions [39] 
Let <J) = (~, .1) be a default theory and <E be a set of closed well-formed 
formulae of a first order language Sl, Suppose that E0, Et. E2, ... is a sequence of 
closed well-formed formula sets such that 
Eo=~, 
and, fori> 0 
A(x):B(x) 
Ei = ~Ei_1) u {C(x) I o = C(x) e.1, A(x)eEi-I and -,B(x)~<E}. 
The set <E is an extension for CJ) if and only if 
3i 
:::::: 
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The beauty of this theorem is that it gives a more intuitive characterization 
of an extension for a default theory. For a given closed well-formed formula set, 
we can construct a sequence of closed well-formed formula sets. To check 
whether the given set is an extension for the default theory, we need only to check 
the union of all sets in the sequence. If the given set is identical with the union, 
then the given set is an extension for the default theory. 
The candidate set for an extension is involved in constructing the sequence 
of well-formed formula sets,. That is, the candidate set is referred to in the 
construction. (It can be seen in the occurrence ofCE in the construction ofEi.) 
Therefore, this theorem cannot be used to construct an extension since we need to 
have an initial candidate set. 
Example 2.2.5: 
Let SO= (Cf, .1 = {o}) be a default theory, where Cf= {bird(Tweety)} and 
o = bird(x):fly(x). As previously mentioned, this default theory has exactly one 
fly(x) 
extension CE, 
CE = Th~u {fly(Tweety)}). 
The sequence for this extension is E0, El> ~' ... , where 
E0 = {bird(Tweety)}, 
E 1 = Th~0) u {fly(Tweety)}, 
~ = ~E1) u {fly(Tweety)} = ~E1), and 
Ei = l'ht~), for i ;::: 3. 
Therefore, verifying the result, we get 
In general, default theories are not monoton. By the term "not monotonic," 
we mean is the following. Let q) = (Cf, .1) be a default theory with an extension 
CE. Suppose that q)' =(a:',~') is a default theory with Cf!:: ~and~ r;: ~·. It is 
usual that there is no extension CE' for q)' such that CE !:: CE'. 
The following example will show these nonmonotonicity properties more 
precisely. 
Example 2.2.6: 
and 
Let CJ) = (Cf, ~ = { o}) be a default theory, where 
Cf= {bird(Tweety)}, 
0 = bird(x):fly(x). 
fly(x) 
As shown previously, this default theory has only one extension CE, where 
CE = Thi,Cf u { fly(Tweety) } ). 
Now, consider a default theory Cj)' =(a:',~'), where 
~ = Cf u {penguin(Tweety), 'r:/x penguin(x) ~ ...,fly(x)} 
and 
.1'=~. 
That is, besides "Tweety is a bird," we also know that "Tweety is a penguin" and 
"penguins cannot fly." An extension for q)' is CE', where 
CE' = Thi,~), 
since default 0 is not applicable in this default theory. Furthermore, there are no 
other extensions for Cj)'. Therefore, Cf ~ a:' and ~ c ~·, but CE (t CE'. 
Default theories may result in an inconsistent extension. In the Reiter 
approach, the consistency of extensions relies on the consistency of the hard fact 
set. Furthermore, defaults cannot introduce inconsistency. 
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Theorem 2.2.2: Inconsistent extensions [39] 
A default theory has an inconsistent extension if and only if its hard fact set 
is inconsistent and it is a unique extension. 
That is, if a default theory has an inconsistent extension, then it is the only 
extension for the default theory. For this reason, we will not be concerned with an 
inconsistent hard fact set from now on. Therefore, we assume that a hard fact set 
is always consistent. 
It is in question whether adding derivable facts from an extension for a 
default theory can enlarge the extension. This question can be answered by the 
following theorem, which is that adding facts that are derivable from an extension 
does not expand the extension. 
Theorem 2.2.3: [39] 
If a default theory Cj) = (~, a) has an extension <E, then it is also an 
extension for every default theory Cj)' = (Cf', L\), where~~ Cf' c CE. 
2.2.3 Normal Default Theories 
In general, default theories lack extensions. Those theories do not define 
the notion of consequences. The following example is a simple non-normal 
default theory that does not have an extension. 
Example 2.2.7: A default theory not having extensions. 
and 
Let 'D = (~, a = { o}) be a default theory, where 
~= {P}, 
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That is, the fact is a proposition constant P and the default is "If P is believed and it 
is consistent to believe Q, then infer -,Q." Suppose that this default theory has an 
extension. Therefore, a candidate set must contain P. There are only two 
candidates: E1 = Th({P}) and~= Th(Cfu {-,Q}) = Th({P, -,Q}). E1 cannot be 
an extension since the default is applicable, causing -,Q in E1, though it is not. 
Furthermore, E2 cannot also be an extension since the default is not applicable, 
causing -,Q not in E2, though it is. Thus, ']) does not have an extension. 
Reiter found a class of default theories that has some interesting properties 
[39]. This class consists of normal default theories. Recall that a default theory is 
called normal if and only if its default set consists of normal defaults. 
Some interesting properties are the existence of extension, semi-
monotonicity, and orthogonality of extensions. For normal default theories, the 
existence of extensions is guaranteed. That is, every normal default theory has at 
least one extension. Semi-monotonicity is another property of normal default 
theories that can be used to deal with incomplete knowledge. 
In the rest of this section will discuss those properties of normal defaults. 
The most important property is the existence of extensions for normal default 
theories. It is given by the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.2.4: Existence of extension for normal default theories [39] 
For every normal default theory, there is at least one extension. 
As previously mentioned, default theories are not monoton. By "not 
monotonic," we mean that adding facts to the hard fact set does not guarantee that 
an extension will be enlarged. Therefore, it could be that adding facts causes an 
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extension not to change, to "shrink," or to expand. However, adding defaults to a 
default set will not shrink an extension. In other words, if g)= {(f, ..l) is a default 
theory with an extension CE, and en = (81, CD') is a default theory such that Cf~ 
and CDQD', it could be that there is no extension <E' for q)' such that <EQE'. These 
are called semi-monotonicity properties of an extension for a default theory. 
As the following theorem concluded, normal default theories have semi-
monotonicity properties. 
Theorem 2.2.5: Semi-monotonicity [39] 
Let <E be an extension for a normal default theory CD = {(f, ..l). A default 
theory en· = {(f, ~'), where ~ ~ ..l'' has an extension <E' such that <E c <E'. 
The proof of the existence of an extension can be seen as a direct 
consequence of the semi-monotonicity properties. The extension for any default 
theory en = (g;, 0), i.e., its default set is empty, is Th(Cf), that is, the set of all 
facts derivable from the hard fact set (f. This is true because it follows from the 
first and second conditions for an extension plus no applicable defaults. Therefore, 
using the semi-monotonicity properties, it follows that an extension for normal 
default theories exists. 
The next theorem will show the orthogonality of extensions for normal 
default .theories. 
Theorem 2.2.6: Orthogonality of extensions [39] 
The union of two distinct extensions for normal default theories is 
inconsistent. 
Therefore, ifboth <E1 and~ are two distinct extensions for a normal 
default theory, then <E1 UE2 is inconsistent. 
~~~~ 
:::::: 
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2.3 Lukaszewicz Default Theories 
In 1988, Lukaszewicz developed a way of deriving an extension so that any 
arbitrary default theory has an extension [24 ]. He defmed so-called modified 
extensions in terms of a fixed point of two operators. He found that these theories 
enjoy some properties that normal default theories have. 
2.3 .I ~ ~ fur Non-noonal Default Theories 
In 1981, the need for non-normal default theories was proposed by Reiter 
and Criscuolo [42]. They found naturally occurring non-normal default theories. 
Some of those default theories are caused by interaction among normal defaults 
such as blocking the transitivity. Furthermore, most of them lack some properties 
that normal default theories enjoy. 
The following example is a normal default theory that has an unacceptable 
extension. It can be modified so that its extension is well behaved. Some other 
examples can be found Reiter and Criscuolo [42]. 
Example 2.3.1: 
A problem with two typical facts "Typically, drop-out-students are adults" 
and "Typically, adults are employed" is formalized by a normal default theory q) = 
((f, Ll = { 01, O:z} ), where 
0 _ drop - out - student( x ): adult ( x) 
1
- adult(x) 
and 
0 _ adult(x):employecXx) 
2 
- employecX x) · 
Suppose that we know only that "John is a drop-out student." Then, by default oh 
"John is an adult." Furthermore, the fact "John is also employed" is derivable 
using default ~· Therefore, drop-out students are also employed unless the 
contrary exists. 
This kind of behavior of extensions for default theories is not acceptable. 
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There should be a mechanism to block the applicability of default ~ as a result of 
81• In order to remedy this problem, Reiter and Criscuolo proposed non-normal 
default theories. They introduced semi-normal defaults. 
In example 2.3.2 above, the source of a problem is the default~· If 81 is 
applicable, it is likely that ~ is applicable. This is a kind of a transitivity. To 
block a transitivity, a semi-normal default can be used [Reiter and Criscuolo, 
1981). For example, the default~ is replaced using a semi-normal default 8'2, 
where 
8.7 = adult(x}employed':x)A-.drop-out-student(x). 
" employed':x) 
Therefore, 8'2 is no longer applicable for a given fact "John is a drop out student." 
So, we can only infer, using the default 81> that "John is an adult" but the fact 
"John is employed" is not derivable. 
2.3.2 Modified Extensions for Default Theories 
In order to ensure that every default theory has an extension, Lukaszewicz 
modified the applicability of defaults. His definition an extension is a little bit 
complicated. He proposed and defined an extension in terms of a fixed point of 
two operators. The first operator is the same as that of Reiter's. The second 
operator is used to control the applicability of defaults by collecting all 
justifications of applied defaults and checking the consistency of the consequents 
and justifications of all already-applied defaults. In this approach, an extension is 
warranted to exist. 
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Following is the Lukaszewicz definition for building a modified extension. 
Definition: Modified extensions for default theories [24] 
Let C1) = (Cf, Ll.) be a default theory and (S, T) be a pair of closed well-
formed formula sets of first order language ~ Suppose that (f 1 (S, T), r 2(S, T)) 
denotes a pair of the smallest sets satisfying the three following conditions: 
Dl Cf c f 1(S, T); 
D2 Thq_( rt(S, T)) = rt(S, T); and 
D3 if 0 = A(x):B(x) E tl, A E rl(S, T), and Su{ C(x)} H- ....,F, 'VF E Tu{B}, 
C(x) 
then C(x) E rt(S, T) and B(x) E r2(S, T)). 
A closed well-formed formula set m-'E is a modified extension for C1) with respect 
to EJ if and only if (r 1 (m-et:, ED, r 2C m -'E, ED) = (m-et:, ED. 
This definition provides criteria for a set 'E to be a modified extension for a 
default theory with respect to a set EJ. The first two conditions are the same as 
those of Reiter. The third condition gives a way to infer using defaults. In contrast 
to the Reiter approach, the applicability of a default refers not only to the defaults 
under consideration, but to the other defaults as well. So, a default is applicable if 
and only if its prerequisite is believed, and adding its consequent to the modified 
extension neither leads to inconsistency nor contradicts the justification of this and 
other already applied defaults. Furthermore, a fact that is in a modified extension, 
is believed, if and only if it is either an axiom, monotonically derivable from other 
beliefs, or the consequent of an applicable default [24]. 
Example 2.3.2: 
Let us consider the non-normal default theory above Cj) = (Cf={P}, Ll.={O} ), 
where o = P: Q . This default theory does not have an extension but it has a 
-,Q 
modified extension m-CE = Th( 00 with respect to 8 = 0. 
2.3.3 General Properties Q[Modified Extensions fur 
Default Theories 
In this section we present some properties that belong to the Lukaszewicz 
formalization. We present the same properties as Reiter's above. 
The first property is the characterization of a modified extension. 
Theorem 3.3 .1 : Characterization of modified extensions [24] 
Let Cj) = (~, A) be a default theory and m-tE be a modified extension with 
respect to EJ. Suppose that E0, Et. ~' ... and J0, Jh J2, ... are two sequences of 
closed well-formed formula sets such that 
Eo=~, 
Jo = 0, 
and, fori> 0 
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A·B 
Ei = Th~Ei_ 1 )u{C I o=-tEA, AEEi-I and m-<Eu{C} H--F, 'VFEgu{B} }, 
A:B Ji = h 1u{B I() =cEd,AEEi-I and m-tEu{C} H--F, 'VFEgu{B} }. 
Then, 
"" -
m-<E= UE; andEJ= UJ;. 
i=O i=O 
The next theorem is the semi-monotonicity property, i.e., monotonicity with 
respect to defaults. 
Theorem 3.3.2: Semi-monotonicity [24] 
Let Cj) = (~, A) be a default theory and m-CE be a modified extension with 
respect to 8· A default theory q)' = ((j=', L\'), where L\ ~ L\', has a modified 
extension m-CE' with respect to Ef such that m-(f: c m-CE' and 8 ~ Ef. 
The next theorem is a warrant for existence of a modified extension for a 
default theory. It can be proved using the semi-monotonicity properties of 
modified extensions for default theories. 
Theorem 3.3 .3: Existence of modified extensions [24] 
Every default theory has a modified extension. 
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CHAPTER III 
A NEW APPROACH 
3.1 Introduction 
As previously mentioned, non-normal default theories occur in nature. 
However, most of them have no extensions. Furthermore, in default theories, an 
extension is essential. In order to remedy this problem, Lukaszewicz developed a 
new way of defining an extension, called a modified extension, so that every 
default theory does have an extension. 
In using both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz approaches, we find some 
disadvantages. Both fail to deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning 
justifications and prerequisites. 
Using the Reiter approach, besides having no extension, disjunctive fact 
problems concerning justifications may cause default theories not to work 
properly, resulting in unacceptable extensions. This is due to inconsistent 
extensi~ns that may arise during the application of defaults, for example, 
applications of defaults that are based on inconsistent justifications. In the 
Lukaszewicz approach, a modified extension for a default theory may result in 
inconsistency with its justification set. That is, a default theory may result in 
modified extensions that are consistent but they are inconsistent with their 
justification sets. 
Both approaches fail to deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning 
prerequisites of defaults having the same justification. Disjunctive fact problems 
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concerning prerequisites may cause a default theory to fail to derive facts even 
though it is a normal default theory. 
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In this chapter, we will see these problems more clearly and develop a new 
approach to overcoming the problems. First, we identify disjunctive fact problems 
concerning justifications, propose a new approach to solving them, and investigate 
the properties of the new approach. Second, we distinguish disjunctive fact 
problems concerning prerequisites of defaults having the same justification. To 
overcome these problems, we develop the first new approach by extending the 
applicability of defaults by including disjunctive forms of prerequisites in applying 
them. In doing so, we will follow conventions from the previous chapter for all 
terms such as a language, a default, a default theory, and an extension. 
All notations are also used as in the previous chapters. A well-formed 
formula will be denoted using capital and italic characters like A and B. A special 
black-chancerry character like A... and en. will be used to denote a special set such 
as hard fact sets, extensions, and justification sets. Other sets such as a sequence 
of sets are denoted by a plain character like A and B. 
Furthermore, we assume that we are dealing with a consistent hard fact set 
since an inconsistent hard fact set will result in inconsistent extensions. 
3.2 Disjunctive Fact Problems Concerning 
Justification 
There are some problems in using both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz 
approaches to disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications. Disjunctive 
facts consist of two or more facts such that we do not have sufficient evidence to 
believe any of them individually but we only believe their disjunctive forms. For 
example, we have two birds, for example bird(Tweety) and bird(Clyde). In 
addition, we see that one of them has broken wings but we do not know which one. 
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Therefore, we believe either Tweety or Clyde has broken wings, that is, -,broken-
wing(Tweety)v-,broken-wing(Clyde). The problems in both the Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz approaches are due to inconsistent facts that may result when 
applying defaults in the presence of disjunctive facts. 
3.2.1 Preliminary Discussion 
Disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications of defaults usually arise 
in non-normal default theories. In using both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz 
approaches, they may result in extensions that are counter-intuitive. 
Consider the following example. In this example, neither approaches 
properly work. 
Example 3.2.1: 
Suppose that all we know is "Tweety and Clyde are birds" and either 
"Tweety has broken wings" or "Clyde has broken wings" but we do not know 
which of them has broken wings. Furthermore, we have a semi-normal default "A 
bird can fly in the absence of evidence that it cannot fly and its wings are not 
broken." This problem can be formalized using a semi-normal default theory q) = 
(Cf, .1 = { ()} ), where 
Cf = {bird(Tweety), bird( Clyde), broken-wing(Tweety)vbroken-wing(Clyde)} 
and 
0 = bird(x):fly(x) A -,broken- wing(x). 
fly(x) 
Since both facts "-,(fly(Tweety)A-,broken-wing(Tweety))" and "-,(fly(Clyde)A 
-,broken-wing(Clyde))" are not inferable, then the default() is applicable for both 
"bird(Tweety)" and "bird(Clyde)" resulting in both "fly(Tweety)" and "fly(Clyde)" 
in an extension. It can be shown that q) has exactly one extension CE, 
34 
CE = Th(~u {fly(Tweety), fly(Clyde)}). 
Furthermore, a modified extension for Cl) is m-CE, 
m-CE = Th(~u {fly(Tweety), fly(Clyde)}) 
with respect to 
3={fly(Tweety)A-,broken-wing(Tweety), fly(Clyde)A-,broken-wing(Clyde)}). 
Both extension and modified extension contain both facts "Tweety can fly" and 
"Clyde can fly." Since an extension contains all the facts that a person may hold, 
these results are counter-intuitive. A person should not be able to infer that both 
birds Tweety and Clyde are able to fly since the person knows that one of them has 
broken wings, and thus it cannot fly. 
.-::::: 
:::::: 
Another example is presented by Poole [35]. This example illustrates a 
difficulty that arises in some attempts to use both Reiter and Lukaszewicz in the 
presence of disjunctive facts. In both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz approaches, 
the default theory results in both an extension and a modified extension that are 
counter-intuitive. 
Example 3.2.2: Disjunctive fact problems concerning justification [35] 
Suppose that we know that one of John's hands is broken but we do not 
know which hand is broken. Suppose that by default, a person's left or right arm is 
usable unless the person's left or right arm, respectively, is broken. This problem 
is formalized using a semi-normal default theory en=(~, .1 = {o~> ~}),where 
and 
~ = {person( John), right-arm-broken(John)vleft-arm-broken(John)}, 
01 = person ( x ): left- arm - usable( x) A -,left- arm - broken( x), 
left-arm -usable(x) 
02 = person ( x ): right -arm - usable( x) A -,right- arm - broken( x) 
right - arm - usable( x) 
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Let us identify an extension for this default theory. Since 01 is applicable, the fact 
"John's left arm is usable" is an extension. Furthermore, since~ is also 
applicable, the fact "John's right arm is usable" is in the extension. The extension 
for this default theory is 
~ = Th(~ u {left-arm-usable(John), right-arm-usable( John)}). 
It can be shown that it is the only extension for this default theory. Now, we see a 
modified extension for this default theory. A modified extension for this default 
theory is 
m-(_E = Th(~ u {left-arm-usable(John), right-arm~usable(John)}) 
with respect to 
3 = {left-arm-usable(John)A-,left-arm-broken(John), 
right-arm-usable(John)A-,right-arm-broken(John)} 
since both defaults are applicable. Moreover, it is the only modified extension for 
this default theory. 
However, neither approaches agrees with the intuition. That is, both 
approaches result in both of John's hands being usable. Since we know that at 
least one of John's hands is broken, at most, only one of John's hands should be 
usable. 
These examples show that both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz approaches 
are unwell-behaved to deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning 
justifications. 
3.2.2 ~Approach tQ Solving Disjunctive~ 
Problems Concerning Justifications 
The Reiter approach cannot fully control the applicability of defaults. The 
restriction on applying defaults in this approach is the derivability of their 
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prerequisites in addition to consistency. Therefore, if a prerequisite of a default is 
provable, it is more likely that the default is applicable. So, in default theories in 
which the applicability of defaults leads to counter-intuitive results such as the 
examples above, the approach does not work properly. It may result in default 
theories having extensions that do not agree with intuition. 
The same reasoning is applied to the Lukaszewicz approach. The 
applicability of defaults in this approach is more complex. In contrast, it refers not 
only to the default under consideration but also to other applied defaults. 
Therefore, a default is applicable if its prerequisite is provable and adding its 
consequent does not result in inconsistency nor contradict any justification of other 
applied defaults including itself. However, the approach does not enforce 
consistency among the justifications as a basis for applying the default. For 
example, ~ is applicable in example 3.2.1 since adding the consequent of~ to 
m-CE does not result in inconsistency (i.e., -,fly(Clyde)e m-CE) and contradict any 
justification of ()1 and~ (i.e., -,(tly(Tweety)A-,broken-wing(Tweety))e 3 and 
--.(fly(Clyde )A-.broken-wing(Clyde ))e 3). 
In other words, in the Lukaszewicz approach, the contradiction as a result of 
applying defaults by adding their consequents is restricted to each individual 
element of the justification set. So, the applicability of a default is checked against 
an individual element of a justification set in addition to the provability of its 
prerequisite and consistency of its justification. 
In order to block inferring the fact "fly(Clyde)," we need to block the 
applicability of~- This can be done by enforcing the contradiction not only to 
each individual element but to the whole justification set as well. This is the main 
idea behind a new approach to dealing with disjunctive fact problems concerning 
justifications. 
This idea will be given formally in the following definition. This definition 
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extends the restriction on applying defaults concerning their justifications. It uses 
two operators, as in the Lukaszewicz approach, to define a pair of sets. This pair 
of sets is called a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set. We also 
refer them as an alternative extension a-CE based on an assumption set A for a 
default theory q). 
Definition: Alternative extensions 
Let q) = (Cf, ~) be a default theory and (E, A) be a pair of closed well-
formed formula sets. Suppose that (r1(E, A), r 2(E, A)) is a pair of the smallest 
sets satisfying the following three conditions: 
Rl. (fcri(E, A), for i= 1 ,2; 
R2. Thq~_ri(E, A))= ri(E, A), for i=l,2; and 
R3. if 8 = A:B E L\, Ae r 1(E, A) and Au{B, C} consistent, then c 
• CE rl(E, A), and 
• B, CE r 2(E, A). 
A closed well-formed formula set a-CE is an alternative extension for a default 
theory q) if and only if there is a closed well-formed formula set A, called an 
assumption set, such that 
·This definition is more complex than those of the Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz approaches. It provides criteria for a closed well-formed formula set 
to be an alternative extension a-CE for a default theory q) based on an assumption 
set A A pair composed of an alternative extension a-CE and an assumption set A is 
a fixed point of operators r 1 and r 2 based on three conditions; i.e., a-CE= ri(a-CE, 
A) and A= r 2( a-CE, A). The first condition insists that both alternative extension 
and assumption set contain the entire hard fact set. The second condition requires 
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that both alternative extension and assumption set be inductively closed; that is, all 
facts derivable from an alternative extension or an assumption set in terms of first 
order theory must be in the alternative extension or in the assumption set, 
respectively. 
The third condition is related to an applicability of a default o. It extends 
the derivability of first order theory. It requires that a prerequisite of a default be 
inferable from an alternative extension a-CE. In addition, its justification and 
consequent are consistent with the related assumption set A: If these requirements 
are satisfied, then the justification and consequent of the default must be in the 
assumption set~ and the consequent of the default must be also in the alternative 
extension a-CE. In this case, the default o is called applicable to an alternative 
extension a-CE based on an assumption set A: In addition, when applying a default, 
its prerequisite, justification, and consequent are closed well-formed formulae. 
In addition, the smallness of the pair assures that no more facts are added to 
it without any reason. In other words, a fact is in an alternative extension if it is a 
hard fact, a consequent of an applicable default, or a fact derivable from the set of 
hard facts and the set of consequents of applicable defaults. Furthermore, a fact is 
in an assumption set if it is a hard fact, a consequent or a justification of an 
applicable default, or a fact derivable from the set of hard facts and the set of 
consequents and justifications of applicable defaults. 
There are some important notes to be identified in this definition. By 
combining the first two conditions, we can conclude that all facts derivable from 
hard facts are in both an alternative extension and an assumption set; i.e., Th((f) c 
a-CE and Th((f) c A: In addition, by condition R3, an assumption set contains 
consequents and justifications of applicable defaults. Meanwhile, an alternative 
extension contains all consequents of applicable defaults. Therefore, an alternative 
extension is a subset of an assumption set; i.e., a-CE ~ A: Furthermore, since an 
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assumption set must be consistent, an alternative extension is also consistent. 
To check whether a pair of sets is a pair composed of an alternative 
extension and an assumption set, we need to verifY the three conditions above in 
addition to the smallness of the pair. Furthermore, a pair of closed well·formed 
formula sets may satisfY one, two, or three of the conditions based on a default 
theory <J) = (o:-, .1) but not necessarily be a pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set. So, A pair of sets (E, A) satisfies condition Rl if o:-cE and (fcA. 
It satisfies condition R2 ifTh(E) = E and Th(A) =A. Finally, it satisfies condition 
R3 if 8 =At is a default, AeE and Au{B, C} is consistent, then CeE and B, CeA. 
(Notice the characters used. The italic characters like A and B denote well-formed 
formulae whereas the plain characters like A and B denote a set.) 
The main reason in using an assumption set is that it assures that we apply 
defaults by inferring facts based on consistent assumptions, that is, a consequent 
and justification of an applicable default consistent with an assumption set. In this 
approach, we assure that no inconsistency problems arise during the application of 
defaults, for example in the previous examples. Therefore, the disjunctive fact 
problems concerning justifications will not arise, as we will see later on. 
The notion of consequences in the new approach is the same as in that of 
the Reiter approach. A consequence of a default theory is a fact that belongs to an 
alternative extension. So, to find out whether a fact is a consequence of a default 
theory, we have to find an alternative extension containing the fact. 
Example 3.2.3: The ability ofbirds to fly 
and 
Let CD = (o:-, .1 = { 8}) be a default theory, where 
o:- = {bird(Tweety)} 
8 = bird(x):fly(x). 
fly(x) 
It is easy to see that this default theory has only one alternative extension a-<E, 
a-<E = Th( { bird(Tweety ), fly(Tweety)}) 
based on an assumption set A.t 
A.= Th( {bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety)} ). 
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In addition, the fact "fly(Tweety)" is a consequence ofc_o. Therefore, in the 
absence of information to the contrary, "-,fly(Tweety)," we can infer that "Tweety 
can fly." 
From this example, it can be seen that an alternative extension for a normal 
default theory is identical to an assumption set. This can be seen in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 3 .2.1: Similarity of a-CE and A. for normal default theories 
An alternative extension for normal default theories is identical to its 
assumption set. 
Proof: Theorem 3.2.1 
Both alternative extension a-CE and assumption set A. contain the entire hard 
fact set, and the difference between the two sets occurs during the application of 
defaults. That is, if a default 0 = Al is applicable, then C E a-E and B, C E A 
Hence, a-CE c A. and no other facts are in both a-CE and A Furthermore, since the 
consequent of a normal default is logically equivalent with its justification, then 
every justification and consequent of applicable defaults must be in both an 
alternative extension and an assumption set. So, the two sets are identical. 
However, it is not generally true for arbitrary default theories. Consider the 
following example. The following example shows a non-normal default theory 
having an alternative extension based on a non-identical assumption set. 
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Example 3.2.4: Non-identical assumption set 
Let q) = (Cf, .:::\. = { Ot, ~}) be a default theory, where Cf = { P}, 01 = i, and 
02 = ~R • This default theory has an alternative extension a-CE, 
a-CE= Th(Cfu {Q, S}) 
based on an assumption set ~ 
A= Th(Cfu {Q, R, S}). 
That is, an alternative extension a-CE for an arbitrary default theory is not identical 
to its assumption set _r\ 
Let us apply this new approach to the two problems in examples 3 .2.1 and 
3 .2.2 above. The following is the first problem. 
Example 3 .2.5: 
Let us examine the first problem in example 3 .2 .1, that is, the default theory 
en = ( Cf, .:::\.), where 
(f = {bird(Tweety), bird( Clyde), broken-wing(Tweety)vbroken-wing(Clyde)} 
and 
0 = bird(x):fly(x) 1\ -,broken- wing(x). 
fly(x) 
Let us apply the default() to "bird(Tweety)" by inferring "fly(Tweety)," i.e., 
fly(Tweety) in an extension a-CE1 based on an assumption set At. It needs 
justification facts "fly(Tweety)" and "fly(Tweety)/\--,broken-wing(Tweety)." 
Therefore, fly(Tweety)EA1 and fly(Tweety)/\--,broken-wing(Tweety)EA..1 • So, 
--,broken-wing(Tweety) is in AI . Hence, the default () is no longer applicable to 
"bird( Clyde)" since "broken-wing(Clyde)" is inferable from A 1 . It can be shown 
that one of the extensions for this default theory is a-CEI> where 
a-<E1 = Th(Cfu {fly(Tweety)}) 
based on an assumption set A 1 , 
At = Th((fu {fly(Tweety), fly(Tweety)A-,broken-wing(Tweety)}). 
The other extension for this default theory is a-<E2, where 
a-CE2 = Th{(fu {fly(Clyde)}) 
based on an assumption set A2 , where 
A2 = Th{(fu {fly(Clyde), fly(Clyde)A-,broken-wing(Clyde)}). 
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These are the only alternative extensions for the default theory. Both facts 
"fly(Tweety)" and "fly(Clyde)" are not simultaneously in any extension. This 
solves the first problem. So, in the new approach, the counter-intuition statement 
does not arise. 
In the new approach, there are two distinct extensions. The first extension 
contains the fact "fly(Tweety)." Since a consequence for a default theory is a 
sentence that belongs to an extension, the fact is a consequence of default theory 
q). Meanwhile, the second extension contains the fact "fly(Clyde)." So, the fact is 
also a consequence ofq). However, they are not simultaneously consequences of 
q). In other words, one may believe either of the facts but not both. 
The next example shows how the new approach solves the second problem 
in examples 3.2.2. 
Example 3.2.6: 
The problem is formalized using a semi-normal default theory q) = {(f, ~ = 
{ <>t. ~}),where 
and 
(f = {person( John), right-arm-broken(John)vleft-arm-broken(John) }, 
person(x): left-arm -usable(x)A-,left-arm -broken(x) 
{)I 
left-arm -usable( x) 
person(x): right-arm -usable(x)A-,right-arm -broken(x) ()2 
right-arm -usable(x) 
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Let us see first the applicability of the default B1• This default is applicable to an 
alternative extension a-<E1 based on an assumption set .AJ, where 
a-tE1 = Th(O: u {left-arm-usable(John)}) 
AI = Th(O: u {left-arm-usable(John), 
left-arm-usable( John )A-,left-arm-broken( John)}), 
since is not possible to derive both facts "-,left-arm-usable(John)" and "left-arm-
broken(John)} ). " However, the default ~ is not applicable since "right-arm-
broken(John)" is inferable from .4..1 ; i.e., both "right-arm-broken(John)vleft-arm-
broken(John)" and "-,left-arm-broken(John)" in A..1 • So, both facts "left-arm-
usable(John)" and "right-arm-usable(John)" are not in a-tE1• Now, we see another 
alternative extension for q). The default ~ is applicable in an alternative a-tt:2 
based on an assumption set A..2 , where 
a-tE2 = Th(g; u { right-arm-usable(John)}) 
A..2 = Th(g; u { right-arm-usable(John), 
right-arm-usable(John)A-,right-arm-broken(John)} ). 
But, the default B1 is inapplicable since "-,left-arm-broken(John)" is inferable from 
Al· Therefore, both facts "left-arm-usable(John)" and "right-arm-usable(John)" 
are also not in a-tE2. It can be shown that a-tE1 and a-tt:2 are the only alternative 
extensions for this default theory. Furthermore, both alternative extensions follow 
intuition. 
· The following example shows a pair of sets satisfying the conditions Rl, 
R2, and R3 but it is not necessarily a pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set. 
Example 3.2.7: The necessity for the smallest sets 
Let q) = (0:, .6. = {Ot. ~})be a normal default theory, where 
a=-= {P}, 81 = P:Q, and 82 = R:S. Q s 
It is easy to see that a-CE= Th( {P, Q}) is an alternative extension for C1) based on 
assumption set A.= Th( {P, Q} ). 
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Now, let us examine a pair of sets (E = Th( {P, Q, S} ), A= Th( {P, Q. S} )). 
Since a=-cE and a=-cA, the pair (E, A) satisfies the condition Rl. Also, the pair 
(E, A) satisfies the condition R2 because Th(E) = Th(Th({P, Q, S})) = Th({P, Q, 
S}) = E and Th(A) = Th(Th({P, Q, S})) = Th({P, Q, S}) =A. Lastly, the default 
81 is applicable since PEE and -,Q~ A, causing QE E and QE A. So, it satisfies 
R3. However, Sis in E but it is neither a hard fact, a consequent of an applicable 
default, nor a fact derivable from the set of hard facts and the set of consequents of 
applicable defaults. Therefore, E is not an alternative extension for en. 
3.2.3 Basic Properties .Qf~ ~Approach 
In this section we will see some properties of alternative extensions for a 
default theory. We will attempt to provide and prove some properties similar to 
the Reiter and Lukaszewicz approaches. 
In the Reiter approach, a similar theorem, which more intuitively 
characterizes an alternative extension based on an assumption set for arbitrary 
default theories, can be given. It is called the characterization theorem. In the 
theorem, we construct a sequence of pairs, called a sequence of pairs related to a 
pair of sets. The following theorem sums up this property. 
Theorem 3.2.2: The characterization of alternative extensions for a default theory 
Suppose CJ) =(a=-, ~) is a default theory, and a-CE and A. are closed well-
formed sets. Let (E0, Ao), (EI> A1), ... be a sequence of pairs of closed well-
formed formula sets, noted as (Ei, Ai), such that 
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and, fori~ I 
Ei = Th(Ei_1) u {Cio= A~B et:l,AeEi-b and~u{B, C} is consistent} 
Ai = Th(Ai_1) u {B, clo= A: et:l,AeEi-t> and~u{B, C} is consistent} 
A set of closed well-formed formulae a-CE is an alternative extension based on an 
assumption set ~for Cj) if and only if 
~ 
a-CE= UE 
i=O I 
and 
~ 
~=UA 
i=O 1 
This theorem provides a more intuitive way to check whether (a-CE, A.) of 
closed well-formed formula sets satisfies as a pair of an alternative extension and 
an assumption set for a default theory, that is, by constructing a sequence of pairs 
of sets. The pair satisfies as an alternative extension and an assumption set if and 
only if the pair is identical with the pair of the unions of all elements of the 
constructed sequence, i.e., (a-CE, A.)= (U:OE;, U~; ). 
In this theorem, we characterize the difference between two consecutive 
sets in the sequence. The next set in the sequence consists of a theory of the 
predecessor set and all consequences of applicable defaults with respect to the 
predecessor set; i.e., Ei+I- Th(Ej)= {CICs are consequents of applicable default 8s 
using the pair (Ei, A.)} and Ai+I- Th(Ai)= {B, CIBs and Cs are justifications and 
consequents, respectively, of applicable default os using the pair (Ei, A.)}. In 
addition, for normal default theories, Ei = Ai. 
In the following, we will present a lemma that is very useful in the proofs of 
theorems in the entire paper. It is related to the construction of a sequence as in 
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theorem 3 .2.2. 
Lemma 3 .2.1: 
Suppose that a sequence of sets Ao, AI> ... such that Th(Ai_1)cAi, fori~ 1. 
Then, Th(U:oA;) = U:oA;. 
Proof: Lemma 3.2.1 
Assume that Th(Ai_1)cAi, fori~ 1. By the monotonicity properties, 
U:oA; cTh(U:oA; ). Suppose thatXeTh(U:oA; ). By the compactness of first 
order theory, there is a finite set S such that Xe Th(S). By the finiteness of S, there 
is an An such that ScA0 . Xe Th(A0 ) since Th(S)cTh(A0 ) by the monotonicity. 
So, Xis in Th(An+t) and also in U:oA;. Hence, Th(U:oA; )cU:oA;. We 
conclude that Th(U:oA; )= U:oA;. 
In order to prove theorem 3 .2.2, we need the following three lemmas. The 
first lemma concerns the property of the pair (U:OEi, Ui:oAi) satisfYing Rl, R2, 
and R3. The last two lemmas concern the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
(a-CE, A) as a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set for a default 
theory related to the sequence. 
Lemma 3.2.2: 
Let a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) be constructed as in theorem 3.2.2 using a 
pair (a-CE, A). Then, 
r2(a-CE, A) c Ui:oA; and rl(a-CE, A)~ Ui:oE;. 
This lemma says that the pair of the unions of all elements of sequences E0, 
Et. ... and Ao, A~> ... satisfies conditions Rl, R2, and R3. 
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Proof: Lemma 3.2.2 
Since (ri(a-CE, A), r2(a-CE, A)) is a pair ofthe smallest sets satisfying the 
three conditions Rl, R2, and R3, it is enough to prove that the pair (U~E;, U~A;) 
satisfies Rl, R2, and R3. 
Rl. Both E0 and Ao contain (f. Therefore, the pair (U~E;, U::OA;) satisfies Rl. 
R2. By lemma 3.2.1, we conclude Th(U~J = U::OE; and Th(U::OA;) = U~Ai. 
So the pair (U~E;, Ui:oA;) satisfies R2. 
R3. We need to prove that if o = 4!leA, Ae U:OE;, and {B, C}uU:oA; is 
consistent, then Ce Ui:o E; and B, Ce Ui:oA; . 
Suppose that 0 = Af ELl, Ae Ui:oE;, and {B, C}uU:OA; is consistent. 
Since Ei-lcEi, fori~ 1, there is ann such thatAeE0 by Ae U~E;. Since {B, 
C}uU:oA; is consistent, then {B, C}uA0 is consistent. Hence, Ce En+ I and 
B, Ce An+ 1 by the construction ofEi and Ai. Therefore, Ce U~E; and B, Ce 
Ui:oA;. 
Next is the second lemma. In the construction, no fact is added to the 
sequence of pairs without a reason, if the construction is based on a pair of an 
alternative extension and an assumption set. 
Lemma 3.2.3: 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension based on an assumption set A. for a 
default theory. Suppose a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) constructed as in theorem 
3.2.2 using a pair (a-CE, A). Then, 
U~E; c rl(a-CE, A) and Ui:oA; c r2(a-CE, A). 
Proof: Lemma 3.2.3 
Assume that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A. 
for a default theory CD; i.e., a-CE= rl(a-CE, A) and A.= r2(a-CE, A). We prove that 
U~E; cr 1 (a-CE, A) and U~A; cr 2( a-CE, A) by induction on i that Eicr 1 ( a-CE,A) 
and Ai c r 2( a-CE, A) for all i. 
Basis: Eo= S:: c r1(a-CE, A) and Ao = S:: c r2(a-tE, A). 
Hypothesis: Ei c r 1 (a-CE, A) implies Ei+ 1 c r 1 (a-CE, A) and 
Ai cr2(a-CE, A) implies Ai+1 cr2(a-CE, A). 
Step: Assume En c ri(a-CE, A) and An c r 2(a-CE, A). By the monotonicity 
properties and R2, Th(En) c rt(a-CE, A) and Th(A0 ) c r 2(a-CE, A). 
If En+1 =Th(En), and so is An+1 =Th(A0 ), we then finish the proof. 
(Recall that, for n ;;-::: 1, 
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En+1- Th(En) = { Cl b=1f-E ~. AE En and {B, C}uA_is consistent} 
An+1- Th(An) = {B, Cl b=~ E ~. AE En and {B, C}uA..is consistent}.) 
Otherwise, suppose there are B, C such that CE En+ 1 - Th(E0 ) and B, CE 
An+1- Th(A0 ). So, there is a default 0=~ E~ such thatAEE0 and {B, C}uA... 
is consistent. By En c rl(a-CE, A),AEE0 impliesAert(a-CE, A). SinceAE 
r 1(a-CE, A) and {B, C}uA. is consistent, Cis in r 1(a-CE, A) and B, Care in 
r2(a-CE, A) by R3. Since Band Care arbitrary, En+1 c rl(a-CE, A) and An+ I 
c r 2( a-CE, A). 
The following is the third lemma. It says that if the pair of the union of all 
Eis and the union of all Ais in the sequence is identical with the pair that is used as 
a basis for the construction, then no fact is added to the sequence of pairs without 
any reasons. 
Lemma 3.2.4: 
Let a sequence of pairs (Eh Ai) be constructed as in theorem 3.2.2 using a 
pair (a-CE, A). If a-CE= U~E; and A.= Ui:oA;, then, 
Ui:oE; c rl(a-<E, A) and U~A; c r2(a-CE, A). 
Proof: Lemma 3 .2.4 
We prove U:OE; c rt(a-CE, A) and Ui:oA; ~ r 2(a-CE, A) by induction on i 
that Ei c rt(a-CE, A) and Ai c r2(a-CE, A) for all i. 
Basis: Eo= Cf ~ rt(a-CE, A) and Ao = Cf c r2(a-CE, A). 
Hypothesis: Eicrt(a-CE, A) implies Ei+t crt(a-CE, A) and 
Ai c r i a-CE, A) implies Ai+ t c r 2( a-CE, A). 
Step: Assume that En c r 1(a-CE, A) and An c r2(a-CE, A). By the monotonicity 
properties and by R2, Th(Eu) c rt(a-CE, A) and Th(An) c r2(a-CE, A). 
IfEn+l =Th(En), and so is An+ I =Th(An), we then finish the proof. 
Otherwise, suppose there are B, C such that Ce En+ 1 - Th(En) and B, Ce 
49 
An+ I-Th(An)· So, there is a default ~=1fle L\ such that Ae En and {B, C}uA.... 
is consistent. Ae En implies Ae U~E;=a-CE. Since Ae a-CE and B, CuA..._ 
consistent, Ce r 1(a-CE, A) and B, Ce r 2(a-CE, A) by R3. Since Band Care 
arbitrary, En+lc r 1(a-CE, A) and An+ I c r2(a-CE, A). 
Now, we proceed to prove characterization theorem 3.2.2 above. 
Proof: Theorem 3.2.2 
We need to prove that: r 1(a-CE, A)= U~E; and r2(a-CE, A)= U~A;. 
(if part) 
. Suppose that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A... 
:for a default theory q); i.e., a-CE= rt(a-CE, A) and A_= r2(a-CE, A). So, 
'1. r 1(a-CE, A) c U~; and r2(a-CE, A) c U~; by lemma 3.2.2; and 
2. r 1(a-CE, A) :2 U:OE; and r2(a-CE, A) :2 U~; by lemma 3.2.3. 
(if part) 
Suppose that a-CE = U~; and A...= U~; . Therefore, 
1. r 1(a-CE, A)~ U~; and r 2(a-CE, A)~ U~; by lemma 3.2.2; and 
2. r 1(a-CE, A) :2 U~; and r 2(a-CE, A.) :2 U"";:oA; by lemma 3.2.4. 
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Therefore, the theorem is proved. 
Let us fmd a sequence of pairs for the flrst problem in example 3.2.1 above. 
Example 3.2.8: 
and 
Consider the default theory en= (a:-, i\) in example 3.2.1 above, where 
a:-= {bird(Tweety ), bird( Clyde), broken-wing(Tweety )vbroken-wing( Clyde)} 
8 = bird(x):fly(x) 1\ -,broken- wing(x). 
fly(x) 
An alternative extension for en is a-CEI, 
a-(E1 = Th( {bird(Tweety), bird( Clyde), fly(Tweety), 
broken-wing(Tweety)vbroken-wing(Clyde)} ), 
based on an assumption set AJ, 
A..1 = Th( {bird(Tweety), bird( Clyde), fly(Tweety)/\-,broken-wing(Tweety), 
fly(Tweety ), broken-wing(Tweety )vbroken-wing( Clyde)}). 
The sequence of pairs related to pair (a-CE1, A..1) is (Ei, Ai), where 
(Eo, Ao) = Co:-, (f), 
(Eb A1) = (Th(Cf)u{fly(Tweety)}, 
Th(Cf)u{ fly(Tweety ),fly(Tweety )1\-,broken-wing(Tweety)} ), 
and fori~ 2, 
(Ei, Ai) = (Th(a;u{fly(Tweety)})u{fly(Tweety)}, 
Th(~u{ fly(Tweety),fly(Tweety)/\-,broken-wing(Tweety)}) u 
{ fly(Tweety),fly(Tweety)/\-,broken-wing(Tweety)}) 
= (Th(a:u { fly(Tweety)} ), 
Th(~u { fly(Tweety ),fly(Tweety)/\--.broken-wing(Tweety)} ). 
Let us verify the previous example 3 .2. 7 about the smallness of an 
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alternative extension for a default theory using the characterization theorem. 
Example 3.2.9: 
Consider a default theory CJ) = (Cf, .1={ 81, ~} ), where~= { P}, Ot = P0°, 
and 02 = ¥. We prove by a contradiction that E = Th( {P, Q, S}) is not an 
alternative extension; that is, suppose that E is an alternative extension. So, there 
is an assumption set A. Since CJ) is a normal default theory, then A= E by theorem 
3 .2.1. Let us construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) related to the pair (E, A). That 
lS, 
Eo= Ao = cr= {P}, 
Et =At= Th({P}) u {Q}, 
E2 = A2 = Th(Th( {P} u {Q}) u {Q} = Th( {P, Q} ), 
and, fori;;::: 3 
Ei = Ai = Th(E2) u {Q} = Th(Th({P, Q}) u {Q} = Th({P, Q}) = E2. 
Therefore, U~E; = Th( {P, Q} ). But, E ::~; U:CEi and A::~; Ui:cA;. This is the 
contradiction. So, it cannot be that E is an alternative extension. This is because 
(E, A) is not a pair of the smallest sets; i.e., SeE but is neither a hard fact, a 
consequent of an applicable default, nor derivable from the set of hard facts and 
consequents of applicable defaults. 
Now, we are ready to describe the relation of an alternative extension and 
an extension for normal default theories; that is, every alternative extension for a 
normal default theory is an extension for the default theory. 
Theorem 3.2.3: Identity of alternative extensions for normal default theories 
Suppose that a-CE is an alternative extension for a normal default theory CJ) 
based on an assumption set _,.:\ Therefore, a-CE is an extension for Cj). 
Proof: Theorem 3.2.3 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension based on an assumption set A. for a 
normal default theory CJ) = (Cf, A). So, a-CE= A_ by theorem 3.2.1. Now, by 
characterization theorem 3.2.2, we construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai), where 
Eo =Ao =Cf 
and, fori~ 1 
Ei = Ai = Th(Ei-I)u{B I o = ~E A, AE Ei-l• and a-CEu{B} is consistent} 
such that a-CE= U:OE; and A.= Ui:oA; . Construct a sequence of sets E'0, E' 1, •.. 
related to a-CE according to Reiter's characterization theorem, 2.2.1: 
E'o = Cf, 
and, fori~ 1 
E'i = Th(E'i_ 1) u {B I o = ~E A, AE E'j_1, and -J3e a-CE}. 
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To prove that a-CE is an extension for q) (i.e., a-CE= U;":0 E; ), it is enough to show 
E\ = Ei for i~O. We prove it by induction. 
Basis: E'0 = E0 = Cf. 
Hypothesis: (Ei=E'j)~(Ei+1 =E'i+I). 
Step: Assume that E'n =En. It implies that Th(En)= Th(E'n), and also, Th(En)c 
En+l and Th(E'n)cE'n+l by the monotonicity properties. 
We prove that E'n+l = En+1 by showing En+tcE'n+J and E'n+JcEn+1· 
IfEn+1 =Th(En), then we have proven that En+ I cE'n+I since Th(En) = 
Th(E'n) c E'n+ 1. Otherwise, suppose there is B in En+ 1- Th(En). By the 
construction ofEn+b there is a default 0 = Af E A such that AE En and B is 
consistent with a-CE. Since E'n=En, AeE'n, and since BEEn+!> -J3 is not in 
a-CE. Therefore, B must be in E'n+ 1 by the construction of E'n+ 1· Hence, 
En+tcE'n+l since Th(En)=Th(E'n)cE'n+l· 
IfE'n+t=Th(E'n), then we have proven that E'n+tcEn+I since 
Th(E'n)=Th(En)cEn+I· Otherwise, suppose there is Bin E'n+I-Th(E'n). By 
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the construction ofE'n+b there is a default()= Af eLl such that Ae E'n and 
-Jl'l. a-CE. By assumption E'n=Em then, Ae En· Also, B is consistent with a-
CE. Therefore, B must be in En+ 1 by the construction of En+ 1• Hence, E'n+ 1 
cEn+l since Th(E'0 )=Th(Eo)cEn+I· 
In the next theorem, we will see the maximality of alternative extensions. 
That is, if there are two pairs (a-CE, A) and (a-CE', A:.) of alternative extensions and 
assumption sets, and a-CE~ a-(E' and A... c A:., then the pairs are identical. 
Theorem 3.2.4: Maximality of alternative extensions 
Suppose that a-CE and a-CE' are alternative extensions for a default theory <]) 
= (Cf, Ll) based on assumption sets A... and A:., respectively, such that a-CE c a-CE' 
and A.. c A· Then, a-CE = a-CE' and A..= A· 
That is, there is no pair of an alternative extension and assumption set such 
that it properly "supersedes" another pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set. 
Proof: Theorem 3.2.4 
Assume that (a-CE, A) and (a-CE', A:.) are pairs of alternative extensions and 
assumption sets for a default theory<])= (Cf, Ll) such that a-CE c a-CE' and A... c ,(. 
Suppose that the sequences of pairs (Ei, Ai) and (E'j, A'i) are related to the pairs 
(a-CE, A) and (a-CE', A:.), respectively, as in characterization theorem 3.2.2. By 
hypotheses a-CE c a-CE' and A.. c ,(, we have 
U~Ei c U:o E: and U~; c U:o A: . 
So, it remains to be proven that 
U:o E: ~ U::OE; and U:o A: ~ U~; . 
We prove them by an induction on i that E;~ U::OE; and A;c U::OA;. 
Basis: E'0 c E0 and A'o c Ao since E'0 = E0 = A'o = A0 = (f. 
Hypothesis: For all i, (E\ cEi) -7(E'i+1cEi+l). 
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Step: Assume that E'ncEn and A'ncAn. By the monotonicity property first order 
theory, Th(E'n)cTh(En) and Th(A'n)CTh(An). 
First, we show that E'n+lcEn+I· IfE'n+l=Th(E'n), then we have 
proven that E'n+IcEn+I since Th(E'n)cTh(En)cEn+I· Otherwise, suppose 
there is C such that CE E'n+ 1 but CE Th(E'n). So, by the construction of 
E'n+b there is a default 8 = 1fLE ..1 such that Ae E'n and {B, C}uA.: is 
consistent. Since Ae E'n, A is in En by assumption E'0 c;E0 • In addition, {B, 
C} uA_is consistent since {B, C}uA.: is consistent and A_ cA.:. So, C must 
be in En+ I by the construction of En+ I· Since Cis arbitrary in E'n+l• 
therefore, E'n+IcEn+l. 
Now, we prove A'n+lcAn+I· If A'n+t=Th(A'0 ), then we have proven 
that A'n+lcAn+I since Th(A'0 )cTh(A0 )cAn+l· Otherwise, suppose there is 
an X such thatXeA'n+l- Th(A'n). So, by the construction of A'n+I> there is 
a default 8 = Ale Ll, where either X=C or X=B, such that AE E'n and { B, C} 
uA.: is consistent. So, A is in En, and {B, C}uA_is consistent. Therefore, B 
and C must be in An+ I> and so must X Since Th(A'0 )cTh(A0 )cAn+b 
hence, A'n+lcAn+l 
Now, we present the semi-monotonicity properties of alternative extensions 
for default theories. We will show that adding new defaults to a default theory 
cannot shrink an alternative extension. 
Theorem 3.2.5: Semi-monotonicity properties of alternative extensions 
Let q)=(g;, ~)and q)'=( g;, S) be default theories, where Llc~'. For 
every alternative extension a-<E based on assumption set A. for Cj), there is an 
alternative extension a-CE' based on an assumption set A.: for CJ)' such that a-CE ~ 
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a-CE' and A.. c..(. 
Before proving this theorem, we will make some clarification. In the 
definition of a default theory in Chapter 2, we assume that the number of defaults 
in a default set is countable. Further, we also discussed partitioning defaults in~ 
into an equivalence class of sets of defaults having the same nature. The purpose 
of partitioning is to abbreviate writing a lengthy default set. Therefore, it does not 
change the meaning of each default. In addition, we can enumerate the default set 
of a default theory; i.e., ~ = { 81, ~, ~, .•• } . This set is possibly finite. Also, recall 
that a union of two countable sets is countable. 
To prove the semi-monotonicity properties, we need some tools. First, we 
construct candidate sets for an alternative extension and its assumption set for CJ)' 
based on construction 3 .1. The construction is started with the alternative 
extension a-CE and assumption set A.. for en. Second, we prove that the candidate 
sets are the alternative extension and assumption set for the modified default 
theory en· using characterization theorem 3 .2.1. 
Construction 3 .1: 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension based on an assumption set A. for a 
default theory en=(Cf, ~). Suppose en'=(Cf, ~')is a default theory such that ~c,1.'. 
1: A,·~ 1: ~ 1: A:J·B, } • fi d . C. A I Suppo~e, further, that { u 1=r,, u 2= ~2 , u 3=-t;-, ... 1s a 1xe enumeratiOn 10r u. 
We construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) as follows: 
E0 = a-CE and Ao = A, 
and fori'?:. 1, 
where 
Ei = Th(Ei-l) u U~f 
Ai = Th(Ai-t) u U;At 
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and for}~ 1, (we attempt to apply all default Ojs, one by one, using Ei_ 1), 
Ej- E·j-1 {CIs:: _A;Jlj AI A E d {B c} A·H . . } ; - ; u j uj-c;-E u, jE i-1> an j• j u ; IS consistent 
A j_Aj-1 {C B Is: _A;JI; AI A E d {B C} A.i-'. . } ;- , u j• j ui-c;eu, jE i- 1, an j• j u ; IS consistent . 
Assign E = Ui:o E; and A = Ui:o A; . All sets Eis and Ais are consistent, and so are 
sets E and A. Since E0 =a-CE and A0 = A, we conclude that a-CEcE and A._cA. 
From this construction, we can apply lemma 3.2.1 to the pair (E, A) 
resulting in Th(A) =A and Th(E) =E. In addition, we will construct a sequence of 
pairs related to (E, A) according to characterization theorem 3.2.2 as in 
construction 3 .2. 
Construction 3.2: A sequence of pairs using the characterization theorem. 
Let en and en' be default theories and a-CE be an alternative extension based 
on an assumption set A. for '1). Assume (E,A) is a pair of sets constructed as in 
construction 3.1. Construct a sequence of pairs (Si, Ti) related to the pair (E, A), 
S0 = ~ and T 0 = (f, 
and for}~ I, 
Sj = Th(Sj_1)u { Cl o=~ E 8, Ae Sj_ 1 and {B, C}uA is consistent}, 
Tj = Th(Tj_1)u {B, Cl B=A! E 8, Ae Sj-I and {B, C}uA is consistent}. 
AssignS= Uj:oSj and T = U;o ~. 
To prove theorem 3.2.5, we will use one lemma. This lemma assures that S 
and Tin construction 3.2 contain a-CE and A, respectively. It will be used as a 
basis for an induction in the proof of theorem 3.2.5. 
Lemma 3.2.5: 
Let'])=(~. d) and '])'=(a:-, d') be default theories, where dr;;A'. Suppose 
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a-CE is an alternative extension based on assumption set A. for g). If the pair (S, T) 
is constructed as in construction 3.2, then, a-CEcS and A._cT. 
Proof: Lemma 3 .2.5 
Assume that a-CE is an alternative extension based on assumption set A. for 
g) =(Cf, .!\). SandT are sets assigned in construction 3.2. Using characterization 
theorem 3.2.3, construct a sequence of pairs (Gi, Hi) related to the pair (a-CE, A) 
using the default theory CJ)=(a;-, .L\) such that a-CE =U;:0 Gi and A._=U;:oHi, where 
G0 = H0 = Cf, and for i?.I, 
Gi =Gi-l u { C I 0 = ~8 E .L\, Ae Gi-l and {B, C}uA)s consistent}, 
Hi= Hi_ 1 u {B, C lo = ~e.L\, AeGi_1 and {B, C}u_..<\_is consistent}. 
We prove a-CEcS and A._cT by an induction on ithat GicS and Hi cT. 
Basis: Go=Cf=SocS and H0=Cf=TocT. 
Hypothesis: GicS and HicT imply Gi+I cS and Hi+JcT. 
Step: Assume GncS and HncT. These imply that Th(Gn)cS and Th(Hn)~T 
since Th(S)=S and Th(T)=T by lemma 3.2.1. 
First, we prove that Gn+l cS. IfTh(Gn)=Gn+b we have proven 
Gn+l cS. Otherwise, suppose there is C such that Ce Gn+1- Th(Gn). C 
comes from applying a default Be .L\ in the construction ofGn+I; i.e., 8=~~~, 
Ae Gn and {B, C}uA_is consistent. These cause Band C in Hn+l by the 
construction of Hn+ 1. B, Ce Hn+ 1 implies B, Ce U::o Hi= A= A0, causing B 
and C in U;:oAi and also in A, since A=U;:0 Ai. By assumption GncS, Ae 
Gn implies AE S. Since u;osj=S, there is an m such thatAE Sm. Since AE 
Sm and B, Ce A, then, Ce Sm+l· So, Ce S. Hence, Gn+tCS since Th(Gn)c 
S and Gn+ 1 = Th( Gn)u{ those Cs}. 
Next, we prove that Hn+1 cT. IfTh(Hn)=Hn+l• we have proven 
Hn+I cT. Otherwise, suppose there is X such thatXEHn+l- Th(Hn)· X 
comes from applying a default Oe .L\ in the construction of Hn+ 1; i.e., 8= A~n, 
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whereX=B or X=C, such thatAeG0 and {B, C}uA.is consistent. These 
cause Band C in Hn+l· Band C in Hn+I implies Band C in U::oHi=A.=A0, 
causing B and C in U::o Ai and also in A. By assumption G0 c S, Ae G0 
implies Ae S. Since UJ:<,Sj=S, there is an m such thatAe Sm. Since Ae Sm 
and B, CeA, B, CeTm+l· Therefore, B, Ce U;o ~' causingXe Uj:o ~. 
Hn+ 1 cT since Th(H0 ) cT and Hn+ I= Th(H0 )u{ those Xs}. 
Now, we have enough tools to prove theorem 3.2.5. 
Proof: Theorem 3 .2.5 
Let en= (a:-, b.) and en I= (a:-, b.') be default theories, where ~ct'. Suppose 
a-CE is an alternative extension based on assumption set A for en. Suppose, 
fu h h { S: - .:i_!i S: - A2:~ S: - ~:B:, } • fi d . i'. A' c rt er, t at u 1- c, , u 2 -c;-, u 3 -c;-, ... IS a Ixe enumeratiOn 10r Ll. onstruct 
a pair (E, A) as in construction 3.1 and a pair (S, T) as in construction 3.2. Since 
a-cEcE and ACA, it remains to be proven that E is an alternative extension based 
on A for en'. By characterization theorem 3.2.3, we need to show E=S and A=T. 
That is, U::o Ei = U;osj and U::o Ai = U;o ~. First, we prove that S cE and T cA 
by induction onj that SjcE and TjcA. 
Basis: S0=a:-cE and T0 =a:-cA since Eo=a:- and Ao= A: 
Hypothesis: SjcE and TjcA imply Sj+I cE and Tj+l cA. 
Step: Assume S0~ and T0 cA. So, Th(S0 )cE and Th(T0 )cA since Th(E) =E 
and Th(A)=A by lemma 3.2.1. 
First, we prove Sn+ 1 c E = U:o E; . If Sn+ I =Th(S0 ), we have proven 
that Sn+l c U:oEi. Otherwise, suppose there is Ce Sn+I-Th(S0 ). C comes 
from applying a default 8 with respect to (S0 , T 0 ) in the construction of 
Sn+I; i.e., a default B=A~ ell' such thatAe S0 and {B, C}uU:oAi is 
consistent. By assumption S0~, Ae S0 causes A to be in E and also in 
u:oE; since u:oE; =A. Ae U:OE; implies that there is an m such thatAE 
Em· bE!:!' implies &=oj. Also, {B, C}uU;:oA; is consistent, implying that 
{B, C}uA~+I is consistent. Hence, C must be in E~~r~ and also in Em+ 1. 
Sn+ 1 e U:o E; since Sn+ 1 = Th(Sn)U{ those Cs}. 
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Next, we prove T n+ 1 eA = U:o A; . If T n+ 1 =Th(T n), we have proven 
that T n+ 1 cA. Otherwise, suppose there is Xe T n+ 1-Th(T n)· X comes from 
applying a default b with respect to (Sn, Tn) in the construction ofT n+I: i.e., 
a default b=A/ E !:!',where X= B or X= C, such that AE Sn and {B, C}u 
U:o A; is consistent. By assumption SncE, AE S0 causes A to be in E and 
also in U;":oE; since U;":oE;=A. AE U;":oE; implies that there is an m such 
that Ae Em. 8e !:!'implies b = bj. Also, {B, C}uU;":oA; is consistent, 
implying that {B, C}uA~1+1 is consistent. Hence, B, C must be in A~+I and 
also in Am+ 1• Since X = B or X = C, then, X must be in Am+ 1. Therefore, 
Tn_,_ 1e U;":oA; and also Tn+1eA. 
We have finished proving SeE and TeA. Now, we continue proving EcS and 
AcT by induction on i that Ei c S and Ai c T for all i. 
Basis: E0cS and A0cT by lemma 3.2.5 since a-CE=E0 and A._=A0. 
Hypothesis: EicS and AicT imply Ei+I cS and Ai+I cT. 
Step: Assume EncS and An cT. So, Th(En)cS and Th(A0 )cT since Th(S)=S 
and Th(T)=T by lemma 3.2.1. 
First, we will prove En+ I cS. IfEn+1 =Th(E0 ), then, we have proven 
En+l cS. Otherwise, suppose there is qcEn+l- Th(En). q comes from 
applying a default ()j using En in the construction of E~+l; i.e., oj= A{~j E !:!' 
such that AjE En and {Bj, q}uA~~~ is consistent. These cause Bj, qe A~+I 
and also, Bj, qeAn+l· AjEEn impliesAjE U;:oE;. Moreover, Bj, qeAn+I 
implies Bj, qe U:o A; , causing { Bj, q} u U;":0 A; to be consistent. By 
assumption En e S, and u;o sj = S, AjE En implies AjE u;o sj. AjE Uj:o sj 
implies there is Sk such that AjE Sk. Since Aje Sk and {Bj, Cj}uU:oA; is 
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consistent, CjE Sk+I· En+! cUj:0 Si since En+ I =Th(En)u{ qs}. Hence. En+ I 
cS. 
Next, we will prove An+lcT. If An+! =Th(An), we proved that An+l 
cT. Otherwise, suppose there is XeAn+l- Th(An). X comes from applying 
a default Sj using En in the construction of A~+!' That is, a default 8i= Y~' e 
8, where either X=Bj or X=q, such thatAjEEn and {Bj, Cj}uA~~~ is 
consistent, causing Bj, Cje A~+' and also, Bj, Cje An+ 1• In addition, Bj, Cje 
An+ I implies Bj, qe U~oA;, causing {Bj, Cj}uU~oA; to be consistent. By 
assumption En cS, and Uj:0SJ=S, AjE En implies AjE Uj:0Si. Aje U;os; 
implies that there is Sk such that AjE Sk. Since Aje Sk and {Bi, Lj}uU~oA; 
is consistent, then, Bj and Lje are in T k+ 1, and so is X So, An+ 1 c U;o ~ . 
Hence, An+! cT. 
We have finished proving EcS and AcT, and so the theorem. 
In the proof of theorem 3.2.5, we assume that a default set 8 has a fixed 
enumeration. We apply all defaults, one by one, following the sequence of the 
fixed numeration to construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) as in construction 3 .1. In 
this construction, we will have a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption 
for a default theory. If we have a different enumeration, we may have another 
similar pair. Therefore, adding some defaults into a default theory may cause the 
number of pairs of alternative extensions and assumption sets to increase. Each 
pair will "supersede" its based construction pair. 
The theorem is also saying that an alternative extension for a default theory 
based on an assumption set is monoton when adding defaults. 
However, the new approach is not monotonic. 
Example 3.2.10: Not monotonicity of alternative extensions related to facts 
Let q) = (Cf, 8 = { 8}) be a default theory, where (f = {bird(Tweety)} and 
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bird(x):fly(x) . . 
D = fly{x) . As seen before m example 3.2.8, th1s default theory has only 
one alternative extension a-CE, 
a-CE= Th( {bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety) }) 
based on an assumption set ..>'\ 
A..= Th( {bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety)} ). 
If we add facts "penguin(Tweety)" and "'Vx penguin(x)-+-,tly(x)" to this 
default theory (i.e., en·= ((f', ~)),where 
(f' = (fU {penguin(Tweety ), Vx penguin(x)-+-.fly(x)}) 
the new default theory will have an alternative extension a-LE', where 
a-CE' = Th( { bird(Tweety ),penguin(Tweety ), V x penguin( x)-+-.fly( x)}) 
based on an assumption set~= a-<E'. The addition "shrinks" an alternative 
extension; i.e., a-CE r:t a-<E'. 
If we add facts "bird(Clyde)" to the original default theory, for example CD" 
= (~', L1), where~·= (Fu{bird(Clyde) }, the default theory CD" has an extension 
a-CE", where 
a-CE"= Th( {bird(Tweety),bird(Clyde),fly(Tweety),fly(Clyde)}) 
based on an assumption set ~~ = a-l£". The addition enlarges an alternative 
extension; i.e., a-CE c a-tE". 
Furthermore, if we add a fact "fly(Tweety)" to the original default theory, 
the new default theory has an unchanged alternative extension based on an 
unchanged assumption set. 
Now, the existence of an alternative extension for default theories is 
guaranteed by the semi--monotonicity properties. 
Theorem 3.2.6: Existence of alternative extensions 
Every default theory has an alternative extension a-CE based on an 
............ 
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assumption set A· 
Proof: Theorem 3.2.6 
Let CJ) = ((f, .1) be a default theory. The default theory CJ)' = (CF, 0), where 
0 denotes the empty default set, has an alternative extension a-CE'= Th(CF) based 
on itself for CD'. Since 0 c .1, by the semi-monotonicity properties, there is an 
alternative extension a-CE based on an assumption set A_ for CJ) such that a-CE'ca-CE 
and a-CE'~. 
Let us consider an example in Chapter 2 which does not have an extension. 
Example 3.2.11: Non-normal default theory 
Let CJ) = (CF, .1 = {o}) be a default theory, where CF= {P} and o= P:Q. This 
-,Q 
default theory has an alternative extension a-CE = Th(CF) based on an assumption 
set A_= Th(CF). 
The next property of an alternative extension for a default theory is 
orthogonality. In the Reiter works, the orthogonality property is relative to an 
extension. In the new approach, the orthogonality property is relative to an 
assumption set. In case of normal default theories, both approaches have the same 
meaning. It can be summed up as "the union oftwo assumption sets of two 
distinct alternative extensions is inconsistent." It is concluded in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 3 .2. 7: Orthogonality of alternative extensions 
Let a-CE and a-CE' be two distinct alternative extensions based on assumption 
sets A and A for a default theory CJ) = (CF, .1 ), respectively. Then, Au A' is 
inconsistent. 
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Proof: Theorem 3.2.7 
Let (Ei, Ai) and (E'i• A'j) be sequences of pairs related to pairs (a-CE, A.) and 
(a-CE', A) using characterization theorem 3.2.2 such that a-tE= U::oE, and a-(E' = 
u::oE; and A...= u::oA;and ~ = U::oA;. Since a-CE and a-CE' are two distinct 
alternative extensions and E0 = E'0, there is ann such that En = E'n but En+ 1 =t= 
E'n+l· Therefore, there is C such that CEEn+l- E'n+l; ifthere is no such C, assume 
otherwise, CE E'n+ 1 - En+ 1• So, there is a default 8 = ~!l E ~ such that AE En, and A.. 
u{B, C} is consistent by the construction ofEn+l· By the construction of An+" 
both B and Care in An+ 1, causing both B and C in A.: Since A E E'n but Cit E'n+ 1, A.'. 
u{B, C} is inconsistent. Furthermore, because of Band C in A_ and A,'.u{B. C} 
being inconsistent, then A... is inconsistent with~- Thus, A... u A..' is inconsistent. 
It is not necessary that the union of two distinct alternative extensions be 
inconsistent. The following is one example. 
Example 3.2.12: 
Let<])= (Cf, ~ = {81> ~})be a default theory, where Cf = {P}, 01 = p R Q, 
and 02 = P sQ. This default theory has two extensions a-CE 1 and a-CE2> where 
a-tE1 = Th( {P, R} ), 
a-tE2 = Th( {P, S}) 
based on assumption sets A...1 and A2· where 
A...t = Th({P, Q, R}), 
A..2 = Th( {P, -.Q, S}) 
respectively. It is easy to see that a-CE1 ua-CE2 is consistent but A..t u A..2 is not. 
3.3 Disjunctive Fact Problems Concerning 
Prerequisites 
3 .3 .1 Preliminary Discussion 
64 
Another problem that may arise in using both the Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz approaches is to deal with disjunctive facts concerning prerequisites. 
These approaches cannot deal with default theories consisting of disjunctive facts 
in which applicabilities of defaults are blocked due to no evidence to believe any 
of their prerequisites. 
Consider the following example. This artificial example is observed by Lin 
and Shoham [22]. It shows that both the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz approaches 
do not work properly to derive facts. 
Example 3.3 .1: 
P·R 
Let Cl) =(a=-, ~={81> ~})be a default theory, where a=-= {PvQ}, 81 = -·-, R 
and<\= Q:R. This normal default theory has exactly one extension CE, where 
R 
CE=Th(~. 
It also has exactly one modified extension m-CE, where 
m-CE=Th(~ 
with respect to a justification set EJ = 0, since there is no applicable default. 
Therefore, all facts that can be derived are consequences of a hard fact set a=-. This 
is unacceptable. We should be able to derive the fact R by 81 and~ using PvQ ...... . 
~~~~~~~~ 
To see this more clearly, we present an example occurring naturally. 
Example 3.3.2: Disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites 
Suppose that all we know is that either "John was born in the US" or "John 
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was naturalized by the US government." However, we do not have any evidence 
to believe either of them. In addition, we use two typical facts to supposedly infer 
the citizenship of a US person, i.e., represented using normal defaults. The typical 
facts are "Typically, a person born in the US is a US citizen" and "Typically, a 
person naturalized by the US government is a US citizen." This problem can be 
formalized using a normal default theory q) = (~, .1) = (~, { 81, ~} ), where 
~ = {born-in-US(John) v naturalized-by-US(John)}, 
0 = bom-in-US(x):citizen-of-US(x) 
I 
citizen-of-US( x) 
and 
0 = naturalized-by-US(x):citizen-of-US(x) 
2 citizen-of-US( x) · 
Since we only know the disjunctive form of the prerequisites of both defaults, that 
is, bom-in-US(John) v naturalized-by-US(John), both defaults are inapplicable. 
Hence, an extension for CO is CE, where 
CE = Th(~). 
Furthermore, this default theory also has exactly one modified extension m-le, 
where 
m-CE= Th(~) 
with respect to a justification set 3 = 0 since there is no applicable default. So, 
both approaches result in the same set, that is, all facts derivable from the hard fact 
set ~ in terms of first order theory. Therefore, the consequences of the default 
theories are all facts that can be derived from the hard fact set. This is 
unacceptable since we should be able to infer that "citizen-of-US(John)"; i.e., John 
is a US citizen. 
From this example, even though we know a disjunctive fact (i.e., "John was 
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born in the US" or "John was naturalized by the US government'1) we are not able 
to use either defaults to derive any fact, even though no inconsistency has 
occurred. So, both the Reiter and Lukaszewicz approaches should be revised in 
order to deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites. 
The major problem concerning prerequisites is that we cannot apply 
defaults due to no evidence to believe their prerequisites. Those defaults have the 
same nature in the justification. They have the same justification. So, we can 
construct a class of equivalence sets. Each equivalence set consists of defaults 
having the same justification and is called a default set associated to a justification. 
Since the number of defaults in a default theory is countable, we should have a 
countable class of such associated sets. For any associated default set, we 
construct a set of disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites of the defaults in the 
set. These forms come from defaults having the same justifications. In such a set, 
we may find special disjunctive forms that may be useful in applying the related 
defaults. Those disjunctive forms are called prime. So, by forcing consistency in 
applying defaults using prime disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites of some 
defaults, we can infer some facts in the form of disjunctions consisting of 
consequents of the related defaults. This approach should solve the disjunctive 
fact problems concerning prerequisites as mentioned above. In addition, this new 
approach should also solve the disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications 
as mentioned in the previous section since we are forcing consistency in the 
assumption set when applying defaults using a prime disjunctive form. This is the 
idea behind the new approach. 
3.3.2 New Approach tQ Solving Disjunctive &.Q1 
Problems Concerning Prerequisites 
As previously mentioned, we need to revise both the Reiter and the 
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Lukaszewicz approaches in order to deal with disjunctive fact problems 
concerning prerequisites. The main problem in dealing with fact problems 
concerning prerequisites is that we cannot apply some defaults due to no evidence 
to believe their prerequisite (though there is evidence to believe their disjunctive 
form) even though consistency is guaranteed. So, a disjunctive fact can cause the 
application of some defaults to be blocked. 
These problems can be overcome by letting a system apply defaults using 
not only their prerequisites but their disjunctive form consisting of their 
prerequisites as well. In addition, we need to force consistency not only in a set of 
the justification, the consequents, and the disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites of defaults under consideration, but in the whole set of hard facts and 
justifications, consequents, and disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites of all 
applicable defaults as well. Therefore, the applicability of defaults is checked 
against their prerequisites in disjunctive forms. By doing this, we extend the 
applicability of default in terms of prerequisites. 
This can be accomplished by generating a class of sets of disjunctive forms 
based on prerequisites of defaults having the same justification. That is, for any 
distinct justification, we define a set of disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites of defaults, which have the same justification. Therefore, in 
applying defaults, we need to check against their associated sets. In doing so, we 
extend the applicability of defaults . 
.. Before extending the applicability of defaults, we need some definitions. 
First, we partition defaults into sets based on justification Bs. Each set, noted ~B 
and called a default set associated to justification B, consists of defaults having the 
same B. It is defined in the following. 
Definition: Associated default sets 
Let 6 be a set of defaults. The set of defaults associated to justification B, 
noted 38 , is as follows: 
3 8 = { 0= A:B I OE .1}. 
c 
8 8 is called an associated default set to a justification B. 
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A set 38 is associated to B appearing in place of the justification of defaults. 
So, the number of sets B8 s depends on the number of distinct justifications in .1. 
Example 3.3.3: 
Let .1 = {o = bird(Twee~:fl){Tweety) >:.~ = pet(Tweety):fl){Tweety) 0 = 
I fl){Tweety) ' VZ fl)(Tweety) ' 3 
bird(Clyde):fly(Clyde)} b f d r. I s· d' . . 'fi . . fl){Clyde) e a set o e1au ts. mce two tstmct JUStt tcahons appears m 
defaults in .1, there are only two default sets associated to them: "fly(Tweety)" and 
"fly( Clyde)." They are Bfl)(Tweety) and Bfl)(CJyde)' where 
3fl)(Tweety)= {OJ,~} 
and 
For each set 88 , we generate a set of disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites of defaults in the set B8 • Each form is called a disjunctive form 
consisting of prerequisites. 
Definition: Set of disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites 
Let q) = (8=", .1) be a default theory and B8 denote a default set associated to 
a justification B. Construct a set noted CJIB as follows: 
<HB = {V;~ I O=~E B8 and Ais are distinct}. 
<HB is called a set of disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites associated to a 
justification B. An element in the set, Y; ~. is called a disjunctive form consisting 
of prerequisites. 
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That is, a set of all disjunctive forms consist of prerequisites of defaults 
having the same justification. The disjunctive operator Vi may take any number 
of operands as long as all prerequisites, A is, are different. However, since a default 
set 88 is countable, the generated set should be countable. 
Example 3.3 .4: 
Let~= {b~> b.2, ~}be a default set of a default theory 1}), where 01=Pb0 , 
02 =~R, and 03= T~R. There are two distinct justifications. So, there are two default 
sets associated to justifications: 80 = { o1} and 8R = { b.2. o3 }. A set of a disjunctive 
form consisting of a prerequisite related to 80 is Cflo = { P} and a set of disjunctive 
forms consisting of prerequisites related to BR is CfiR = { Q, T, QvT}. 
The word "distinct" means no duplicate prerequisite in any disjunctive form 
V;A;. For example, A1vA2vA 1 is not a disjunctive form sinceA 1vA2vA 1=A 1vA2. 
In addition, Av't is also not, since Av't='t, where 't stands for verum as opposed to 
the symbol ..L, falsum. So, 't will not appear in another disjunctive form but itself. 
It is related to a default without a prerequisite. 
Before presenting a new approach to dealing with disjunctive facts, we need 
to define a prime element in a set of disjunctive forms with respect to a set. It is 
needed to apply defaults and is called a prime disjunctive form. 
Definition: Prime disjunctive forms 
Let CfiB denote a set of disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites based 
on a justification B. A disjunctive form v~=I ~ in CfiB is prime with respect to a set 
S if and only ifv~=I ~E S but v~=I ~is not derivable from a set {Aj=V~=I ~IAje 
i .. j 
<HB, Aje S, 1 ~j~ n} ins. We call it a prime disjunctive form of prerequisites. (~(~ 
~~«: 
In other words, a disjunctive form A = v~=I ~ in <HB is prime with respect to 
a set S if and only if it is in S but cannot be derived from a set of disjunctive 
forms Aj sinS obtained by removing one prerequisite Aj from A; i.e., Aj=V~=l A,. 
'"J 
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If A is a prerequisite of a default, i.e., n = 1, it is likely that it is a prime disjunctive 
form. We only need to check its membership in S· Therefore, it is possible that 
several disjunctive forms in <Hs are prime but they are countable. 
In addition, a special treatment should be taken for 't. This form 't is always 
prime. It is related to a default without a prerequisite, and it is likely applicable. 
Also, for every prime disjunctive form v~=l A;, there are B, C b ... , and Cn 
related to it. B is the related justification of the defaults. The related disjunctive 
form v~=t ~ is a disjunctive form consisting of the consequents of the defaults. 
Example 3.3.5: Prime disjunctive forms 
Let us see the previous example. Let CH0 and <HR be sets of disjunctive 
forms consisting of prerequisites, where 
<Ho = {P} 
and 
<HR = {Q, T, QvT}. 
Suppose, further, that S = Th( {P, Q, QvT} ). Therefore, both P and Q are prime 
disjunctive forms in Cflo and CHR, respectively, with respect to s. Since Q is inS, 
QvT is not a prime disjunctive form in CHR with respect to S since it is derivable 
from Q in s. Furthermore, T is not a prime disjunctive form since T E S. 
The following lemma is very useful in the proof of theorems in the rest of 
paper. It is related to the derivability of a disjunctive form. 
Lemma 3 .3 .1: 
Let v~=1 A; be a disjunctive form in a set CHs. Suppose that a setS is 
deductively closed. If v~=1 Ai in S, then v~=I A; is derivable from a set of prime 
::::~:::::: 
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disjunctive forms in Cfl8 with respect to S-
This lemma says that if a disjunctive form in Cfls is derivable from a 
deductively closed set S, then it is derivable from a set of prime disjunctive forms 
in s; they are in Cfls. 
Proof: Lemma 3 .3 .I 
Let v~=I A; be a disjunctive form in a set CfiB and S is deductively closed. If 
v~=J A; is prime with respect to S, then we proved the lemma. Otherwise, suppose 
that v~=I A; is not prime. Therefore, v~=l A; is derivable from a set of Aj s in S and 
CH8 , 1 S:.j -:;.n, each Aj is resulted from removing one prerequisite from v:1 ~. If all 
Aj s are prime with respect to S, then, we have proven the lemma. Otherwise, 
suppose that there is an Aj that is not prime. By the same reason, Aj can be 
derived from a set of smaller disjunctive forms in S and Cfls by removing one 
prerequisite from Aj. This continues until all smaller disjunctive forms are prime 
with respect to S- This is guaranteed because the smallest disjunctive forms in Cfl8 
consist of one prerequisite. In addition, they must be prime with respect to S-
Example 3.3.6: 
Let H8 be a set {P, Q, R, S, T, PvQ, PvR, PvS, PvT, ... , PvQvRvSvT}. 
Suppose that S=Th({P, PvQ, QvR, RvSvT}). Disjunctive forms P, QvR, RvSvT 
are inS, and they are prime with respect to S· Disjunctive form A= PvQvRvSvT 
is ins. However, it is not prime and is derivable from {PvQvR, RvSvT} inS· A 
disjunctive form RvSvT is prime with respect to S but PvQvR is not. PvQvR 
can be derived from {PvQ, QvR} inS· Also, QvR is prime with respect to S but 
PvQ is not. PvQ is derivable from P in S, and P is prime. So, A is derivable from 
a set {P, QvR, RvSvT} inS, and P, QvR, RvSvT are all prime with respect to q.; .... 
~~~~~ 
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Before presenting a new approach, we need to make some clarification in 
dealing with disjunctive forms. As Kautz and Selman observed, some defaults 
may have the same justification but they may have prerequisites in the form of 
complements to each other [19]. That is, their disjunctive form consists of 
prerequisites of defaults, implying that is always true. For example, consider the 
following two defaults 01 and~. where o,=~ and 02=~. The disjunctive form 
consisting of prerequisites of both defaults, Pv-,P, is always true. Therefore, we 
are likely able to conclude that the disjunctive form is prime. So, we are likely 
able to infer Q regardless ofP. It seems weird. However, by looking at both 
defaults, we can combine the two defaults into one default which does not have a 
prerequisite. That is, a default O= r~Q. Therefore, it is more likely that this default 
is applicable. So, it is reasonable to assume that the disjunctive form is replace by 
't. Furthermore, 't will not appear in another disjunctive form but itself. 
Example 3.3.7: 
Let <HB be a set of disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites, where 
tHB = { 't, P, Q, R, PvQ, PvR, QvR, PvQvR}, 
and S be a set, where 
S = Th( {PvR, QvR, S}) 
Therefore, the forms 't, PvR and QvR are prime disjunctive forms in tHE with 
respect to S· However, PvQvR is not since both PvR and QvR are in S, and Pv 
QvR is derivable from {PvR, QvR} inS· 
Now, we are in a position to defme formally a new version to deal with 
disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites. In addition, it also can deal 
with disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications. The main idea is to check 
the applicability of defaults using their related set of disjunctive forms consisting 
of prerequisites. A pair of sets defmed in the definition is called an alternative 
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extension and an assumption set for a default theory. 
Definition: Alternative extensions 
Let CJ) = (Cf, !1) be a default theory and (E, A) be a pair of closed well-
formed formula sets. Suppose that cHB denotes a set of disjunctive forms 
consisting of prerequisites based on a justification B of defaults in !1. Suppose that 
(f1(E, A), f2(E, A)) is a pair of the smallest sets satisfying the following three 
conditions: 
Sl. (fcfi(E, A), for i=l,2; 
S2. ThQ~,ri(E, A))= fi(E, A), for i=l,2; and 
S3. if A = v~~l Ai E CHB is a prime disjunctive form with respect to r I (E, A) and 
Au{B, CI> ... , C0 } is consistent, then 
• v~~~C: isinf1(E,A);and 
• Band CI> ... , C0 are in f 2(E, A). 
A closed well-formed formula set a-CE is an alternative extension for a default 
theory CJ) if and only if there is a closed well-formed formula set A, called an 
assumption set, such that 
This definition is a little more complex than that of the previous section. It 
provides criteria for a closed well-formed formula set a-<E to be an alternative 
extension based on an assumption set A.. for a default theory CJ). A pair of an 
alternative extension a-CE and an assumption set A.. is a fixed point of operators r 1 
and r 2, a-CE= f 1(a-c:E, A) and A..= f2(a-CE, A), based on three conditions. The first 
two conditions are identical with those in the previous section, that is, both an 
alternative extension and an assumption set containing the entire hard fact set and 
being inductively closed. 
The difference is in the third condition, and it is related to the applicability 
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of some defaults. It requires that there be a prime disjunctive form consisting of 
prerequisites in <HB with respect to alternative extension a-CE. In addition, 
justification Band the related consequents C~> ... , Cn are consistent with the 
assumption set A· If these requirements are satisfied, then B and the related 
consequents must be in assumption set A· The related disjunctive form consisting 
of consequents must also be in alternative extension a-CE. In this case, the defaults 
are called applicable to an alternative extension a-CE based on an assumption set A· 
In addition, when some defaults are applied, a justification B and a disjunctive 
form consisting of prerequisite, related consequents are closed well-formed 
formulae. 
In addition, the smallness of both alternative extension and assumption set 
assures that no more facts are added to them without any reason. In other words, a 
fact is in an alternative extension if it is a hard fact, a disjunctive form consisting 
of consequents of applicable defaults, or a fact derivable from the set of hard facts 
and the set of disjunctive forms consisting of consequents of applicable defaults. 
Furthermore, a fact is in an assumption set if it is a hard fact or a justification or 
consequents of applicable defaults, or a fact derivable from the set of hard facts, 
justifications, and consequents of applicable defaults. 
As already noticed in the previous section, by combining the first two 
conditions, we can conclude that all facts derivable from a hard fact set are in both 
an alternative extension and an assumption set; i.e., Th( 00 c a-CE and Th( 00 cA: 
In addition, by condition S3, an assumption set contains all justifications and 
consequents of applicable defaults. Meanwhile, an alternative extension contains 
all disjunctive forms consisting of consequents of applicable defaults. Therefore, 
an alternative extension is a subset of an assumption set; i.e., a-CEc-A: 
Furthermore, since an assumption set must be consistent, an alternative extension 
is also consistent. 
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To check whether a pair of sets is a pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set for a default theory, we need to verify the satisfaction of the three 
conditions above in addition to the smallness of the pair. In other words, a pair of 
closed well-formed formula sets may satisfy one, two, or three ofthe conditions 
with respect to a default theory q) = (Cf, .6) but not necessarily be a pair of an 
alternative extension and an assumption set. A pair of sets (E, A) may satisfy 
condition S 1; i.e., (TeE and (TeA. It may satisfy condition S2; i.e., Th(E) = E 
and Th(A) =A. Also, it may satisfy condition S3; i.e., if v~=I ~ is a prime 
disjunctive form consisting of prerequisites in CHB, a set of disjunctive forms 
consisting of prerequisites related to justification B, with respect toE, and Au{B, 
Ct. ... , Cn} is consistent, then v~=t C;eE and B, C1, .•• , CneA. However, (E, A) 
may not be a pair of the smallest sets. 
The main reason for using prime disjunctive forms in applying defaults is 
that we assure that we derive all disjunctive forms whenever possible and 
reasonable. By doing so, we do not have disjunctive fact problems concerning 
prerequisites as mentioned early in this chapter. So, the new approach will handle 
those problems adequately. Furthermore, we still force the consistency of the 
assumption set in applying defaults. Therefore, the disjunctive fact problems 
concerning justifications will not arise in the new approach. So, the new approach 
will handle both problems adequately. 
Example 3.3.8: 
As mentioned early in example 3.3 .1, default theory q) = ((7, d = { 81, ~} ), 
~ P:R d ~ Q:R h I . a;:- d where (T = {P v Q }, u1 =--,an u2 = --, as exact y one extensiOn 'L an R R 
also exactly one modified extension m-CE with respect to EJ = 0, where CE = m-CE = 
Th( (f). Now, we see an alternative extension a-CE for this theory. That is, 
a-CE= Th(~u{R}) 
based on an assumption set A, 
A= Th((fu {R} ). 
It is easy to see that the pair (a-<E, A) satisfies conditions S 1 and S2. Now, we 
need to check condition S3. This default theory has only one default set 8R 
associated to justification R. So, the set of disjunctive fonns consisting of 
prerequisites related to 8R is tJIR ={P, Q, PvQ}. Therefore, a prime disjunctive 
fonn in tJIR with respect to a-CE is PvQ. It is the only prime disjunctive fonn in 
tJIR with respect to a-CE. Since R is consistent with A, the related justification R 
and the related disjunctive fonn consisting of consequents RvR = R, must be in 
a-CE. Also, justification R and the consequents R must be in A_. So, the pair 
satisfies S3. In addition, (a-CE, A) is a pair of the smallest sets satisfying Sl, S2, 
and S3. Hence, the pair satisfies as an alternative extension based on an 
assumption set for <_D. 
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The concept of a consequence in a default theory is different from other 
theories, for example, NMLs [26] and Disjunctive Default Theories [18]. A 
consequence ofNMLs is a closed well-fonned fonnula that belongs to the 
intersection of all extensions. For example, if A is a closed well-formed fonnula in 
all extensions for an NML, then A is a consequence of the NML. A different 
concept is also used in disjunctive default theories, DDTs for short. A 
consequence ofDDTs is a closed well-formed fonnula that belongs to all 
extensions. For example, if Ai is a closed well-fonned formula in a set Ei, where 
Ei is an extension for a DDT, 1 ~i~n, V~1 ~ is a consequence of the DDT. 
In contrast, a consequence of a default theory is a sentence that belongs to 
an alternative extension. Therefore, we need to check whether a closed well-
fanned formula is in any extension before we can say that it is a consequence of 
the default theory. For example, if A is a closed well-fonned fonnula in an 
extension for a default theory, then it is a consequence of the default theory. 
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Let us see how the new approach solves example 3.3.1 occurring naturally. 
Example 3.3.9: Disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisite 
Consider the default theory CJ) = (Cf, a = { o1, ~} ), where 
a:-= {born-in-US(John) v naturalized-by-US(John)}, 
8 _ born-in-US(x):citizen-of-US(x) 
~-
citizen-of-US( x) 
and 
8 = naturalized-by-US( x ): citizen-of-US( x) 
2 citizen-of-US(x) · 
It is easy to see that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A. 
for en, where 
a-CE= A.= Th(Cfv{ citizen-of-US( John)}). 
In the new approach, we can conclude that "John is a US citizen" as intended. 
The following example is a default theory involving a default without a 
prerequisite. So, the symbol 't is more likely to be a prime disjunctive form. 
Example 3.3.10: 
Let en = (Cf, A={ 8i I I ~ i ~ 4}) be a default theory, where a:-={PvQ}, o1 = ~~, 
82 = ~~ , 83 = s~T, and 8 4 = ~:T . The prerequisites of 03 and 84 are complements. So, 
there will be 'tin a set of disjunctive forms related to a justification B = T. Hence, 
combining those defaults will result in a default without prerequisite. In addition, 
there are two distinct justifications. So, there are two associated default sets: BR 
and 8T. The sets of disjunctive forms related to BR and BT are 'HR = {P, Q, PvQ} 
and <fiT= {'t}, respectively. The candidate prime disjunctive forms are P, Q, PvQ 
and 't. p and Q are not prime since we do not have evidence to believe P and Q, 
respectively. Therefore, an alternative extension for Cj) is a-CE based on ~ where 
a-CE= Th({PvQ, R1vR2, T1vT2}) and A.= Th({PvQ, Rt, R2, Tt. T2}). It is the 
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only alternative extension for Cj). 
.. .......... 
Gelfond et al. developed a totally new theory, called Disjunctive Default 
Theories, to deal with disjunctive facts [18]. Their approach is not only to change 
the representation of a default theory and the derivation of extensions, but also to 
change the representation of defaults. Their theory can deal adequately with 
disjunctive problems. Furthermore, their approach is more general than the new 
approach. 
However, deriving facts using a disjunctive default theory is similar to that 
of the Reiter approach. In their approach, the applicability of a default is checked 
against the derivability of its prerequisite and the consistency of its justification. 
So, it may lack extensions, as the Reiter approach may. Furthermore, this 
approach may fail to derive facts, as we will see in the following example. 
Consider the following example. This is an artificial example. 
Example 3.3.11: 
s: P.R s: -,QR s: P:-,S s: -,Q-,S }) be a Let G = ( {P 1-,Q, R H S, o 1=-, o 2=--, o3=--, o 4 R R -.S -,S 
disjunctive default theory. ( P 1-,Q is to be understood as of a disjunctive default 
according to the Gel fond et al. formulation.) This disjunctive default theory G has 
exactly four extensions: c.E., ~. c.E3, and CE4, where 
and 
c.Et = Th( {P, R H S, R} ), 
CE2 = Th({-,Q, RHS, R}), 
CE3 = Th( {P, R H S, -,S} ), 
CE4 = Th( { -,Q, R H S, -.S }). 
Both cr;1 and~ contain both RandS whereas both CE3 and CE4 contain both -,R 
and -,S. Therefore, Rv-,R, Rv-,S, Sv-,R, and Sv-,S are consequences of the 
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disjunctive default theory G. (A consequence for a disjunctive default theory is a 
sentence that belongs to all extensions [18].) That is, nothing is additionally 
derivable using defaults. So, R is not a consequence of G; neither is S. This is not 
acceptable since we should be able to derive R by applying defaults 51 and ~ 
using the disjunctive fact Pv-.Q. 
Let us consider a default theory CJ) = (3=', ~),where a=-= {Pv-,Q, RHS}, 
d A {~ PR ~ -.QR ~ P:....,S -.Q-,S . an L\ = ui=-R , u2=-R , u 3=--, 04 }. Thts default theory has two 
-.S ....,S 
alternative extensions: a-C£1 and a-C£2, where 
a-C£ 1 = Th({Pv-,Q, RHS, R}) 
and 
a-C£2 = Th( {Pv-,Q, RHS, ....,S} ), 
based on assumption sets AJ and ..4.2, respectively, where 
AJ = Th( {Pv-,Q, RHS, R}) 
and 
A.2 = Th( {Pv-,Q, RHS, -,S} ). 
Therefore, R is a consequence of the default theory q) as intended. 
The new approach should not destroy the ability to derive facts using a 
default in the absence of information as Reiter intended. In the new approach, the 
applicability of defaults is related to prime disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites. Furthermore, a prime disjunctive form is obtained from defaults by 
making a disjunctive form of their prerequisite. So, a default could be applicable 
since its prerequisite could be a prime disjunctive form. Hence, the new approach 
does not destroy the capability of defaults in deriving facts as Reiter intended. 
Example 3.3.12: The ability ofbirds to fly 
Let q) = (3=', ~ = { b}) be a default theory, where 3=' = {bird(Tweety)} and 
8 = bird(x):fly(x) 
fly(x) · 
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Since there is only one distinct justification, there is only one default set associated 
to justification "fly(Tweety)." The set is Bfll{Tweet)')= { 8}. Furthermore, the set of 
disjunctive forms consisting of a prerequisite related to 8 is <Hfl (T ) fll{Twee!)') y weety ' 
where <Hfly(Tweety) = {bird(Tweety)}. So, "bird(Tweety)" is the only candidate to 
be a prime disjunctive form in CHfly· It is easy to see that a-CE is the only 
alternative extension for <I) based on an assumption set A, where 
a-CE= Th( {bird( Tweety), fly( Tweety)} ), 
A= Th( {bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety)} ). 
3.3 .3 ~ Properties .of~~ Approach 
In this section we will see some properties of the new approach for building 
an alternative extension for a default theory. We will attempt to provide and prove 
some properties similar to those of the previous approaches. 
The characterization theorem for an alternative extension for arbitrary 
default theories based on an assumption set will be given in the following. This 
theorem provides a more intuitive way to identify a pair (E, A) satisfying as an 
alternative extension and an assumption set for a default theory. According to the 
theorem, we can construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) that can be used to identifY a 
pair (E, A) satisfying the conditions for an alternative extension E and an 
assumption set A. The sufficient and necessary condition for a pair (E, A) 
satisfying as an alternative extension E and an assumption set A for a default 
theory is that the pair is identical with the pair of the unions of all elements of the 
constructed sequence; i.e., (E, A)= (Uj:oEp u;oA). The following theorem sums 
up this property. 
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Theorem 3.3 .1: The characterization of an alternative extension 
Suppose q) = (g;, .!\)is a default theory, and a-tE and A. are closed well-
formed formula sets. Suppose that 'Hs denotes a set of disjunctive forms 
consisting of prerequisites associated to a justification B of defaults in ~. Let (E0, 
Ao), (E b A 1 ), ... be a sequence of pairs of closed well-formed formula sets. noted 
as (Ej, Aj), such that 
Eo = Cf and Ao = g; 
and, for};;:: I 
Ej = Th(Ej-I) u {v:1 C: I v~=1 ~e<HB is a prime disjunctive form with 
respect to Ej.1, <HB is associated to a justification B of 
defaults in~. and A._u{B, C1, ... , Cn} is consistent}, 
Aj = Th(Aj_1) u {B, C1, ... , Cn I v~=t ~e <Hs is a prime disjunctive form with 
respect to Ej. 1, <HB is associated to a justification B of 
defaults in~. and A._u{B, C1, ... , Cn} is consistent}. 
A set of closed well-formed formulae a-<E is an alternative extension based on an 
assumption set A_ for q) if and only if 
To prove that a pair (E, A) of sets is an alternative extension and an 
assumption set, we first construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) using a pair (E, A). 
Then, we need to check whether the pair is identical with the pair of the union of 
all members of the sequence. If so, the pair (E, A) is an alternative extension and 
an assumption set. 
To prove the theorem, we use three lemmas. The following is the first. It 
says that the pair (U;oEi' u;oA) satisfies Sl, S2, and S3. 
Lemma 3.3 .2: 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension based on an assumption set A._ for a 
default theory <n=(~. A); i.e., a-CE=r1(a-CE, 7\.) and A._=r2(a-CE, 7\). Then, 
rl(a-CE, 7\.) c U;oEi and r2(a-CE, 7\.) c U;Ai 
Proof: Lemma 3 .3 .2 
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Since (r 1 (a-CE, A), r 2( a-CE, A) is a pair of the smallest set satisfying S 1, S2, 
and S3, it is enough to show that the pair (U;oEi, U;oAi) satisfies three conditions 
Sl, S2, and S3. 
S 1. Both E0 and Ao contain ~- Therefore, the pair ( u;oE i, U;oA i ) satisfies S 1. 
S2. Since Th(Ei_1)cEi and Th(Ai_1)cAi for i?.l, then, Th(U;oAi) = U;oAiand 
Th(U;oEi) = U;oEi by lemma 3.2.1. So, the pair satisfies S2. 
S3. We need to prove that if v~=' ~ is a prime disjunctive form in CHB with respect 
to u;oEi, and {B, C1, ... , Cn}uU;cAi is consistent, then, v~=' C;e u;oEi and 
B, CI, ... , CnE U;oAi. 
Suppose v~=' ~ is a prime disjunctive form in CHB with respect to u;oEi' and 
{B, C1, ... , Cn}uU;oAi is consistent. By the construction ofEj, there is an m 
such that V~1 Ai is a prime disjunctive form in CHB with respect to Em· Since 
{B, C1, ... , Cn}uU;oAi is consistent, so is {B, C1, ... , Cn}uAm. Hence, v~=' C; 
E Em+ 1 and B, C 1, ... , Cne Am+ I by the construction of Em+ I and Am+ I· So, 
v~=' C;e Uj:oEi and B, C1, ... , Cne U;oAi. Hence, the pair (U;oEi, U;oAi) 
satisfies R3. 
The following is the second lemma. It says that the necessary condition for 
the construction not to add unnecessary facts to a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) is that 
we use a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set as a basis. 
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Lemma 3.3.3: 
Suppose that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A.. 
for a default theory q); i.e., a-CE= f 1(a-CE, A) and A..= f 2(a-CE, A). If(Ei> Ai) is a 
sequence of pairs constructed in theorem 3.4.1, then 
Uj:oEi c f1(a-CE, A) and Uj:oAi c f 2(a-CE, A). 
Proof: Lemma 3.3.3 
We need to prove that Uj:oEi c a-CE and U;oAi c A We will first prove 
U;,oEi c a-CE by a contradiction; i.e., suppose U;oEi r:t a-CE. Since Eo c a-CE and 
Ej-1 c Ej forj2: 1, there is an m such that Em c a-CE but Em+ I r:t a-CE. By the 
monotonicity property of first order theory, Th(Em) c Th(a-CE), and Th(Em) c a-tE 
by S2 since a-CE= f 1(a-CE, A..). Since Em+ I r:t a-CE, there is v~=1 C;E Em+l- a-CE. So, 
v~=1 C, E Th(Em), and v~=l C, is a disjunctive form of consequents of applicable 
defaults by the construction of Em+ 1• Therefore, there is v~=1 A; being a prime 
disjunctive form in lHB with respect to Em, and {B, C1, ... , Cn}UA..is consistent. 
So, v~= 1 ~EEm· By the assumption Em c a-CE, A,..EEm implies v~= 1 ~Ea-CE. We 
need to find a contradiction; i.e., v~=1 C, E a-'E. If v~=1 A; is a prime disjunctive form 
with respect to a-tE, by S3, v~=1 C,e a-CE since {B, C1, ••. , Cn}UA,..is consistent. 
Otherwise, suppose v:1 ~is not a prime disjunctive form with respect to a-CE. 
Therefore, v:1 A; is derivable from a set of prime disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites in a-CE by lemma 3.3.1. Since {B, C1, ... , Cn}uA_is consistent, {B, 
Ck1, ••• , Ck)uA_is consistent, where Cki= q, 1 5:) 5: n, causing that those related 
ViCks are derivable and are in rl(a-CE, A) by S3. In addition, v~=l c, is derivable 
I 
from a set of the related vi Ck1 s. By monotonicity, v~=1 C, is in r 1 (a-CE, A). The 
contradiction is found. It must be u;oEi~f1 (a-CE, A). 
We finish proving by a contradiction the lemma that U;oAi ~ i.e., 
suppose U;oA j r:t.A.: Since Ao cA.. and Aj-1 cAj for j;;:: 1 , there is an m such that Am 
s;;;A.. but Am+ 10:7\: So, Th(Am) c Th( A), implying Th(Am) CA. by S2 since A.= 
f2(a-CE, A). Since Am+I<t: ~there isXEAm+l- A_ by the construction of Am+ I> 
implying X~ Th(Em). So, X is either a justification or a consequent of applicable 
defaults. We need to fmd a contradiction; i.e.,XE_,.c\ 
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By the construction of Am+ 1, there is a prime disjunctive form v~=1 ~ E tHE 
with respect to Em and {B, C1, ..• , Cn}uA,is consistent, where X= B or X= q. 
Since v~=1 ~ E Em, v~=1 ~ in a-CE by the assumption Em ~ a-CE. If v~=1 ~ is a prime 
disjunctive form with respect to a-CE, then X must be in A by S3. Otherwise, 
suppose v~=1 ~ is not a prime disjunctive form with respect to a-CE. By lemma 
3.3.1, therefore, v~=1 ~ is derivable from a set of prime disjunctive forms 
consisting of prerequisites in a-<E. Since {B, C1, ... , Cn}UAis consistent, {B, Ck1, 
... , Ck }uAis consistent, where Ck= CJ·, 1 ~j ~ n, causing that those related B, C1, 
n 1 
... , Cn are in f 2(a-CE, A) by S3. So, Xis in f 2(a-CE, A). This is the contradiction. 
It must be Uj:oAi c f 2(a-<E, A). 
The following is the last lemma used to prove theorem 3.3.1. It says that 
the sufficient condition for the construction not to add unnecessary facts to a 
sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) is that we use the pair (lJpoEi, u;oA) as a basis for the 
construction of the sequence of pairs. 
Lemma 3.3.4: 
Let ( a-<E, A) be a pair of sets, and a sequence of pairs (Ei> Ai) be 
constructed as in theorem 3.3.1 using default theory Cj)=(Cf, A). Ifa-<E = u;oEj 
and A= U;oAi, then 
Uj:oEj c f 1(a-<E, A) and U~i c f2(a-CE, A). 
Proof: 
Assume that a-CE= u;oEi and A= U;,oAj. We will prove by induction onj 
that Ej crl(a-CE, A) and Aj cr2(a-CE, A) for allj. 
Basis: Eo=~ c rt(a-<E, A) and Ao =a; c r 2(a-CE, A). 
Hypothesis: Ej c rl(a-CE, A) and Aj c r 2(a-CE, A) imply Ej+I c r 1(a-CE, A) and 
Aj+ 1 cr 2( a-CE, A) 
Step: Assume that Em c rt(a-tE, A) and Am c r 2(a-CE, A). Then, by S2 and 
monotonicity, Th(Ero) c rt(a-CE, A) and Th(Am) c r 2(a-CE, A). 
First, we will prove that Em+ I c r 1(a-tE, A). lfEm+I =Th(Em), we 
have proven it. Otherwise, suppose there is a v:1 ~ such that v~=1 ~ e 
Em+ I- Th(Em). By the construction ofEm+I and Am+l> there is a prime 
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disjunctive form v:1 ~ consisting of prerequisites of applicable defaults 
with respect to Em and {B, Ch ... , Cn}UA..is consistent. v:1AieEm implies 
v:,~e r 1(a-CE, A) by the assumption Em~r1 (a-CE, A). Ifv:1 ~ is also 
prime with respect to a-CE, then V~~t ~E rl(a-CE, A) and B, C" ... , Cne r2(a-
CE, A) by S3. Otherwise, suppose that it is not. By lemma 3.3 .1, v~=t ~ is 
derivable from a set of prime disjunctive forms in <Hn and rl(a-tE, A). 
Since {B, C1, ... , Cn}uA.,is consistent, {B, Ck1, ... , Ckn}uA,is consistent, 
where Cki= Cj, 1 '5:j '5: n, causing that those related vick;s are derivable and 
are in r 1(a-tE, A) by S3. In addition, v:1 ~ is derivable from a set ofthe 
those related ViCks. By monotonicity, V~=1 ~ is in rt(a-CE, A). Since Em+ I 
I 
= Th(Em) u {those V~=t ~ s}, Em +I cr I (a-CE, A). 
Next, we prove that Am+ I c r2(a-tE, A). If Am+ I =Th(Am), we have 
proven it. Otherwise, suppose there is X such thatXEEm+I- Th(Em)· By 
the construction of Am+ I> there is a prime disjunctive form v~=t ~ consisting 
of prerequisites of applicable defaults with respect to Em and { B, C I, ... , Cn} 
uA,is consistent. v~~eEm implies v:1 ~er1(a-CE, A) by the assumption 
Emcr1(a-<E, A). Ifv:1~ is also prime with respect to a-CE, then v~~~ ~e 
r 1(a-<E, A) andB, C1, ••• , Cner2(a-<E, A) by S3. Otherwise, suppose that it 
86 
is not. By lemma 3.3.1, v:1~ is derivable from a set of prime disjunctive 
forms in <HB and ri(a-<E, A). Since {B,C1, ... ,C0 }u,A)s consistent, {B, Ck1, 
... , C~cn}uAis consistent, where Cki= q, 1 -5.:}:::; n, causing that those related 
B, Ct, ... , Cn are in r2(a-<E, A) by S3. So, Xis in r 2(a-<E, A). Since 
Am+t=Th(Am)u{thoseXs}, Am+tc:r2(a-<E, A). 
Using these three lemmas, it is easy to prove theorem 3.4.1. This is the 
proof of the theorem. 
Proof: Theorem 3.4.1 
(if part) 
Suppose that a-<E is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A 
for a default theory 'D; i.e., a-CE= r 1(a-<E, A) and A= r 2(a-<E, A). Then, 
• rt(a-CE, A) c U~i and r2(a-CE, A)~ U;oAi by lemma 3.3.2; and 
• rl(a-CE, A) ::2 U~i and r2(a-<E, A) :::2 U;oAi by lemma 3.3.3. 
(only if part) 
Suppose that a-<E = U~Ei and A= U;oA i. Then, 
• r 1(a-CE, A)~ U~Ei and r2(a-<E, A)~ U;oAi by lemma 3.3.2; and 
• r 1(a-<E, A) :J U~Ei and r 2(a-<E, A) :::2 U;oAi by lemma 3.3.4. 
Hence, we prove the theorem. 
: Let us verify the pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set in 
the eXample 3.3.8 using the characterization theorem. 
Example 3.3.12: 
We will prove using the characterization that a pair (a-CE = Th( ~u { R} ), A... 
= Th(~u {R} )) is a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set for the 
{ Q} ~ P:R d ~ Q:R default theory Cj) = (Cf, a= {01> O;z}), where Cf= Pv 'ui=R, an u2=R· 
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Since there is only one distinct justification, there is only one default set associated 
to the justification: BR. Hence, the set of disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites related to BR is <HR = { P, Q, P v Q } . So, a prime disjunctive form 
consisting of prerequisites in CJIR with respect to a-CE is PvQ. It is the only prime 
disjunctive form consisting of prerequisites in <HR. Now, let us calculate the 
sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) related to the pair (a-CE, A). 
Eo =Ao =Cf, 
E1 = Th(E0)u{RvR} = Th(a:)u{R}, 
A1 = Th(A0)u{R, R, R} = Th(a:)u{R}, 
E2 = Th(E1)u{RvR} = Th(Th(a:)u{R} )u{R} = Th(Cfu{R} ), 
A2 = Th(A1)u{R, R, R} = Th(Th(a:)u{R})u{R} = Th((fU{R}), 
and, for j ;?: 3 
Ej = Th(E2)u{RvR} = Th(E2), 
Aj = Th(A2)u{R, R, R} = Th(A2). 
It is easy to verify that (Uj:oEj, U;oAj) = (Th(Ez), Th(A2)) = (a-<E, A). 
From the examples above we can see that an alternative extension is 
identical to its assumption set for a normal default theory. This property is 
summed up by the following theorem. We will use characterization theorem 3.4.1 
to prove the theorem. 
Theorem 3.3.2: 
If a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A.. for a 
normal default theory en, then a-CE = A..· 
Proof: 
Let (a-<E, A) be a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set for 
a normal default theory <D = (Cf, .6). Construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) related 
to the pair. Recall that 
E0 = g; and Ao = g;, 
and, for}~ 1 
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Ej = Th(Ej-1) u { v~=1 C: I v:1 ~ E CJfB is a prime disjunctive form with 
respect to Ej-l, CHs is associated to a justification B and A.. 
u{B, C1, ... , Cn} is consistent}, 
Aj = Th(Aj_1) u {B, C1, ... , Cn I v~=1 Aie<HB is a prime disjunctive form 
with respect to Ej-l• CHs is associated to a justification B 
and A...u{B, C1, ... , Cn} is consistent}. 
Let 58 be a set of defaults having the same justification B; i.e., B8 = { 0=~8 I o E 
I 
il}. Since en is normal, ci = B for all O's in BB. So, Ej = Aj. 
3.4 Properties of the New Approach 
In this section, we will investigate further the properties of an alternative 
extension for a default theory. We will also look for the relation between an 
extension and an alternative extension, especially for normal default theories. We 
expect to see that an alternative extension for a default theory is a natural extension 
ofthat of the Reiter approach. 
First, we will see the behavior of alternative extensions when adding some 
facts to a default theory. It is expected that, as seen in section 3.2, the new 
approach will not have monotonicity properties. However, adding facts derivable 
from an alternative extension does not cause any changes to the alternative 
extension. In addition, it may affect other alternative extensions. In other words, 
for every alternative extension a-CE for a default theory <D = (ffi Li), then a-<E is 
also an alternative extension for t_n' = (g;us, .1), where Ss;;a-CE. For example, if 
we add "fly(Tweety)" to (fin example 3.2.5, it does not change a-CE1 but does 
cause no other alternative extension. 
Theorem 3.4.1: 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension for a default theory q) = (Cf, i.l) based 
on an assumption set A..· Then, a-CE is also an alternative extension for a default 
theory q)' = (CfuS, i.l), where Sca-CE. 
Proof: 
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Assume that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A.. 
for a default q) = ((f, A). Now, consider a default theory q)' = (CfuS, i.l), where 
sca-CE. We need to check the three conditions Sl, S2, and S3. The pair (a-CE, A..) 
satisfies Sl and S2; i.e., Cfus~a-CE and CfUScA..and Th(a-CE) =a-CE and Th(A) 
= A· In addition, suppose that v:, A; is a prime disjunctive form in CHB with 
respect to a-CE and {B, C1, ... , C0 }u.Ais consistent. Then, v:,~ E a-CE and B, C1, 
... , Cn EA.. by S3. r 1 (a-cE, A) c a-CE and r 2( a-CE, A) c a-CE by the smallness of 
f 1(a-CE, A) and r2(a-CE, A). We need to check the smallness ofthe pair (a-CE, A..). 
(f 1 (a-CE, A), r 2( a-CE, A)) is a pair of the smallest sets satisfying S I, S2, and S3 
with respect to Cl) and Cl)'. Recall that (a-CE, A) is a pair of the smallest sets 
satisfying Sl, S2, and S3 with respect to q); i.e., a-CE=f1(a-CE, A) and A..=f2(a-CE, 
A) with respect c_n. So, it must be a-c.E=fi(a-CE, A) and A._=f2(a-CE, A) with 
respect to q)'. Hence, the pair is an alternative extension for q)'. 
Next, we will investigate the behavior of alternative extensions when 
adding some defaults. Adding some defaults to a default theory will not shrink 
any extension. This means that the new approach is monoton in terms of adding 
defaults. 
The following theorem shows the semi-monotonicity properties of an 
alternative extension for a default theory. 
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Theorem 3.4.2: Semi-monotonicity properties of alternative extensions 
Let Cj) = (Cf, .1) be a default theory. For every alternative extension a-CE 
based on an assumption set A.. for Cj), there is an alternative extension a-<E' and an 
assumption,.( for CJ)' = (Cf, .1'), where a~ .1', such that a-<E!:; a-<E' and A.. c ,.(. 
This theorem guarantees that when adding defaults to a default theory CJ), 
for any alternative extension a-CE for CJ). there is an alternative extension for the 
newly added default theory such that it supersedes a-CE. In other words, adding 
defaults will not shrink any extension. Therefore, default theories are monoton in 
terms of defaults. 
To prove the theorem, we first construct a pair (a-CE', A..') of sets based on 
an alternative extension a-CE and an assumption set A.. for CJ). See the construction 
3.3. Since the pair (a-CE', A) is based on the pair (a-CE, A), then, a-CE~a-CE' and A.. 
~ ,.(. So, we only need to prove that (a-CE', A..') is a pair of an alternative extension 
and an assumption for CJ)'. To prove it, we use characterization theorem 3.4.1 by 
constructing a sequence of pairs (Si, Ti) as in construction 3.4. 
Construction 3.3. is similar to construction 3.1. However, we apply defaults 
using their disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites. Therefore, we need to 
check the consistency of their justification and consequents, in addition to the 
derivability of the disjunctive forms. 
Construction 3.3: 
Suppose a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A.. for a 
default theory CJ) = (Cf, 8). Suppose 8' is countable, possibly fmite, where 8 ~ .1'. 
So, a set of distinct justifications of defaults in .1' is countable, possibly finite: { B 1, 
B2, B3, ... } . Let Bj denote a set of defaults having the same justification Bk, 
Bj={Ojj = 1~81 I OjjE8}. 
Therefore, we have a countable, possibly fmite, class of such sets. Suppose that B 
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= {51, B2 , ••• } is a fixed enumeration of the class. <Hj is a set of disjunctive forms 
consisting of prerequisites of defaults in Si. This set is countable. Suppose that 
<Hj= {At! I At! is a disjunctive fonn consisting of prerequisites of defaults in Bi}. So, 
Aj=v~ ~.i' where Aijs are prerequisites of defaults in Sj, and the set of the related 
consequents is C~={C1 j, ... ,Cnj}, and the related disjunctive form consisting of 
consequents is v cect, C. Let us construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) as follows: 
E0 = a-CE and Ao = A,., 
and fork~ 1, 
where 
Ek = Th(Ek_1) u U~E~, and 
Ak = Th(Ak-1) u U~t, 
E0 = 0 and 
k ' 
A~= Ak-t> 
and for}~ 1, (we attempt to apply defaults in Si) 
E i - U · Ej.h and Ai - A.i-1 u U-J Aj.h k - A.:e~ k k - k A,;~ k ' 
where 
and for A;e <Hj, (we attempt to check all disjunctive fonns in <Hj) 
Ei.hk. = { v -j C I ~ is a prime disjunctive fonn with respect to Ek.1 and { B1·} ceq 
u C~ u A~-~ is consistent} 
At" = A~-1 u { Bj, Ce C~ 1 A; is a prime disjunctive form with respect to Ek-
1 and {Bj} u C~ u At"-1 is consistent}. 
Assign E = U~k and A = U;,.oA.k . All Aks are consistent causing A to be 
consistent, and so is E. Since E0 =a-CE and Ao= A, a-CE~E and A..~ A. 
Let us attempt to apply construction 3.4.3. 
Example 3.4.1: 
Let'])'= {(J", L:\'={oi 11::;;i::;;9}) be a default theory, where~= {PvQ}, 
Bl=P~R' B2=Q~R' B3=P~S' B4=Q~S' Bs=\T' B6=s~u' B7=s~v' Bs=u~w, and 09= vww. 
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There are five distinct justifications of defaults in L\': B1=R, B2=S, B3=T, B4=U, 
Bs=V, and B6=W. So, we have 81= 8R= {OJ,~}, 82= 85= {o3, 84}, 83= 8r= {o5}, 
84= 8u= {06}, 85 = Bv= {~}.and 86 = Bw= {Og, ~}. Also, Clft = CHR = { A/=P, 
~1 =Q. ~'=PvQ}, CH2 = Clfs = {A/=P, ~2=Q, ~2=PvQ}, CH3 = CHr = { A/=T}, CH4 = 
CHu = {A,4=S}, CHs = Hv = {A,5=S}, and CH6 = CHw = {A,6=U, ~6=V, A36=UvV}. 
Suppose a-<E = ~and A..=~· Construct a sequence of pairs (Ei, Ai) as in 
construction 3.3. Initially, we have 
Eo= Ao = (J"= {PvQ}. 
Fork= 1, we have 
E~ = 0 and A~ = Ao = ~-
Forj = 1, we attempt to apply defaults in S1 and to check the three disjunctive 
forms in CH1 = { A,1, A;, ~~}. Set A:·0= A~. For h = 1 and h = 2, since ~ is not in 
E E1.h=0 and Ath=A1'° For h = 3 Eu = {v C} = {RvR} = {R} and A 1.3 = 0• 1 I I ' ' I CeC: I 
A:·2 u{BI}uC~ = ~ u {R} since~~= PvQ is prime in E0. So, 
E: = U~~E:.h = {R} 
A:= A~ u U~e~ A:.h=(J"u {R}. 
Next, for j = 2, we attempt to apply defaults in 82 by checking the three disjunctive 
forms in CH2 = {A,2 , ~2 , ~2 }. Set A~·o =A:. For h = 1 and h = 2, then E~·h = 0 
and A~·h = Ai'0 since ~2 is not in E0. For h = 3, since ~2 = PvQ is prime in Eo, 
then E~.3 = vcec;C = {SvS} = {S} and A~.3 = A~·2 u {B2} u C~ =a=-u {S}. So, 
E; = U~~E~Jt= {S} 
A;= A: u U~2~ A:11 =(J"u {R, S}. 
For j > 2, we will have E: = 0 and A~ = A~. Thus, 
Et = Th(Eo) u u~: = Th(~ u {R, S} = Th(Cf) u {R, S}, and 
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A1 = Th(Ao) u U~At = Th(a=) u Cfu {R, S} = Th(Cf) u {R, S}. 
Fork= 2, we have 
E~ = 0 and A~ =A1 = Th(~ u {R, S} 
and get the same result for)= 1 and)= 2: E~ = Et and A~ =A~. For}= 3, we 
attempt to apply defaults in ~3 ={85 } by checking the only one disjunctive form in 
413 = { ~3 }. Set A;·0= A;. For h = 1, since ~3 =Tis prime in E1, then E;.1 = 
{vceC;'C} = {T} and A~·'= A~·0u{B3}uc: =Th(~u{R, S, T}. So, 
E~ = U~e<H,E~ = {T} 
A; =A; u U~e'H; A~= Th(Cf) u {R, S, T}. 
Next, for}= 4, we apply a default in ~4= {86} by checking the only one 
disjunctive form in 414 = {~4 }. Set A~·0 =A;. For h = 1, since ~4 =Sis prime in 
Eb E~·h = {vcectC} = {U} and A~·b = A~·0 u{B4}uc; =Th(~u{R, S, T, U}. So, 
E~ = U~E'lf.E~Jt= {T, U} 
A~ =A; u U~e<H4 A~Jt = Th(Cf) u {R, S, T, U}. 
For j = 5, we attempt to apply a default in ~5 = {fry} by checking the only one 
disjunctive form in CH5 = { ~5 }. Set A~·0= A;. For h = 1, since ~s = S is in Et. E~.J 
= {v ceciC}= {V} and A;·'= A~·0u{B5 }uc: = Th(Cf)u{R, S, T, U, V}. So, 
E~ = U~e%E;·h= {R, S, T, U, V} and 
A~= A~ u U~e<Hs A;)!= Th(~ u {R, S, T, U, V}. 
Continuing calculation for j > 5, we will get the same result: E; = 0 and A~ = A~. 
So, we get, for k = 2, 
~ = Th(E 1)uU~Et= Th(E1)u(fu{R, S, T, U} = Th(E1)u{T, U, V} and 
A2 = Th(A1)uU~A:= Th(A1)u(fu{R, S, T, U} = Th(A1})u{T, U, V}. 
Fork= 3, we have 
E~ = 0 and A~ = A2 = Th(A1) u {T, U, V}. 
. . ' 0 
For)= 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, we will have the same result: E; = E~ and A~ = A3 • For} 
= 6, we attempt to apply defaults in ~6 = {88, ~}by checking the three disjunctive 
form in 416 ={A/, ~6, ~6 }. Set A~·0= A~. For h = 1 and h = 2, we get E!·h= 0 
and A~·h= A!·0 • For h = 3, E!3 = {v _6 C} = {WvW} = {W} and A 63 = A 6•2 u 
· CeC1 3 3 
{B6}UC16 = Th(A2)u{T, U, V, W} since ~6=UvV is prime in~- So, 
E! = U~e<Ho E~.h = {W} and 
A~ = A~ u U A:e<Ho A~.h = Th(A2) u {W}. 
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Continuing calculation for j > 6, we will get the same result: E~ = 0 and A! = A~. 
Consequently, we get, fork= 3, 
E3 = Th(E2) u U;oE~ = Th(~) u {W} and 
A3 = Th(A2) u Uj:oA~ = Th(A2) u {W}. 
For k = 4, we will get the same result: E! = E~ and A! = A~. Therefore, 
E4 = Th(E3) u U;oE! = Th(E3) and 
A4 = Th(A3) u U;oA! = Th(A3). 
Continuing calculation fork> 4, we will get the same thing, 
Hence, 
E = U;=OEk = E4 = Th(a:- u {R, S, T, U, W}) and 
A = U;~k = A4 = Th(a:- u {R, S, T, U, W} ). 
It is easy to verity that (E, A) is a pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set for the default theory CD'. 
The following construction is similar to construction 3.2 but uses 
disjunctive forms consisting of prerequisites of defaults. 
Construction 3.4: 
:.·::::: 
:::::: 
Suppose CD' = (a;, L\') is a default theory. Let BB' denote a set of defaults 
having justification B. Since L\' is countable, there is at most a countable class of 
such set BB's. Now, construct a sequence of pairs (Si, Ti) based on characterization 
theorem 3.3.1 related to a pair (E, A). (In the proof of theorem 3.4.1, this pair is 
related to the pair constructed in construction 3.3.) That is, So = (F and T 0 = (F, 
and fork' C. I, 
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Sk' = Th(Sk'-I)u{v~G I v:1..(e<Hn• is a prime disjunctive form with respect 
to Sk'-1, <HB' is associated to a justification B' of defaults in 
!::..',and {B', C1', •.. , Cn'}uA is consistent}, 
T k' = Th(T k'-l)u{B', cl ', ... , Cn' I v~IA; E <Hn· is a prime disjunctive form 
with respect to Sk'-J, <HB' is associated to a justification B' 
of defaults in!::..', and {B', C1', ••• , Cn'}uA is consistent}. 
Assign S = u;;:~k' and T = UJ::=0 Tk'. 
To prove theorem 3.4.1, we will use the following lemma. Construction 3.4 
based on the pair (E, A) constructed in construction 3.3 will result in pair (S, T) 
superseding the pair used to construct the pair (a-CE, A) in construction 3.3. 
Lemma 3.4.1: 
Let CJ) = ((f, !::..) be a default theory, and let a-CE be an alternative extension 
based on an assumption set A for CJ). Suppose that (S, T) is a pair of sets 
constructed as in construction 3.4 related to a default theory q)' = ((f, !::..') and to a 
pair (E, A), where !::.. c !::..', a-CEcE and A,._cA. Then, a-CE c S and A.. cT. 
Proof: Lemma 3.4.1 
Assume that a-CE is an alternative extension based on an assumption set A.. 
for q). Using characterization theorem 3.3.1, we construct a sequence of pairs 
( Gk, Hk) related to ( a-<E, A) and c_o. So, a-CE = U;=0G k and A= Uk"=0Hk, where 
G0 =H0 =Cf, 
and fork C. 1, 
Gk = Th(Gk_1)u{v:=1C: I v:=~~ e<Hn is a prime disjunctive form with respect 
to Gk-h 'HB is associated to a justification B of defaults in 
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L\, and {B, CI> ... , Cn}uA_is consistent}, 
Hk = Th(Hk-t)U{B, Cr. ... , Cn I v~,~ e CHB is a prime disjunctive form with 
respect to Gk-1, CH8 is associated to a justification B of 
defaults inL\, and {B, CI> ... , Cn}UA_is consistent}. 
Suppose that CD'= (a;, L\') is a default theory, where L\cL\'. Construct a pair of sets 
(S, T) as in construction 3.4 related to pair of consistent sets (E, A) and to g)', 
where a-CEcE and A cA. We will prove a-CE c Sand A. cT by induction on k 
that Gk cS and Hk ~T for all k. 
Basis: G0= a;= S0 c Sand H0 = a;= T0 cT. 
Hypothesis: Gk c Sand Hk c T imply Gk+I c Sand Hk+I cT. 
Step: Assume that GmcS and HmcT. By monotonicity and lemma 3.2.1, 
Th(Gm) c Sand Th(Hm) CT. 
First, we prove Gm+l c S. IfGm+l = Th(Gm), we have proven it. 
Otherwise, suppose there is v~,C; such that v~=1 C;e Gm+I- Th(Gm). By the 
construction of Gm+ 1, there is a prime disjunctive form V~1 ~ e CHB with 
respect to Gm and {B, CI> ... , Cn}uA_is consistent, causing B, CI> ... , Cn to 
be in u;~Hk. B, CI> ... , Cn in U;~Hk =A_ implies that {B, Ct> ... , Cn}uA is 
consistent. By the assumption Gm c S, v~, ~ e Gm implies v~, ~ e S. If 
v~,~ is a prime disjunctive form with respect to S=u;~sk., then there is IC 
such that v~=• ~ is a prime disjunctive form with respect to Sk'· So, v~=• C; e 
Sk'+I and B, Cb ... , Cne T k'+I since {B, CI> ... , Cn}UA is consistent. These 
imply that v~,~ e Sand B, v:=,~ e T. Otherwise, suppose v~=~~ is not a 
prime disjunctive form with respect to S. By lemma 3.4.1, v~=~~ is 
derivable from a set of smaller prime disjunctive forms in CH8 and in S. 
Since {B, Ct> ... , Cn}uA is consistent, B, Ck,• ... , CkJuA is consistent, 
where cki = cj, 1 ~j ~ n, causing those related vicki s to be derivable and in 
S by S3. In addition, v~,, C; is derivable from a set of the related vi ck. s. 
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By monotonicity, v~=t C; is inS. Since Gm+l = Th(Gm) u {those v~=l C;s }, 
consequently, Gm+l c S. 
Next we prove Hm+l cT. IfHm+I = Th(Hm), we have proven it. 
Otherwise, suppose there is Xe Hm+l- Th(Hm). By the construction of 
Hm+ 1, there is a prime disjunctive form v:1 ~ e 'liB with respect to Gm and 
{B, Ch ... , C0 }UA_is consistent, causing B, C1, ... , C0 to be in Ui;,oHk. B, 
Cl> ... , Cn in U;,oHk =A_ implies that {B, CI> ... , C0 }uA is consistent. By 
the assumption Gm ~ S, v:1 ~ e Gm implies v~=1 ~ e S. If v~=t ~ is a prime 
disjunctive form with respect to S = u;,osk., then there is~ such that v~=~~ 
is a prime disjunctive form with respect to sk'· So, v~=IC; E sk'+l and B, cb 
... , C0 eTk'+l by S3 since {B, Cb ... , C0 }uA is consistent. These imply that 
B, Cl> ... , C0ET. Otherwise, suppose that v~=t~ is not a prime disjunctive 
form with respect to S. By lemma 3.4.1, v:1A; is derivable from a set of 
prime disjunctive forms in 'liB and S. Since {B, C1, ... , C0 }UA_is 
consistent, {B, Ck1, ••• , Ckn}uA_is consistent, where Cki= q, 1 ~j ~ n, 
causing those related B, C1, •.. , C0 to be in T by S3. So, X is in T. Since 
Hm+l = Th(Hm) u {B, thoseXs}, Hm+l ~ T. 
Next, we will prove the semi-monotonicity theorem 3.4.2. 
Proof: Theorem 3.4.2 
Let a-CE be an alternative extension for a default theory <J) = (Q=", a) based 
on an assumption set A_. Since il' is countable, we have a countable, possibly 
fmite, set of justifications of defaults in il': { Bt> B2, ... } . Let Sj denote a set of 
defaults having the same predicate symbol Bk in place of justifications; i.e., 
~ -{S: -~:Bj Is: A} uj- uiJ--c::l UjjE L1 • 
Therefore, we have a countable, possibly finite class of such sets, and let 3 = { 31, 
32 , 33 , ••• } be a fixed enumeration of the class. Cflj is a set of disjunctive forms 
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consisting of prerequisites of defaults having the justification Bj· Using 
construction 3.3, construct a pair (E, A). We know a-CE c E and A..~ A. 
Therefore, we only need to prove that (E, A) is a pair of an alternative extension 
and an assumption set for a default theory q)'. We will use characterization 
theorem 3.3.1 to prove it. Using construction 3.4, construct a pair (S, T) based on 
the characterization theorem related to the pair (E, A). (Note that in constructions 
3.3 and 3.4, there is aj such that B' = Bj and lfls• = <Hs)· To prove E is an 
alternative extension based on A for q)', we show 
E =Sand A= T 
or 
Uk'o-4lEk = u; =<lSk and Uk'~k = u; =() Tk .. 
First, we prove S ~ E and T c A by induction on It that Sk' ~ E and T k' cA. 
Basis: S0 = Cf c E0 c E and T0 = (fc A0 c A. 
Hypothesis: Sk' c E and T k' c A imply Sk'+ 1 c E and T k'+ 1 ~ A. 
Step: Assume Sm' c E and T m' cA. So, Th(Sm•) c E and Th(T m•) cA by 
monotonicity and lemma 3.2.1. 
First, we prove that Sm'+I ~E. IfSm'+1 = Th(Sm·), we have proven 
it. Otherwise, suppose that there is v:1 C: E Sm'+ 1 - Th(Sm•). By construction 
of Sm'+ 1, there is a prime disjunctive form v:, A; in <Hs • with respect to 
Sm,, and {B', C1 ', ... , C0 '}uA is consistent. By assumption Sm' c E, v:1A; e 
Sm' implies v:, A; is in E. There are two possibilities for v:, A;: 
• If v~=1 A; is prime with respect to E, v~=1 A; e E implies that there are Ek-I 
and lflj containing ~, where <HB' = lflj, ~ = v~=1 A;, Bj = B, and C~ = 
{Cb ... , C 0 }, such that~ is prime with respect to Ek-I> and {B} u C~ 
u At h·I is consistent in the construction of Et'. So, v ce~ C = v~=1 C: must 
be in Eth, EL and Ek. So, v:1 C: e E. 
• Otherwise, suppose V~1 A; is not prime with respect to E. By lemma 
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3.4.1, V~1 A;EE implies that v~=1 A; is derivable from a set of smaller 
prime disjunctive forms, A;:s, in <Hj = 418 and E. Since~ is prime with 
respect to E, there is Ek such that the related C~ is { C'm , ... , C'm } , and 
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v CEC{. C must be in Eth, E~, Ek> and E. In addition, v~~~C: is derivable 
from the set of those v ceq Cs. By monotonicity, v:1C: is in E since 
V cec~ Cs are in E. 
Next, we prove that Tm'+l cA. IfTm'+I = Th(Tm·), we have proven 
it. Otherwise, suppose that there is XE T m'+ 1 - Th(T m•). By construction of 
T m'+ 1, there is a prime disjunctive form V~1 A; in 41B' with respect to Sm,, 
and {B', Cb ... , C 0 }uA is consistent, where X= B' or X= Ci. By 
assumption Sm' c E, V~1 A;E Sm' implies v:~~· is in E. There are two 
possibilities for v~=t ~·: 
• If v:1 A; is prime with respect to E, v~=t A; E E implies that there are Ek-I 
and (Hj containing ~, where 418 = <Hj, ~ = V~1 A;, Bj = B', and C~ = 
{ C 1, ... , C n}, such that A;; is prime with respect to Ek-I, and { B'} u C~ 
u Ath-t is consistent in the construction ofEk. So, 13', C 1, ... , C n are in 
A~h, A~, Ak, and A. 
• Otherwise, suppose V~1 A; is not prime with respect to E. By lemma 
3.4.1, v:1A;E E implies v~=tA; is derivable from a set of smaller prime 
disjunctive forms, A!s, in <Hj = <HB' and E. Since A: is prime with 
respect toE, there is Ek such that the related C~ is { C'm 1, ••• , C'm), and 
B', C'm, ... , C'm are in Ath, AL Ak, and A. In addition, the union of 
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those C~s is {CI'• ... , C0 '}. So, 13', C'1> ... , C'n are in A. 
We have proven that S ~ E and T ~A. Now, we will prove that E ~Sand A~ T 
by induction on k that Ek c S and Ak c T. 
Basis: E0 = a-<E c u;=Osk. and A0 =A..~ u;=OTk. by lemma 3.4.2. 
Hypothesis: Ek-I ~Sand Ak-l ~ T imply Ek ~Sand Ak!;;; T. 
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Step: Assume that Ek-1 c Sand Ak_ 1 c T causing Th(Ek_1) ~Sand Th(Ak_1)!:: T 
by lemma 3.2.1 on sequences Ek and Ak and by monotonicity. 
First, we prove that Ek c S. lfEk = Th(Ek_1), we have proven it. 
Otherwise, suppose there is v ceci C E Ek - Th(Ek-l) by the construction of 
h 
Ek. So, there is a prime disjunctive form~ in Cflj with respect to Ek-1> {Bj} 
uC~ uAth-t is consistent, and Bj, Ce C~ are in A~·h, A~, Ak, and A. By 
assumption Ek_1 c S, A;!e Ek-l implies A!e S, and Bj, Ce C~ are in A 
implies {Bj} uC~ uA is consistent. If A! is a prime disjunctive form with 
respect to S, v cec~ C e S. Otherwise, suppose it is not prime. By lemma 
3.4.1, A! is derivable inS from a set of smaller prime disjunctive forms, 
noted Aj, in Cflj and S. ~i inS implies there is an Sk'-1 such that A/e Sk'-l 
and~ is prime with respect to Sk'-I· Since {Bj} uC~ uA is consistent, the 
related Bj, (Ce Ci) are in Tk'• and v cecJ C in Sk'• where qcc~. So, 
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v =j C inS. In addition, vc -ci Cis derivable from {those Ce qs}. By 
CECb E b 
monotonicity, v cec' Cis inS. Since Ek=Th(Ek_1)u{those v cec' Cs}, Ek~S. 
Next, we prove that Ak' cT. If Ak' = Th(Ak_1), we have proven it. 
Otherwise, suppose there is an Xe Ak'- Th(Ak_1). By the construction of 
Ak, there is a prime disjunctive form~ in 'Hj with respect to Ek-1> {Bj} u 
C~ uA{·b-t is consistent, and Bj, Ce C~ are in A~·h, At, Ak, and A, where 
X=Bj or Xe C~. By the assumption Ek_1 ~ S, A!e Ek_1 implies A!e S, and 
Bj, ( Ce C~) are in A implying that {Bj} uC~ uA is consistent. If A; is a 
prime disjunctive form with respect to S, then, Bj, (Ce C~) are in T. 
Otherwise, suppose A! is not prime. By lemma 3.4.1, ~is derivable inS 
from a set of smaller prime disjunctive forms, noted ~, in 'Hj and in S. ~i 
inS implies there is an Sk'-1 such that ~E Sk'-1 and A,! is prime with respect 
to Sk'-t· {Bj}uC~uA is consistent, and so is {Bj}u{iuA, where q~c~. 
101 
Then, the related Bj, (Ce CD are in Tk'· In addition, the union of those qs 
is C~. So, Bj, ( Ce C~) are in T. Since Ak = Th(Ak-I )u{ those Xs}, Ak c S. 
We have now proven that E c Sand A~ T, and so the theorem. 
Using the semi-monotonicity properties above, we can easily prove that 
every default theory has at least one extension. The idea is to construct an 
alternative extension from a hard fact set. A set of all facts derivable from a hard 
fact set in terms of first order theory is an alternative extension for a default theory 
without defaults. So, by adding defaults to every default theory having no 
extension, we will always have an alternative extension for the newly added 
default theory. These properties are summed in the following theorem. The proof 
is similar to 3.2.6 and will not be given here. 
Theorem 3 .4 .3: Existence of alternative extensions 
Every default theory has at least one alternative extension a-CE based on an 
assumption set A ... 
Now, we are ready to describe the relation between an extension and an 
alternative extension for normal default theories. That is, for every extension CE 
for a normal default theory there is an alternative extension a-CE for the default 
theory such that CE\:;a-<E 
Theorem 3.4.4: 
For every extension CE for a normal default theory g), there is an alternative 
extension a-CE based on an assumption set A for g) such that CE ~ a-CE. 
This theorem assures that the new approach is a natural extension of the 
Reiter approach for normal default theories. The idea is that the result of the new 
approach will be that, all consequences of a normal default theory using the Reiter 
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approach are preserved in the new approach. In other words, all consequences of 
the Reiter normal default theories are also consequences in the new approach. In 
addition, there are some additional consequences derived due to the applicability 
of defaults using disjunctive facts. So, the applicability of defaults is extended 
using disjunctive facts. 
The proof of this theorem is based on the existence of an alternative 
extension for a default theory. 
Proof: Theorem 3.4.4 
Let <E be an extension for a normal default theory g) = ( Cf, ~). Consider a 
default theory CD'= (CE, ~). According to theorem 3.4.2, there is an alternative 
extension a-<E based on assumption set A.. for g)'. By theorem 3.3.2, a-CE= A._. 
Furthermore, <Eca-<E by S 1. It is easy to see that the pair ( a-<E, a-CE) satisfies 
conditions Sl, S2, and S3 with respect to g). In addition, it is a pair of the smallest 
sets satisfying r 1 and r 2 with respect to g)', Since no other facts are involved in 
S3, it is also pair of the smallest sets satisfying r 1 and r 2 with respect to CJ). So, 
we have proven the theorem. 
However, theorem 3.4.4 cannot be extended into an arbitrary default theory. 
In other words, there is a default theory that has an extension but does not have an 
alternative extension. For example, we have an extension CE for g), where CE = 
Th(Cfu {fly(Tweety), fly(Clyde)}), in example 3.2.1, and alternative extensions 
a-<E1 and a-~ based on assumption sets AI and -4.2 for g), respectively, where 
a-<E1 = Th(Cfu {fly(Tweety)}), a-~= Th(Cfu {fly(Clyde)}), AI= Th(Cfu 
{ fly(Tweety ), fly(Tweety )A .. broken-wing(Tweety)} ), and -4.2 = Th( Cf u 
{fly( Clyde), fly(Clyde)A .. broken-wing(Clyde)} ). However, there is no alternative 
extensions for g) such that CE ~ a-CE. 
In addition, the new approach may have some more alternative extensions 
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for a default theory that do not have the related extensions. It is easy to find a 
counter-example that shows that an alternative extension for a default theory may 
not be always an extension. That is, we may have an alternative extension that is 
not an extension. One is in example 3.3.8. This is another artificial example. 
Example 3.4.1: 
Let CD= ((f= {PvQ}, L\ = {oi, l~i~5}) be a default theory, where 01=""R.R, 
~ _Q:R ~ _PvQoS ~ _R:-,S d ~ _S:-.R Th" d &: It th h tl u 2-T, u 3--s-, u 4--::;s, an u 5- -.R • IS etau eory as exac y one 
extension <E, where <E = Th( {PvQ, S, -,R} ). There are four distinct justifications 
of defaults in L\. So, there are four sets of disjunctive forms consisting of 
prerequisites based on those justifications. They are <f:IR={P, Q, PvQ}, ClL,R={S}, 
<Hs={PvQ} and <H...,s={R}. The default theory q) has exactly three alternative 
extensions a-CEi based on a-CEi: 
and 
a-<E1 = Th({PvQ, S, R}), 
a-CE2 = Th( {PvQ, S, -,R}), 
a-CE3 = Th({PvQ, R, -,S}). 
We can see that <E=a-CE2. However, there is no extension forD such that it 
supersedes either a-CE1 or a-CE3. 
In the next theorem, we will see the maximality of alternative extensions. 
The maximality of an alternative extension means that if there are two pairs (a-CE, 
A) and (a-CE', A) of alternative extensions and assumption sets, and a-CE c a-CE' 
and A_ c ~. then the pairs are identical. 
Theorem 3.4.6: Maximality of alternative extensions 
Suppose that a-<E and a-<E' are alternative extensions based on assumption 
sets A_ and~. respectively, for a default theory Cj) = ((f, L\) such that a-<E~a-CE' 
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and A c ~· Then, a-CE= a-CE' and A=~· 
The theorem says that we cannot have a pair of an alternative extension and 
an assumption set such that it properly supersedes another pair of an alternative 
extension and an assumption set. 
Proof: 
Assume that a-CE and a-CE' are alternative extensions based on assumption 
sets A_ and~. respectively, for a default theory <J)=(Cf, ~)such that a-CEca-<£' 
and ,AcA_'. Let sequences of pairs (Ei, Ai) and (E'i, A'i) be related to the pairs (a-
CE, A) and (a-CE',~' respectively, as in the characterization theorem. It is enough 
to prove that U~E~ c U~Ei and U~~ c A= U~i. We prove them by 
induction on i that E'i c Ei and A'i!;;;; Ai. 
Basis: For i=O, E'0 cEo and A'o c Ao since E'o = E0 = A'0 = Ao = Cf. 
Hypothesis: E'i c Ei and A'i c Ai imply E'j+I c Ei+I and A'i+I c Ai+I 
Step: Assume that E'n cE0 and A'n cAw So, Th(E'0 ) ~i+ I and Th(A'n ) cAi+ I· 
First, we prove that E'n c E0 • IfE'n+I = Th(E'0 ), then we have 
proven it. Otherwise, suppose that there is v:1 C: such that v:1 C: e E'n+ I -
Th(E'0 ). By the construction ofE'n+ t. there is a prime disjunctive form 
v:1A; in <JIB with respect to A'0 , and {B, Ch ... , C0 }u..( is consistent. So, 
. v~=1 A; is in En by assumption E'n ~0, and {B, Cb ... , C0 }u.>'\_is consistent 
. since A_ c...(. Hence, v~=tC: is in En+ I· Since E'n+I = Th(E'0 ) u {those 
·v:1C:s}, then E'n+I~n+I· 
Next we prove that A'n+ I !;;;; An+ 1. If E'n+ I = Th(E'0 ), we have proven 
it. Otherwise, suppose there is an X such thatXeA'n+I- Th(A'0 ). By the 
construction of A'n+., there is a prime disjunctive form V:':t A; in <HB with 
respect to A'0 , and {B, Ct. ... , C0 }u...( is consistent, where X= B, or X= Ci. 
So, v:1A; is in Eo by assumption A'n ~0, and {B, Ch ... , C0 }UA._is 
consistent since A_ c.,(. Therefore, B, e 1, •.• ,en are in An+ I> and so is X. 
Since A'n+ 1 = Th(A'n) u {those Xs}, then A'n+ 1 !;;;;; An+ 1• 
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Next, we will present the last properties of an alternative extension for a 
default theory. The last properties are about the orthogonality. The orthogonality 
properties for alternative extensions mean that the union of two assumption sets is 
inconsistent. The orthogonality properties of an alternative extension for a default 
theory are summed up in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.4. 7: Orthogonality of alternative extensions 
Let a-CE and a-CE' be two distinct alternative extensions for a default theory 
D = ((f, ~) based on assumption sets A.: and,.(, respectively. Then, A. u A...' is 
inconsistent. 
Proof: 
By characterization theorem 3.3.1, let (Ei, Ai) and (E'i, A'i) be sequences of 
pairs related to alternative extensions a-CE and a-CE' based on A... and A: for CD, 
respectively, such that a-CE= Ui:oE;, A.= U:OA;, a-CE'= Ui:oE; and A:= Ui:oA;. 
Since a-CE and a-CE' are two distinct alternative extensions and E0 = E'0, there is an 
n such that En = E'n but En+ 1 "# E'n+ 1; i.e., there is v:, C: e En+ I-E'n+ I· By 
construction ofEn+l• v:,C: is a disjunctive form consisting of consequents of 
defaults, and there is a prime disjunctive form v~=' ~ in 'Hn with respect to En such 
that {B, e 1, ... , e 0 }UA_is consistent. So, B, e 1, ... , and en are in An+b causing 
both B, C1, ... , and en in A.: Since En= E'0 , v~~ is prime with respect to En and 
toE'0 • Since v~C:eEn+I·E'n+t> then v~C:eE'n+I· So,A:_u{B, el, ... , en} is 
inconsistent by S3. Furthermore, because B, et, ... , and en are in _r\and A:_u{B, 
C 1, ... , en} is inconsistent, then _r\is inconsistent with,.(. 
As previously mentioned in section 3.2, the union of two distinct alternative 
extensions may be consistent. It can be seen in example 3.2.12. 
3.5 Survey of Complexity Analysis ofthe New 
Approach 
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This section completes the discussion of the new approach for a default 
theory dealing with disjunctive fact problems. In this section, we will conduct a 
survey of a complexity analysis of the new approach. Therefore, we do not expect 
to have a detailed analysis. 
In a default theory, we deal with first order theory. As known, the 
computability of first order theory is semi-decidable. So, we do not expect the 
computability of the new approach to be more than that. In most cases, as Kautz 
and Selman observed, checking the membership of extensions may be intractable 
[19]. However, constructing an extension for a default theory could be tractable 
for some areas of interests. 
There are two sources of complexity in default theories. First is the 
inherent complexity of first order theory. Second is the checking of consistency in 
applying defaults. The inherent complexity of first order theory cannot be 
avoided. However, by restricting the set to deal with, we may find some decidable 
problems, for example by using propositional logic. Since the derivability of a 
propositional logic is decidable, we can expect a better result if we use a default 
theory consisting of propositional logic. 
To simplify the analysis, we will not consider the disjunctive fact problems 
concerning justifications. As Kautz and Selman noticed, these problems are more 
complex [19]. They restricted their analysis to disjunctive free default theories. 
Furthermore, the analysis is based on the Reiter approach. 
As Kautz and Selman observed, there are three problems concerning default 
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theories [ 19]. The first is to find an extension. Finding an extension is "easier" 
than the other problems. The second is to determine whether a proposition is 
derivable from an extension. The last is to determine whether a proposition is 
derivable from all extensions. The last two problems seem to be intractable even 
for a very simple default theory. Therefore, in the rest of this section, we will 
conduct analysis for finding an extension. 
The basis of our survey is construction 3 .1. The idea is that construction 
3.1 will result in an alternative extension for a default theory as theorem 3 .2.1 
concluded. However, as the theorem required, we need to calculate an infinite 
sequence of pairs of sets to complete the construction. 
To conduct a survey, we will make some assumptions to deal with. First is 
that the number of defaults in ~ of a default theory is finite, say n. We enumerate 
them and suppose that {OJ> ~' ... , On} is a fixed enumeration for~- Second is that 
the set of hard facts is consistent. Because if a given inconsistent hard fact set is 
inconsistency, the result is an inconsistent alternative extension. In addition, 
during the survey, we will attempt to identify some areas of interest. 
The following procedure is a modification of construction 3.1. Since this 
procedure is based on the construction, we should have a proof that it will 
converge to an alternative extension, especially dealing with constant propositional 
well-formed formulae. However, we have not succeeded in proving this 
procedure. Also, we have not found a counter-example to this procedure. So, we 
conjecture that this procedure will converge to an alternative extension a-CE based 
on an assumption set A. for a default theory. 
This procedure will terminate if two consecutive approximations give the 
same result. The input for this procedure is a default theory g)= (Cf, ~). Set Cf is 
hard facts consisting of finite sentences known to be believed. ~ is the set of 
defaults representing potential beliefs. The main step is step 3. For one 
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approximation, it is done inn iterations, each is for a default in fl. So, if the 
procedure 1 converges in m approximations, the procedure will terminate in n x m 
x the amount of time to check the applicability of a default o. 
Procedure 1: Finding-altemative-extension((f, fl). 
Input : A set of hard facts cr and a set of defaults fl. 
Output A pair of sets (E, A) such that Th(E) and Th(A) are an alternative 
extension and an assumption set for a default theory en= (Cf, L\). 
Method: 1. Assign Eo= (f, Ao = (f, and k = 1. 
2. Ek = Ek-l and Ak = Ak-I· 
3. For i from 1 to n, do the following. 
If applicable(oi, Ek-I• Ak), then, 
Ek = Ek u {con(oi)} and Ak = Ak u {jus(oi), con(oi)}. 
Otherwise, 
Ek = Ek and Ak = Ak. 
4. If Ek = Ek-I and Ak = Ak-h then stop and return E = Ek and A= Ak· 
Otherwise, assign k=k+ 1. 
5. Repeat steps 2, 3, and 4. 
:.·:::: 
The following procedure is central to construction 3.1 It appears as a true-
false value function in procedure 1. It is related to the applicability of a default 
with respect to two sets: a set to check the derivability of a prerequisite of a given 
default and a set to check the consistency of a justification and a consequent ofthe 
default. 
Procedure 2: applicable( o, E, A) 
Input : A default o, a set E, and a set A. 
Output : Return yes, if the default o is applicable; otherwise, no. 
Method : 1. Check whether the pre(o) of o is derivable from E. If not, return no. 
2. Check whether the jus(8) and the con(8) are consistent with A. 
If not, return no. Otherwise, return yes. 
Note: pre(o) =the prerequisite of default o; 
jus(o) =the justification of default 8; and 
con(o) = the consequent of default o. 
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As previously mentioned, this procedure 2 is central to the construction to 
check the applicability of a default. It consists of two steps: checking the 
derivability of the prerequisite and checking the consistency of the justification 
and the consequent. These steps are the sources of problems in dealing with a 
default theory in order to find an alternative extension. The first step is referred to 
as the inherent complexity of first order theory. Generally, this step is semi-
decidable. However, by restricting the area of interest, we may find a better result, 
for example, dealing with constant propositional well-formed formulae. The 
derivability in propositional logic should be obvious. 
Another area of interest is observed by Kautz and Selman [19]. The area 
uses Hom clauses. As Dowling and Gallier found, the satisfiability of 
propositional Hom clauses can be decided in linear time [10]. So, in this area, we 
may find default theories shining. 
The next step is to check the consistency. For an arbitrary first order 
default theory, checking the consistency is undecidable [ 19]. By restricting the 
area of the problem, we may find some interesting results. However, we are not 
going to conduct a further survey. 
We close this section by presenting some examples to fmd an alternative 
extension and an assumption set for a default theory using procedure 1. 
Example 3.5.1: This default theory is taken from Chen [5]. 
Let C)) =(g:;, tJ. = { o' 1, 8'2, 0'3, o'4}) be a default theory, where g:; = {A vG, J, 
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-.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-,Q} o' AvP:(-.cv-,J)"-.A ~· =~ ~· =BvS:P"Q d s:· -~ 
' 1 -.A , 0 2 B 0 3 o , an u4- c · 
Let us calculate an alternative extension and an assumption set for q) using 
procedure 1 with an enumeration: {ol = 0'1, ~ = o'2, ~ = 0'3, 04 = 8'4}. 
Eo= Ao = Cf= {AvO, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q} 
E1 = {AvO, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, -.A} 
A1 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, -.A, (-.Cv-.J)A-.A} 
E2 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-,Pv-.Q, -,A}= E1 
A2 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, -.A, (-,Cv-.J)A-.A} = A1 
(E3, A3) is a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set for q). Let us 
calculate for another enumeration: {o1 = 8'b ~ = 8'~> o3 = 8'3, 84 = 8'4}. 
E0 = A0 = Cf= { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-,Pv-.Q} 
E1 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, B} 
A1 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-,Q, B, AAB, Q, PAQ} 
E2 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, B, Q} 
A2 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-,Pv-,Q, B, AAB, Q, PAQ} 
E3 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-.Q, B, Q} = E2 
A3 = { AvG, J, -.Bv-.Cv-.Pv-,Q, B, AAB, Q, PAQ} = A2 
(E3, A3) is another pair of an alternative extension and assumption set for q). 
Let us calculate another example taken from Etherington [12). 
Example 3.5.2: 
Suppose g)= (Cf, ~ = {8'~> 8'2, 8'3, 8'4}) is a default theory, where Cf= 
···•·· 
{p} and ~~-!Ji o' _.f..;,A o' =.Q.:! and 8' Q:~SA--.R Let us calculate using procedure U 1- Q ' z- R ' 3 S ' 4 ~R ' 
1 with an enumeration: {81 = 8'1> ~ = 8'2, ~ = 8'3, 84 = 8'4}. 
E0 =A0 =(f= {P} 
E1 =At= {P, Q, R} 
E2 = A2 = {P, Q, R, S} 
Ill 
E3 = A3 = {P, Q, R, S} = ~ = A2 
(E3, A3) is a pair of an alternative extension and an assumption set for<]). Also, 
we get the same thing with an enumeration {o1 = O't> ~ = 0'2> o3 = 8'4, 84 = 8'3}. 
Next, we calculate with an enumeration: { o1 = 0'1, ~ = 8'4, ~ = 8'2, 04 = 0'3} 
E0 = A0 = F = {P} 
E1 = {P, Q, -,R} 
At = {P, Q, -,R, -,SA-,R} 
E2 = {P, Q, -,R} = E1 
A2 = {P, Q, -,R, -,SA-,R} =At 
(E2, A2) is also a pair an alternative extension and an assumption set for Cj). We 
get the same thing with an enumeration {01 = 0'1, ~ = 8'4, ~ = 8'3, 84 = 0'2 }. 
Lastly, we will calculate a default theory similar to example 3.4.13. 
Example 3.5.3: 
Let <j) = (Cf, ~={oi jl::;;i::;;7}) be a default theory, where Cf= {P}, oi=P~Q' 
s: =!.:!. s: =Q:s o =!..:.!. o =~ o =~ and o =~ Let us calculate an 
u2 R ' U3 s ' 4 T ' 5 u ' 6 v • 1 w · 
alternative extension and an assumption set for<]). 
Eo= Ao = F = {P} 
Et =At= {P, Q, R} 
~ = A2 = {P, Q, R, S, T} 
E3 = A3 = {P, Q, R, S, T, U} 
E4 = A4 = {P, Q, R, S, T, U, V} 
E5 =A5 = {P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W} 
E6 =At; = {P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W} = E5 = A5 
It is easy to see that the pair (E6, At;) is a pair of an alternative extension and an 
assumption set for<]). 
I 
:::."':: 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A default theory is a formal system logic that deals with incomplete 
knowledge. A system employing a default theory permits us to infer facts using 
the so-called defaults in the absence of information to the contrary. There is much 
research to improve the capability of default theories. The Reiter and Lukaszewicz 
approaches have some problems in dealing with disjunctive fact problems 
concerning both prerequisites and justifications. In this paper, we propose another 
approach to dealing with those problems. 
Disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications may result in an 
extension and a modified extension that are counter-intuitive. The Reiter and the 
Lukaszewicz approaches let the system employing default theories infer some facts 
that are unacceptable. The system may derive some facts using defaults based on 
inconsistent justifications. It may result in an extension and a modified extension 
that are unwell-behaved. 
Disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites may cause the 
applicability of some default to be blocked. These defaults have the same 
justifications. The applicability of these defaults is blocked due to no evidence to 
believe their justification but their disjunctive form. It may result in an extension 
and a modified extension that are unacceptable. 
To deal with disjunctive fact problems, we propose a new approach. To 
deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications, we make the new 
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approach enforce consistency not only with an individual justification of a default 
under consideration but also with a whole set of justifications of already applied 
defaults. By doing this we will not have those problems concerning justifications. 
To deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites, we develop the 
new approach to extend the applicability of some defaults using their disjunctive 
forms. These defaults have the same justification. These disjunctive forms consist 
of prerequisites of defaults having the same justification. A disjunctive form may 
be applicable. If so, it is called prime and we may apply it by inferring the related 
disjunctive form consisting of their consequents. In addition, we also enforce 
consistency with their justification and consequents as mentioned before. In other 
words, we apply defaults by inferring the related disjunctive forms consisting of 
consequents and check their justification and any individual consequents. We do 
not check the consistency with the related disjunctive form. This is to guarantee 
that disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications will not arise. The new 
approach will result in an alternative extension and a consistent assumption set for 
a default theory. 
In doing so, we do not lose the properties of the Reiter and the Lukaszewicz 
approaches. The new approach will always have an alternative extension and an 
assumption set for an arbitrary default theory. Also, we still have the 
characterization theorem that characterizes an alternative extension and an 
assumption set more intuitively. Furthermore, the new approach also has the semi-
monotonicity properties and maximality. In addition, the new approach has the 
properties of orthogonality with respect to the assumption set. Lastly, we have an 
important result: for every extension for normal default theory, we can find an 
alternative extension for the default theory such that it supersedes the extension. It 
means that the new approach is a natural extension of the Reiter approach. 
We also conducted a survey of complexity analysis for the new approach. 
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However, it is not a complete and detailed analysis. 
There are two benefits of the new approach: 
1. It can deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications; and 
2. It can deal with disjunctive fact problems concerning prerequisites of defaults 
having the same justification. 
Further research to improve the new approach is possible. One 
improvement would be to find a proof of or a counter-example to the conjecture 
about the convergence of procedure 1. Second, we need to find another approach 
to dealing with disjunctive fact problems concerning justifications in which the 
applicability of defaults that may have the same symbol in the place of 
justification, but perhaps different terms, is blocked. 
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APPENDIX 
FIRST ORDER THEORIES 
Introduction 
First order theory is by far the most important and commonly used logical 
system. It is known that ftrst order theory is adequately powerful for complete 
knowledge classical mathematics. It extends propositional calculus in two ways: 
providing an inner structure for well-formed formulae that are viewed as 
expressing relations between things and giving the means to express and to reason 
with. The ftrst concerns the syntactic part, whereas the second concerns with the 
semantic part. 
The concept of a formal theory should be clear. A formal theory consists of 
a set of countable symbols from which are built expressions called well-formed 
formulae, a set of axioms, and a set of rules of inference. For example, rules of 
inferences in ftrst order logics are modus ponens and generalization. 
The notion of the syntax of a formal theory is the concept which describes 
the formal theory as a symbol system. It starts with defining the symbols used and 
then defmes the language consisting of well-formed formulae. The well-formed 
formulae denote an assertion in which their truth or falsehood depends on the 
interpretation used. 
The semantic part of a formal theory deals with a model of the theory. It 
provides the meaning of well-formed formulae that emerges from various 
interpretations that may be given. The interpretation supplies a meaning for each 
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of the symbols in a formal theory such that any well-formed formula can be 
understood as a statement that is true or false in the interpretation. Such 
interpretation is a model for a set of well-formed formulae if every well-formed 
formula in the set is true under the interpretation and we say that the interpretation 
provides a model for the formal theory. 
The study of ftrst order theory will be given in the next several sections. 
The sequence is first order language, first order interpretation/model, and first 
order properties. Most materials of first order theories are taken from and proofs 
of theorems and corollary can be found in, Mendelson [28]. 
First Order Language 
The ftrst requirement for description of a formal theory is to describe the 
syntax of the language. Therefore, for first order language, we need to describe 
the symbols of the language and the rules for generating well-formed formulae of 
the language. The set of well-formed formulae is the first order language. 
First, we need to defme an alphabet used for the language. It consists of 
several symbol sets. Then, we define rules of creating well-formed formulae based 
on those symbols. In order to do that, we need some formal defmitions. 
An alphabet consists of four symbol sets. The first symbol set is usually the 
same for a formal theory. It is called a logical symbol set and is usually finite. 
The second set is a denumerable number of variable symbols. In first order theory, 
a quantification is allowed only over these variables. The third is a countable set 
of constant symbols. The next is a countable set of function symbols. The 
constant and function symbol sets are possibly empty. The last is a countable set 
of non-empty predicate symbols. An alphabet of a first order theory will be 
precisely defmed in the following definition. 
Definition: Alphabet 
An alphabet consists of four symbols sets: 
• a logical symbol set: 
{1, l_, -,, /\, v, ~. H, V, 3 }; 
• a denumerable individual variable set: 
• {xi> x2> x3, ... }; 
• a countable, possibly empty, function symbol set: 
{ f0°, f~, ~1 , f~, ~2 , • • • } ; and 
• a countable, non-empty, predicate symbol set: 
{ p~' p~' ~I' p;' ~2' ..• } . 
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The symbol'! reads verum, as opposed to symbol 1_, called falsum. The 
logical symbols V and 3 are called universal and existential quantifiers, 
respectively. The subscript on individual variables, function symbols, and 
predicate symbols is just an indexing number to distinguish different symbols. 
The superscript on function and predicate symbols indicates the arity of the 
symbol being superscripted, that is, the number of arguments. As this notation is 
very cumbersome, the superscript will be dropped if there is no danger of 
confusion. Function symbols of arity zero are also called individual constants, 
and they will also be noted asci· Predicate symbols of arity zero are called 
propositional symbols or propositional constant symbols to be precise. 
Sometimes, the words constant and variable mean an individual constant and an 
individual variable unless otherwise specified. 
To avoid getting symbols cluttered with parentheses, the precedence 
hierarchies among the logic symbols are taken on. The highest to the lowest 
precedence hierarchy is listed as the following: 't, l_, 1\, v, ~. H, V, and 3. 
Parentheses are used to change the grouping of logical symbols in terms of the 
highest precedence. Square brackets are sometimes used in order to improve 
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readability instead of parentheses. 
The informal semantics of the connectives and quantifiers is as usual. That 
is, the connective symbols .l, A, v, ~.and H mean negation, conjunction (and), 
disjunction (or), implication, and equivalence, respectively. Also, the quantifier 
symbols \:1 and 3 mean "for all x," and "there exists an x," respectively. 
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to define the existential symbol 3 as a primitive 
logical symbol since it can be defined as an abbreviation as follows: 
3xA stands for -,('r:/x-.A). 
Next, some defmitions are presented in order to define the first order 
language over a given alphabet. First, a term is defined, followed by an atomic 
formula, a well-formed formula, and so on. 
A term is generated by applying individual variables and individual 
constants to function symbols. It is defmed inductively as the following definition: 
Definition: Terms 
Terms in first order language ~are defined as follows: 
• xi is a term for all individual variable xi; and 
• f (tb t2, ... , tn) is a term, if t;" is an n-ary function symbol and t., t2, ... , tn 
are terms. 
Terms include all individual constant symbols since they are zero-ary 
forms. 
An atomic formula is generated by applying terms to predicate symbols 
applied. It is defmed inductively as follows. 
Defmition: Atomic formulae 
Atomic formulae are defined as follows: 
• t and ..L are atomic formulae; and 
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• ~"(tl, t2, ... , 1n) is an atomic formula if~" is an n-ary predicate symbol and 
tl> t2, ... , 1n are terms. 
Atomic formulae include all propositional constant symbols. Well-formed 
formulae are of forms using logical symbols as defmed by the following. 
Definition: Well-formed formulae 
Well-formed formulae are defined as follows: 
• Atomic formulae are well-formed formulae; 
• If A is a well-formed formula, so is -.A; that is, the denial of a well-formed 
formula is also a well-formed formula; 
• If A and E are well-formed formulae, then so are AAB, AvE, A~E, and A 
HE; and 
• If A is a well-formed formula for each individual variable x, then so are 
VxA and 3xA. 
Example: 
The following forms are well-formed formulae: Vx 3y (P(x, y) ~ Q(x)) and 
-,3xP(x, c)AQ(f(x)). 
.-.·:.·:: 
:-:-::~·:· 
Defmition: First Order Language st, 
The first order language c:rJor a given alphabet consists of a set of all well-
formedformulae that can be constructed from the symbols in the alphabet. 
The scope of a quantifier is a well-formed formula to which it applies. For 
example, in 'Vx -,AvE, the scope of the quantifier V'Vx is -.AvE. Furthermore, 
consecutive quantifying occurrences of variables of the same nature can be 
attached to a single -quantifier. So, for example, Vx1 ... 'V:xn A can be abbreviated 
by 'Vxl···Xn A. 
Definition: Subformulae 
A subformula is defined as follows: 
• A is a subformula of a well-formed formula A, -,A, 'rtxA, and 3xA; and 
• A and Bare subformulae of well-formed formulae AAB, AvB, A~B and 
AHB. 
A subformula is also a well-formed formula. 
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The occurrence of a variable in a well-formed formula can be classified into 
two: bound and free. The scope of quantifiers determines the classes of variables. 
Definition: Bound and free occurrence 
An occurrence of a variable x is bound in a well-formed formula A if and 
only if it is either the variable of a quantifier, 'rtxA or 3xA, or it is the same 
variable that is quantified and is within the scope of the quantifier. Otherwise, the 
occurrence is said to be free in A. 
Definition: Free variables 
A variable x is said to be free or bound in a well-formed formula A if and 
only if it has a free or bound occurrence in the well-formed formula, respectively. 
It is possible that a variable may have both free and bound occurrences in a 
given well-formed formula. Therefore, a variable may be both free and bound in a 
well-formed formula. For example, in a well-formed formula A(x, y) ~ 'rtxB(x), 
the first occurrence of x is free, and the second and third are bound and the 
occurrence ofy in the well-formed formula is free. 
Definition: Terms free for variables 
A term t is free for a variable xi in a well-formed formula A if and only if no 
free occurrences of xi in A lie within the scope of quantifier, 'rtxy4 or 3x0. 
~~~~ 
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The defmition of "a term free for a variable11 is quite complicated. The idea 
is that a term t is free for a variable x unless there is a free occurrence of x within 
the scope of a quantifier binding a variable in t. For example, in a well-formed 
formula 
\ix3 (~3 (XJ> x2> x3) A \ix2 ~3 (f(x 1 ), x2, x3) A P11(x3)) 
a term f(g(c, x2)) is free for x2 and z but not for x1 since it is within the scope of 
binding variable x2 of the term f. 
The definition of free and bound variables makes clear that a bound variable 
of well-formed formula A is one that has only bound occurrences in A meanwhile a 
free variable of A is one that has free occurrences in A. That definition results in a 
set of free variables of a well-formed formula. Furthermore, well-formed formulae 
without a free variable have an important role in first order theory. They are called 
closed well-formed formulae. 
Definition: Set of free variables 
A set of.free variables of well-formed formula A is defined as follows: 
• FV (A) is the set of all free variables occurring in A, if it is an atomic 
formula; 
• FV(-.A) = FV(A); 
• FV(A) = FV(B)uFV(C), where A is either BAC, BvC, B-?C, or BHC; and 
• FV(A) = FV(B)- {x}, where A is either VxB or 3xB. 
The notion of free variables results in a well-formed formula called a closed 
well-formed formula. 
Definition: Closed well-formed formulae 
A closed well-formed formula A is a well-formed formula that has no free 
variable; i.e., FV(A) = 0, the empty set. A closed well-formed formula is also 
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called a sentence. 
Example: 
The well-formed formula Vx 3y (P(x, y)"' Q(x)) is closed but 3y (P(x, y)"' 
Q(x)) is not since the variable xis not a free occurrence. 
A closed well-formed formula can be obtained by adding a universal 
quantifier for every free variable occurring in a well-formed formula. This closed 
well-formed formula is called the universal closure of the well-formed formula. 
Definition: Universal closure 
The universal closure of a well-formed formula A whose FV (A) = { x 1, ••• , 
x0 } is oftheform: Vx1 ••• Vx0 A. 
Other important well-formed formulae are ground formulae. They have no 
occurrence of variables and can be obtained by substituting all variables occurring 
in well-formed formulae. 
Definition: Ground formula 
A well-formed formula A is ground if and only if it has no occurrence of 
variables. 
All propositional constant symbols are ground formulae. 
Example: 
P(f(ch ~)) ~ P(c1) is a ground formula, where ci is an individual constant 
symbol, for each i. 
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First Order Interpretation/Model 
Well-formed formulae have a meaning when an interpretation is applied to 
the symbols; that is the semantic part. First order theory is concerned with the 
formal description of the constructs that provide an interpretation for symbols of 
the language. Rules are given to check whether a particular construct correctly 
reflects the meaning of a given well-formed formula of the language. 
Definition: First order interpretation 
An interpretation of a well-formed formula or a set of well-formed 
formulae of first order language consists of: 
• A non-empty set D, called a domain of the interpretation; 
• An assignment to each n-ary function symbol t;" of ann-place operation 
closed over the domain D; i.e., ~: Dn ~ D; and. 
• An assignment to each n-ary predicate symbol ~n of an n-place relation on 
the domain D. 
Intuitively, the notion of interpretation is as follows. Given an 
interpretation, variables are thought of as ranging over its domain, and logical and 
quantifier symbols are given as their usual meaning. Furthermore, an n-ary 
relation in D can be thought of as a subset ofDn; i.e., the set ofn-tuples of 
elements of D. For example, if domain D is a set of integers, then the relation 
"less ~an" can be identified by the set of all ordered pairs (x, y) such that x $ y; 
I.e., 
R = {(x, y) I x $ y, where x, y e D} 
For a given interpretation, a closed well-formed formula stands for a proposition 
which is true or false whereas a well-formed formula with free variables represents 
a relation on the domain which may be true for some values in the domain of the 
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free variables and false for the others. For example, let a domain of an 
interpretation for a well-formed formula be the set of positive integers and P;n(y,z) 
be interpreted as y $ z. Then the well-formed formula P;n ( x1, x2 ) represents the 
relation x 1 :$; x2 which is satisfied by all the ordered pairs ( c 1 ,c2) of positive 
integers such that c1 :$; c2> and well-formed formula 3x2 V'x1 Pt(xpx2 ) is a true 
sentence; i.e., there is a smallest positive integer. Of course, if the domain is 
changed to the set of all integers, the well-formed formula will be false. 
For a given interpretation, the notions of satisfiability and truth of well-
formed formulae are in question. For that reason, the definition of satisfiability 
and truth will be given precisely. Doing that, we first construct a set 'L of 
denumerable sequences of elements of the domain D; i.e., 
L = { 0' = (db d2, ... ) I di E D} 
and then define the meaning of a sequence cr satisfying a well-formed formula A 
under the given interpretation. To do that, a function cr* will be defined. It is a 
function of one argument, with terms as arguments and values in the domain D, 
associated to cr. 
Since a term could be a variable symbol, an individual constant symbol, or 
a function symbol, cr* will be defined inductively. The function cr* is defined as 
the following. 
Definition: Interpretation for terms 
Let cr be a sequence in 'L and 0'* be an associated function of one argument 
applied to terms such that: 
• cr*(t) = bi, ift is a variable xi. So, a sequence CJ can be considered to be a 
symbol table, and 0'* applied to a variable simply assigns the associated value 
in the table; 
• cr*(t) = b, ift is an individual constant, where b is afzxed element ofD 
assigned by the interpretation; and 
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• cr*(('(tP ... ,tn)) = ('(cr•(tt), ... , cr*(tn)), if(' is an n-ary function symbol, 
where "P; is the corresponding operation in D assigned by the interpretation 
and tb ... , tn are terms. 
The function cr• is associated to the sequence cr. It maps a syntactic 
expression onto its intended value. In other words, for a sequence cr = (dt. db ... ) 
and a term t, cr*(t) is a value in D by substituting di for all occurrences of variable 
xi in t for each i, and then performing the corresponding operation of the 
interpretation to the function symbol f. So, if a sequence cr is considered as a 
symbol table containing values for variables in the language, then cr* is an 
interpreter that evaluates a term tin the context of the symbol table cr. 
Example: 
Let term t be f2(x3, f1(x1, c1)), the domain D of an interpretation be the set 
of integers, and c1 be the constant 10. Iff1 and f2 are assigned to integer addition 
and integer multiplication, respectively, then cr*(t) = d3 (d1 + 10) for any sequence 
of integers cr =(db d2> ... ). 
The previous definition provides a way of interpreting terms for a given 
interpretation. The next definition will provide a way of interpreting well-formed 
formulae for a given interpretation. 
Definition: Interpretation for well-formed formulae 
Let cr be a sequence of elements of a domain of an interpretation. A well-
formed formula A is interpreted as the following: 
• if A is an atomic formula and A is the corresponding relation in the 
interpretation, then cr satisfies A if and only if the n-tuple ( cr*( t 1 ), cr*( t2), ... , 
0"*( tn)) is in the relation A ; 
• if A = -J3, where B is a well-formed formula, then <J' satisfies A if and only if 
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a does not satisfy B; 
• if A = BAC, where B and C are well-formed formulae, then cr satisfies A if 
and only if cr satisfies both B and C; 
• if A= BvC, where Band Care well-formed formulae, then cr satisfies A if 
and only if a satisfies either B or C; 
• if A = B~C. where Band Care well-formed formulae, then cr satisfies A if 
and only if either a does not satisfy B or cr satisfies C; 
• if A= BHC, where Band Care well-formed formulae, then cr satisfies A if 
and only if cr satisfies both B~C and C~B; 
• if A is a well-formed formula, then cr satisfies Vxi A if and only if every 
sequence in :I: that differs from cr in at most the i-th component satisfies A; 
and 
• if A is a well-formed formula, then cr satisfies 3xi A if and only if there is a 
sequence in :I: that differs from cr in at most the i-th component satisfies A. 
Intuitively, a sequence cr =(db d2, ... ) satisfies a well-formed formula A if 
and only if, when di is substituted for all free occurrences of xi in A for every i, the 
resulting proposition is true under the given interpretation. 
Example: 
LetA be a well-formed formula P( xh x2) ~ Q(x1), the domain of an 
interpretation D be the set of integers and P(x, y) and Q(x) be interpreted as "x = 
y" and "x > 1," respectively. Therefore, the sequence cr = (2,3, ... ) satisfies A; i.e., 
"2 = 3" ~ "2 > I" is true. Furthermore, for any sequence in which the frrst 
element is greater than 1, the sequence will satisfy. However, the sequence cr = 
(1, I, ... ) does not. 
The definition above also applies to an individual propositional constant 
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symbol. For example, let P and Q be individual propositional constants interpreted 
as "Snow is white" and "Sugar is a hydrocarbon", respectively. Then, any 
sequence of elements of a domain of an interpretation satisfies the well-formed 
formula P AQ. 
Now, we define the truthness of a well-formed formula. 
Definition: 
A well-formed formula A is true for a given interpretation if and only if for 
every sequence cr in L, cr satisfies A. A is false if and only there is no sequence in 
L satisfying A. 
For a given interpretation, a well-formed formula is true if and only if it is 
true for all possible assignments of values for its free variables and it is false if and 
only if it is false for all possible assignments of values to its free variables. Thus, 
it is possible for a well-formed formula to be neither true nor false for a given 
interpretation. 
The following properties of well-formed formulae are direct consequences 
of the previous definition. All these properties can be easily proved. 
Corollary: 
The followings are some properties of well-formed formulae. 
• A is false for a given interpretation if and only if -,A is true for that 
interpretation. Furthermore, A is true if only if -,A is false. 
• A well-formed formula A is true for a given interpretation if and only if its 
closure is true for that interpretation; 
• If A is a closed well-formed formula, for a given interpretation either A is 
true or -,A is true. 
• If A and A ~ B are true for a given interpretation, so is B; A ~ B is false if 
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and only if A is true and B is false. 
The first property says that for a given interpretation, both a well-formed 
formula and its denial cannot be true at the same time. The second ensures that an 
arbitrary well-formed formula is true if and only if\ixiA is true. Since a well-
formed formula may be true for some interpretations and false for others, the next 
property insists that either a closed well-formed formula A is true or its denial is 
true, that is A is false. The last property is one of the most important results in first 
order theories. It is the modus ponens inference rule. 
Now we will present the notion of the logical validity of well-formed 
formulae and then define the relationship between two well-formed formulae 
called logical implication. 
Definition: Logically valid 
A well-formed formula A is said to be logically valid if and only if it is true 
in every interpretation. 
A well-formed formula A is logically valid if and only if it is true for every 
interpretation. Note that this definition requires A to be true in all interpretations. 
Therefore, it is possible that well-formed formulae may be satisfied but not true for 
any interpretation. These well-formed formulae are said to be satisfiable as 
defined by the following. 
Definition: Satisfiable 
A well-formed formula A is said to be satisfiable if and only if there is an 
interpretation such that A is satisfied by at least one sequence of elements of the 
domain of that interpretation. Otherwise, it is called unsatisfiable or 
contradictory. 
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Combining the last two definitions, we have 1) A is logically valid if and 
only if -,A is unsatisfiable; and 2) A is satisfiable if and only if -,A is not logically 
valid. Therefore, for a closed well-formed formula A, A is either true or false for 
any given interpretation. In other words, A is satisfied by all sequences in 1: or by 
none. Furthermore, A is satisfiable if and only if A is true for some interpretation. 
The next defmition will give the relationship of two well-formed formulae. 
This relationship is called to "logically imply". 
Definition: Logical implication 
Let A and B be well-formed formulae. A is said to logically imply B if and 
only if any sequence in L satisfying A also satisfies B. Furthermore, A and B are 
logically equivalent if and only if they logically imply each other. 
The definition of "logical implication" can be easily extended to a set of 
well-formed formulae. 
Definition: 
LetS be a set of well-formed formulae and A be a well-formed formula. S 
is said to logically imply A if and only if any sequence satisfying any well-formed 
formula in S also satisfies A for every interpretation. 
The following properties of well-formed formulae are simple consequences 
of the defmitions above. 
Corollary: 
Let A and B be well-formed formulae. 
• A logically implies B if and only if A ~ B is logically valid. 
• A and B are logically equivalent if and only if A H B is logically valid. 
• If A is a logical consequence of a setS ofwell-formed formulae, and any 
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well-formed formula inS is true in a given interpretation, so is A. 
First Order Proof 
In the previous section, the symbols and the well-formed formulae of a first 
order language are presented. Then, to those well-formed formulae, we define an 
interpretation. To get a complete formal theory, we need to furnish the theory with 
the axioms and rules of inferences. Since there are numerous theories, in this 
paper we will follow the Church framework. 
In the Church framework, there are five axioms and two rules of inferences. 
Those axioms and rules are given below. 
Definition: First order theory 
First order theory T consists of a set of well-formed formulae of .first order 
language <;{_gver an alphabet, a set of axioms, and a set of rules of the following: 
• A set of axioms is schemas: (A, B, and Care well-formed formulae ofT) 
(Al) A --7 (B --7 A) 
(A2) (A --7 (B --7 C)) --7 ((A --7 B) (A --7 C)) 
(A3) (-J3 --7 -.A) --7 ((-.B --7 A) --7 B) 
(A4) ('•:ixi A(xi)) --7 A(t), if A(xi) is a well-formed formula and tis a term 
free for xi in A(xJ Note that ift is Xj, we have the axioms 'Vxi A(xi) 
--7 A(Xj). 
(AS) (\fxi A --7 B) --7 (A --7 \fxiB), if A is well-formed formula such that xi 
FV(A). 
• A set of rules of inferences: (A and Bare well-formed formulae ofT): 
(Rl) Modus ponens: A, A --7 B ~ B 
That is, B follows from A and A --7 B. 
(R2) Generalization: A ~ \fxA 
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That is, 'dxAfollowsfrom A. 
The Church axiomatization for first order theory T does not have a set of 
proper (or non-logical) axioms. 
An instance of a schema is a well-formed formula obtained from the 
schema by substitution. For example, an instance of the axiom schema Al is 
('ifx1 P/(xt)) ~ ('dx1 3x2 ~2(Xt> x2) ~ Vx1 P/(x1)) 
with A and Bas well-formed formulae Vx1 P11(x1) and Vx1 3x2 ~2 (xt> x2), 
respectively. 
A model for first order theory T is an interpretation in which all the axioms 
ofT are true. Therefore, the rules of inferences such as modus ponens and 
generalization can be applied to well-formed formulae. Such rules are truth 
preserving. So, if the application of these rules to well-formed formulae in a given 
interpretation is true, the results are also true. In other words, every theorem of a 
first order theory Tis true in any model ofT. This can be guaranteed due to 
properties of well-formed formulae for a given interpretation. 
The purpose of the logical axioms of a first order theory S is to ensure that 
all logical consequences ofT are precisely the theorems ofT. Especially, all 
theorems of a first order theory Tare those well-formed formulae ofT that are 
logically valid. 
In applying of A4 and AS, we need extra care. That is, if term tis not free 
for xi in a well-formed formula A, applying A4 would get an unexpected result. 
For example, letA be a well-formed formula -,Vx2 ~2(xl> x2), and lett be x2. An 
instance of A4 with A will result in 
(Vx1 -,Vx2 ~2(x.,x2)) ~ -,Vx2 ~2(X2,x2). 
Consider an interpretation whose domain has at least two distinct elements and the 
predicate Pl2 is interpreted as the identity relation. Therefore, vx.(-,Vx2 P(Xt.X2)) 
is true but ....., Vx2 P(x2,x2) is not. So, the instance does not result in a logically valid 
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well-formed formula because the term tis not free for x1• 
This is the right place to make some important notes. A schema is a 
statement form. It provides a template to form a well-formed formula while 
leaving some parts unspecified. The unspecified parts use "meta-variables" which 
do not belong to first order language. In this paper, the distinctions between meta-
variables and variable are kept in the notation. The symbols P with superscript and 
subscript belong to the first order language. Sometimes, symbols like P, Q, and R 
are used instead. They are well-formed formulae. On the other hand, symbols like 
A, B, and C belong to the meta-language of first order logic denoting well-formed 
formulae. Notice that symbols used for meta-language are italic. Moreover, 
symbols like x, y, and z are sometimes used for individual variables instead of 
unwieldy supercripted and subscripted symbols whereas symbols a, b, and c are 
sometimes used for individual constants for the same reason. 
When seeking suitable premises of an inference rule, the axiom schemas 
can be used since they define some laws. Therefore, an instance of an axiom 
schema is a consequence of the theory. 
The notion of theorems and consequences in first order theory is defined in 
terms of a proof, that is a fmite sequence of well-formed formulae. The last 
element of the sequence is the consequence. The other elements of the sequence 
are either a sentence, an instance of an axiom schema, or the results from 
application of one rule of inference: modus ponens and generalization. 
Definition: Proof 
A proof in a first order theory T is a finite sequence Ao, A 1, ... , A0 of well-
formedformulae such that, for each i, either Ai is an instance of an axiom schema 
ofT or it is a result from an application of either generalization to Aj where j < i 
or modus ponens to Aj and Ak where j, k < i. 
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Defmition: Theorems 
A well-formed formula A is a theorem of a first order theory S if and only if 
there is a proof such that the last element of the proof is A; that is, A= An. Such a 
proof is called a proof of A. 
Definition: Consequences 
A well-formed formula A is said to be a consequence of a set S in a first 
order theory T if and only if there is a finite sequence A0, A b ... ,An of well-formed 
formulae such that A =An and for each i, either Ai inS, it is an instance of an 
axiom schema ofT or it is a direct consequence by rule of inference of some of the 
preceding well-formed formulae in the sequence. Such a sequence is called a 
proof or a deduction of A from S, denoted A e Thr(S), and S is called the 
hypothesis or premises of the proof 
Thr(S) is the set of well-formed formulae in T that are consequences in T 
from S. It includes all well-formed formulae in S. If a well-formed formula A is 
in Thr(S), it is said to be derived or deduced in T from S, denoted S ~A and 
Thr(S) = {A IS ~A}. It is also called the deductive closure in T ofS. 
Of course, a set S can be a first order theory itself. That is, S = T. In this 
case, the subscript T in the Th can be omitted. Furthermore, if S is a set of closed 
well-formed formulae, then Thr(S) is the set of closed well-formed formulae in T 
that can be derived from S. 
The notion of the deductive closure of a first order theory results in the 
concept of consistency. It characterizes whether all sentences are in a theory. 
Definition: Consistency 
A first order theory S is inconsistent if and only ifTh(S) contains all well-
formedformulae of the language. Otherwise, Sis consistent. A setS' of well-
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formed formulae is consistent with S if and only if their union is consistent. 
Properties of First Order Theory 
In this section, we will present some fundamental properties of first order 
theory. Proofs of these properties will not be given and can be found in numerous 
references such as Mendelson, 1964. 
The following properties are useful in the study of nonmonotonic theories. 
Theorem: Idempotence for first order theory 
LetT be a first order theory. Then, Thy(Thr(S)) = Th-y{S). 
Theorem: Deduction theorem for first order theory 
LetT be a first order theory. If A and Bare closed well-formed formulae, 
then S u {A} rB if and only ifS rA ~B. 
This theorem says that if there is a proof of B from S u {A} if and only if 
there is a proof of A ~ B from S. As previously noted, an instance of A4 and AS 
for arbitrary well-formed formulae may bring an unpleasant result. This can 
happen if the term t is not free for the variable being substituted. Therefore, it is 
important that both A and B be closed well-formed formulae. 
Theorem: Soundness of first order theory 
If a closed well-formed formula A is a consequence of a first order theory S, 
then A is true in all models of S. 
Theorem: Completeness of first order theory 
If a closed well-formed formula A is true in all models of a first order 
theory S, then A is a consequence of S. 
:-:-:-:·:~· 
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Theorem: Undecidability of first order theory 
There is no decision procedure for a first order theory. 
Theorem: Semi-decidability of first order theory 
There is a proof procedure for a first order theory that provides a proof of a 
sentence entailed by the theory in a finite number of steps and a finite amount of 
time. 
Theorem: Compactness of first order theory 
A first order theory S has a model if and only if every finite subset of S has 
a model. 
Theorem: 
A closed well-formed formula A can be deduced from a first order theory S 
if and only if there is a finite subset T of S such that T r A. 
·:::::. 
·:.·.:::. 
The notion of a proof of a well-formed formula from a first order theory S 
lets the system employing first order theory deduce using axiom schemas and rules 
of inferences. 
To close the discussion of first order theory, an example of a proof will be 
gtven. 
Example: 
' Prove that {\fx A -+B} r \fx A -t \fx B, for X is not a free occurrence. 
1. (\fxA-+B) -t (A-t B) A4 
2. \fx(A -t B) hypothesis 
3. A-tB modus ponens I and 2 
4. VxA hypothesis 
5. \fxA -tA A4 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
A 
B 
'VxB 
'VxA -t 'VxB 
modus ponens 4 and 5 
modus ponens 3 and 6 
generalization 7 
deduction theorem 4 and 8 
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